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Abstract
Gaining autonomy is a key aspect of growing up. However, little is known about how children
engage cognitive control in an autonomous (or self-directed) fashion to achieve goals. The aim
of this dissertation is to better understand the cognitive processes supporting self-directed control
development, examining in particular the potentially prominent role of goal identification. In a
first study, we disentangle task selection and task execution by adapting the double registration
procedure for use with children, and explore whether these processes follow a similar or different
developmental trajectory and to what extent they are influenced by task self-directedness regarding
performance costs. We show that task selection development lags behind task execution develop-
ment, task selection yields both mixing and switch costs whilst task execution yields switch costs
only, and that both task selection and task execution are affected by task self-directedness. In a
second study, we adapt a paradigm widely used in the adult literature to investigate self-directed
control, the voluntary task-switching paradigm, and explore task selection development and the
contributions of proactive and reactive control to this form of control. Our results indicate both
younger and older children struggle with task selection as compared to adults, and that reactive and
proactive control may be related to self-directed control. Further, younger children did not struggle
to switch tasks, indicating that switching per se is unlikely to be the main source of difficulty for
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children when engaging cognitive control. In a last study, we specifically target and disentangle
context-tracking and task selection by varying the difficulty on each process in two experiments.
We find that, although both processes contribute to self-directed control performance, progress with
age is mostly associated with improvements in context-tracking. These results are then discussed
and leads to the elaboration of a tentative theoretical model of self-directed control development.




When growing up as a child, we progressively engage behaviours during activities from being
supervised by adults to being on our own. In other words, we are required to become more and
more autonomously with age to achieve our goals. This is particularly the case at school where we
are increasingly expected to successfully prepare a school exam by deciding by ourselves which
relevant course materials have to be studied. To achieve this task, we need to goal-directedly
regulate our thoughts and actions in an autonomous manner without. Although, this behaviour
may become increasingly critical for academic achievement, little is known about how what are the
cognitive processes and how they develop during childhood. Indeed, research on cognitive control
development has mainly focused on situations where its engagement is externally driven about
the goal to attain. Identifying goals without help is therefore more challenging without external
help. The objective of this dissertation is to better understand how goals are identified in such
situations and what are the underlying cognitive processes that are subject to age-related progress
in self-directed control, in order to propose a theoretical framework to guide future research and
the development of training programmes promoting autonomous behaviours during childhood.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In our daily lives, we constantly engage cognitive control, the goal-directed regulation of thoughts,
actions and emotions (Miller & Cohen, 2001), in various contexts to achieve goals, the mental
representations of an intention to perform an action, complete a task, or reach a state (Altmann &
Trafton, 2002). For instance, when commuting to work, one needs to engage cognitive control if
a car crash drastically slows down the traffic in order to be at work on time. More specifically,
this situation requires updating and manipulating the new information of a car crash, inhibiting the
usual itinerary and switching to a faster one to reach the goal. These actions map onto the three
main components of cognitive control according to Miyake et al. (2000) seminal model which are
working memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility, respectively (see also Friedman & Miyake,
2017).
Cognitive control is also critical for school-work activities, for instance, ignoring sources of
distractions and staying on task while working on homework or studying for exams (e.g., watching
TV). and its development during childhood is one of the best predictors for later life successes
and academic achievement (e.g., Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Moffitt et al., 2011; Samuels, Tour-
naki, Blackman, & Zilinski, 2016). Cognitive control protracted development is driven by complex
changes in the underlying cognitive processes such as a progressive differentiation of its main ex-
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ecutive components (Miyake et al., 2000) from middle to late childhood (e.g., Brydges, Fox, Reid,
& Anderson, 2014; Wiebe, Espy, & Charak, 2008), or an increasing ability to flexibly engage a
reactive mode of control (i.e., engaging cognitive control in the moment it is needed) or a proactive
mode of control (engaging cognitive control in anticipation to upcoming demands; Braver, 2012)
depending of the situation (e.g., Chatham, Frank, & Munakata, 2009; Chevalier, James, Wiebe,
Nelson, & Espy, 2014; Chevalier, Martis, Curran, & Munakata, 2015; Lucenet & Blaye, 2014;
Niebaum, Chevalier, Guild, & Munakata, 2019) These cognitive changes are also accompanied by
important neural changes with an increasingly focal prefrontal activity, and a segregation and in-
tegration of fronto-parietal networks (e.g., Chevalier et al., 2015; Durston et al., 2006; Fair et al.,
2009)
Given the goal-directed nature of cognitive control, identifying the goal that one has to reach is
key to successfully guide behaviour (e.g., on Thursday children will not look at the day ‘Monday’
on their homework book if they ignore their goal is to do their homework in advance because
they will not have the time to do it during the weekend). Indeed, recent research has shown that
goal identification is one of the main factors driving cognitive control development and children
progressively improve in their ability to identify and achieve goals (Chevalier, 2015). For instance,
in the classroom, when the teacher asks a question that children want to answer (i.e., goal), they
have to inhibit their wish to be the first to talk (i.e., inappropriate action) and raise their hand to wait
for their turn (i.e., appropriate action), but they also might have to keep track of what other children
say in order to adapt their answer. While younger children often start talking without raising their
hand and need to be externally driven by explicit reminders from the teacher in order to adaptively
engage such cognitive control, older children progressively exert cognitive control in a more self-
directed fashion with (or without) increasingly subtle reminders from the teacher to raise their hand
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before talking. Moreover, most of the personal work required to prepare for a school test is less
explicitly guided by teachers or parents as children move up across school grades, hence leading to
greater demands on what particular course materials to study and when and how to study them.
It is therefore crucial to better understand what are the cognitive processes underlying the de-
velopment of self-directed control (i.e., when control is engaged without or few external aids) for
both theoretical and educational purposes. Indeed, self-directed control remains largely under-
researched (for a review, see Barker & Munakata, 2015), as opposed to externally-driven control
(i.e., when control engagement is driven by environmental cues; for reviews see Best & Miller,
2010; Wiebe & Karbach, 2017), and its better understanding has the potential to significantly en-
hance our general theoretical comprehension of cognitive control. Moreover, although externally
driven control has been identified to strongly influence school performance (e.g., Fair et al., 2009),
self-directed control is also bound to substantially impact children’s lives and academic achieve-
ment, and perhaps more than externally driven control, as school activities become increasingly
self-directed as children move up school grades. Consequently, gaining a better understanding of
self-directed control may also help develop more fine-grained training programmes aiming to im-
prove cognitive control engagement during school-learning activities, as so far these programmes
have only focused on externally-driven control (for a review, see Kirk, Gray, Riby, & Cornish,
2015).
1 Externally-driven control versus self-directed control: A dis-
sociation or a continuum?
The transition between externally-driven control and self-directed control has been identified as
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one the major three transitions in cognitive control development (Munakata, Snyder, & Chatham,
2012). The notion of self-directed control, and its dissociation with externally-driven control, re-
lates back to the distinction between ill-structured and well-structured tasks initially proposed by
Reitman (1964) who classified problem solving tasks based on the amount of information available
regarding three vectors which are the start state, the goal state and the transformation function.
Typically, in ill-structured (i.e., self-directed) tasks, these vectors are incompletely specified but
completely specified in well-structured (i.e., externally-driven) tasks (see Goel, 1995; Goel & Graf-
man, 2000). As noted by Goel and Grafman (2000), two planning tasks such as the Tower of Hanoi
and preparing lunch for friends are intrinsically different when it comes to their self-directedness.
Indeed, the Tower of Hanoi has no self-directedness demand, with a clear start state (i.e., discs in
a stack in ascending order of size on rod A), goal state (i.e., discs in a stack in the same ascending
order of size on rod C) and a transformation function driven by specific rules (i.e., only one disc
can be moved at a time, each move consists of taking the upper disc from one stack to be placed on
the top of another stack and no disc can be placed on top of a smaller disc). Conversely, preparing
lunch for friends has a high self-directedness demand, with a vague start state (e.g., time needed)
and goal state (e.g., excellent or average meal) with a permissive transformation function (e.g., use
of fresh or frozen ingredients). Thus, beyond the fact that there is only one way to successfully
complete the Tower of Hanoi and several ways to prepare lunch for friends, one of the key distinc-
tions between these two tasks is that individuals are externally-driven about what to do and when
to do it when performing the Tower of Hanoi, whereas they are completely free to decide what to
do and when to do it when preparing lunch for friends.
At a first glance, externally-driven control and self-directed control may be viewed as two
distinct forms of control, as it is the case for reactive control and proactive control (Braver, 2012).
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For instance, this dissociation can be illustrated with the difference in nature between deductive
tasks (i.e., when rules are explicitly stated) such as in the Dimensional Change Card Test (DCCS;
Zelazo, 2006) and inductive tasks (i.e., when rules need to be inferred) such as in the Flexible Item
Selection Task (FIST; Jacques & Zelazo, 2001). In DCCS, individuals have to sort bi-dimensional
cards (e.g., blue rabbit) according to their colour or their shape based on explicit cues that indicate
to which dimension the cards have to be sorted. In contrast, in FIST, individuals have to first select
two bi-dimensional cards out of three that match each other (e.g., same colour) before inferring that
they have to select two new cards out of three according to the other dimension (e.g., same shape)
based on the previous demonstration on how to sort cards by an experimenter. As such, whereas
in DCCS individuals are externally-driven by cues, in FIST individuals need to infer the rule of
selecting two cards having the same dimension and then switch by selecting the cards that have
the same other dimension, thus relying on self-directed control. Interestingly, in children, flexible
performance is observed around 4-years-old (Marcovitch, Boseovski, Knapp, & Kane, 2010) while
such performance is attained around 5-years-old (Jacques & Zelazo, 2001), suggesting that FIST is
more challenging than DCCS and the development of self-directed control lags behind of externally
driven control, or in other words that cognitive control engagement is more challenging when it is
self-directed than when it is externally driven in childhood.
However, self-directed cognitive tasks actually vary in degrees of self-directedness, especially
through the different amount of information provided by the start state, the goal state and the
transformation function (Reitman, 1964). Consider for instance the Verbal Fluency task (Troyer,
Moscovitch, & Winocur, 1997) and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948),
which are two examples of self-directed tasks. In the Verbal Fluency, individuals have to say as
many items from a particular category (e.g., animals) as possible within a minute. To maximise
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their performance, individuals should use the efficient strategy of grouping their responses into the
same semantic subcategory (e.g., animals from the farm: ‘pig, chicken, sheep, cow, duck. . . ’) and
to self-directedly detect when a switch from one subcategory to another is needed and to which
subcategory (e.g., from farm animals to zoo animals). In WCST, individuals have to sort cards
according to sorting dimensions (colour, forms or number of geometrical figures) that have to be
endogenously inferred from external feedback ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ given by the experimenter.
Critically, switching is entirely self-generated and decided by individuals in the Verbal Fluency task
whilst it is in part externally driven by feedback from the experimenter in WCST, although children
must select on their own which task to perform on each trial. Therefore, the Verbal Fluency is more
self-directly demanding than WCST in terms of task selection demands, suggesting the existence
of different layers of self-directedness on a continuum ranging from self-directed and externally
driven control in which goal identification plays a key role (Munakata et al., 2012; White, Burgess,
& Hill, 2009).
2 Role of goal identification in self-directed control
Self-directedness demands vary hand in hand with goal identification demands. Even in situa-
tions in which cognitive control is externally-driven, goal identification is key to efficient cognitive
control engagement (Broeker et al., 2018; Chevalier, 2015). In particular, goal identification is
often achieved through contextual cues (e.g., tapping foot from parents to indicate to turn off the
TV) that guide which relevant behaviour to select and engage (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Yet, chil-
dren have difficulties to process cues and use this information to select the most relevant task in
situations where they have to switch between multiple tasks (Chevalier & Blaye, 2009; Chevalier,
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Huber, Wiebe, & Espy, 2013). They are better at switching tasks after practicing cue identification
(Chevalier, Chatham, & Munakata, 2014; Kray, Gaspard, Karbach, & Blaye, 2013) or when cues
are easier to process (Chevalier & Blaye, 2009). Cue processing progressively improves with age,
resulting in increasingly successful task selection and, more broadly, cognitive control (Chevalier,
2015).
However, goal identification is particularly difficult when cognitive control is self-directed, as
there is no external support to drive what to do and when. To date, very little is known about how
children engage cognitive control in self-directed situations. Indeed, only a few developmental
studies have explored this question, mainly due to the difficulty of design tasks in which control
must be engaged in a self-directed manner (Barker & Munakata, 2015). These studies (Barker
et al., 2014; Snyder & Munakata, 2010, 2013) have exclusively used the Verbal Fluency task and
observed that although younger children spontaneously generate only a couple of items from one
sub-category (e.g., cat, dog, rabbit, bird), they generate more items and switch more often between
sub-categories when given pre-task reminders (e.g., ‘a cat is a pet’ or ‘a lion is a zoo animal’), that
reduce high goal identification demands (i.e., choices between multiple competing subcategories).
Therefore, reducing goal identification demands seems critical for successful task performance in
young children, perhaps even more so than switching per se. However, it remains unknown how
children engage self-directed control in non-linguistic situations as linguistic ability might be a
confound with self-directed performance in the Verbal Fluency task (i.e., better performance might
be more linked with better linguistic capacities than self-directed capacities per se). Moreover, the
Verbal Fluency task offers very little room for experimental manipulations, and therefore appears as
a relatively poor tool to explore goal identification processes in self-directed control development.
A better tool, as discussed in the next section, is the task-switching paradigm.
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3 Assessing self-directed control with task-switching paradigms
Cognitive control has been investigated with a large variety of experimental paradigms that re-
quire individuals to inhibit irrelevant goals, update relevant goals in working memory or switch
relevant goals. One of the most widely used paradigms to assess cognitive control is the task-
switching paradigm (for reviews, see Grange & Houghton, 2014; Koch, Poljac, Müller, & Kiesel,
2018) in which participants are instructed to perform two (or sometimes more) simple tasks, A and
B, either in single blocks in which they perform each task separately or in mixed blocks in which
they have to switch back and forth between task A and task B, therefore switching between one rel-
evant goal to another. This design allows for the computation of two types of costs, namely mixing
and switch costs (Peng, Kirkham, & Mareschal, 2018; Rubin & Meiran, 2005). Mixing costs are
computed by contrasting between single-task trials in single blocks and task repetition trials from
the mixed block, and index the difficulty of identifying the relevant task when tasks are mixed (or
the ability to maintain two tasks and select the relevant one). Switch costs contrast between task
repetition trials and task switch trials from the mixed block and index the cost of task-switching
per se. Past research has used three main versions of the task-switching paradigm which are the
cued task-switching paradigm (when the task-switching rule is externally-driven by environmen-
tal cues; Meiran, 1996), the alternating-runs task-switching paradigm (Rogers & Monsell, 1995),
and the voluntary task-switching paradigm (VTS; Arrington & Logan, 2004), but only the last two
paradigms specifically target self-directed control as they provide no environmental information
such as task cues, response feedback or common stimulus features to determine when and what
goal to switch to, such as in cued task-switching paradigms.
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3.1 Alternating-runs task-switching paradigm
The alternating-runs task-switching paradigm was first introduced by Rogers and Monsell (1995).
In this paradigm, individuals are required to perform one task (Task A) twice and then switch to
another task (Task B), therefore following a trial by trial sequence such as AA-BB-AA-BB and so
forth. Although the initial experiment by Rogers and Monsell (1995) did not use any task cues, in
every trial, the target stimulus rotated in a clockwise direction on a 2 by 2 table, and the stimuli
from the two top positions referred to Task A and the stimuli from the two bottom positions referred
to Task B. As such, individuals could identify the task that had to be performed on each trial based
on the location of the stimulus, which acted as an environmental cue that facilitated task selection.
Nevertheless, in subsequent studies on adults (e.g., Altmann, 2007; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000;
Wylie & Allport, 2000) and the few done on children (Dauvier, Chevalier, & Blaye, 2012; Kray
et al., 2013), no such information was provided. This made task selection particularly challeng-
ing as participants have to rely on internal cues to select the relevant task on each trial and have
to update what is the relevant task in working memory, by keeping track of the current position
in the task sequence. Therefore, participants need to memorise and use the information related
to the immediately preceding trials (e.g., if Task A has just been performed twice, Task B is now
relevant). Comparing performance on the cued task-switching paradigm and the alternating-runs
task-switching paradigm, Altmann (2007) reported that switch costs were larger in the latter than
in the former paradigm.
In children, Dauvier et al. (2012) observed that most 5-year-olds can successfully update task
goals and switch tasks accordingly, although performance decreased across trials due to growing
interference from accumulating traces from past trials, suggesting that working memory (alongside
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with other potential factors, e.g., backward inhibition) underlies updating and maintaining task-
related goals, that help the task selection process. In another study using the alternating-runs task-
switching paradigm, Kray et al. (2013) compared 8-10 year-olds and 11-13 year-olds and observed
that mixing costs were partly greater for the younger age group than for the older age group for
reaction times (RTs), although this difference disappeared for accuracy rates, indicating that task
selection was harder for younger children than older children. Interestingly, smaller mixing costs
were observed for both age groups when children received verbal self-cueing and spatial cue tasks,
hence reducing the costs of task selection.
3.2 Voluntary task-switching paradigm
Another paradigm particularly relevant to investigate goal identification, and more particularly
one of its main theoretical components, which is task selection in a self-directed situation, is VTS
(Arrington & Logan, 2004). This procedure is considered as the gold standard assessment of
self-directed control in adults and engages the prefrontal cortex more than other task-switching
paradigms (Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & Von Cramon, 2006). VTS requires individuals to self-
directedly choose which task to perform between two tasks on each trial, with the instructions to
select the tasks equally often and randomly. Yet, similar to other task-switching paradigms (e.g.,
Meiran, 1996), task performance is worse in task switch trials than in task repetition trials, and
therefore switch costs are observed, especially in terms of RTs (for reviews, see Kiesel et al., 2010;
Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). In addition, as adults are asked to select both
tasks equally often in a random order, this should result in an equal number of task repetition and
task switch trials. However, they show a repetition bias (i.e., repeating the task they have just
done more often than switching to the other task), quantified by a probability of switching, noted
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p(switch), lower than the optimal score of .5 (around .44), indicating that task selection is par-
ticularly effortful and difficult (for a review, see Grange & Houghton, 2014). Interestingly, the
repetition bias seems to follow a U-shape pattern with age, as adolescents and elderly people show
a stronger repetition bias than adults (Butler & Weywadt, 2013; Poljac, Haartsen, van der Cruijsen,
Kiesel, & Poljac, 2018; Terry & Sliwinski, 2012).
Enough time to prepare for the next trial is important to successfully engaging cognitive control,
as evidenced by a smaller repetition bias (higher p(switch)), when participants are given a longer
preparation time before stimulus onset (Arrington & Logan, 2005; Butler, Arrington, & Weywadt,
2011; Butler & Weywadt, 2013; Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 2009; Yeung, 2010).
Longer preparation times allow adults to select the next task through the representativeness heuris-
tic, which consists of selecting a task after maintaining a sequence of previously performed tasks in
working memory and comparing it with an internal concept of randomness before stimulus onset,
hence suggesting that a process like context-tracking might be at play in goal identification. Alter-
natively, the next task to be performed can be selected via the availability heuristic, which consists
of selecting after stimulus onset the task that has just been done. Contrary to the representativeness
heuristic, the availability heuristic requires no preparation time but leads to more task repetitions
(Arrington & Logan, 2005), whereas enough time to prepare favoured the representativeness heuris-
tic over the availability heuristic. Interestingly, these heuristics map onto the distinction between
proactive control and reactive control (Braver, 2012), respectively. Concurrent working memory
load leads to more task repetitions in VTS (Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 2010; Weaver
& Arrington, 2010), potentially because it impedes the use of proactive control, which strongly
relies on working memory capacities (Marklund & Persson, 2012). However, working memory
capacities per se seem to not be related to task selection (Butler et al., 2011). This indicates that
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task selection is largely driven by factors that increase demands on top-down processes, such as
time preparation.
However, task selection can be also influenced by other factors tapping on bottom-up processes.
For instance, when off-setting the onset timing between the presentations of two stimuli in VTS
(also referred to as stimulus onset asynchrony), individuals are biased to choose the task associated
with the first stimulus that appears (i.e., either a digit for even/odd classification or a letter for con-
sonant/vowel classification; Arrington, 2008). However, this bias is reduced when the preparation
time is increased, suggesting that preparation time could buffer against the bottom-up influence
of stimulus availability. Stimulus identity also influences task selection as individuals tend to per-
form the task associated with a particular stimulus at its first experimental exposure during practice
trials (Arrington, Weaver, & Pauker, 2010; Demanet, Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck,
2010). These different biases in task selection seem to convey the message that individuals have
a preference for minimising effort (see also Arrington & Yates, 2009; Lien & Ruthruff, 2008;
Mayr & Bell, 2006), which is consistent with other non-VTS studies on cognitive effort in adults
that used different paradigms (e.g., Demand Selection Tasks (DSTs) or Cognitive Effort Discount-
ing (COG-ED)) to show that individuals tend to avoid cognitive demand Kool, McGuire, Rosen,
and Botvinick (2010); Westbrook, Kester, and Braver (2013); Westbrook, Lamichhane, and Braver
(2019). Although most VTS research has used two tasks with similar difficulty (i.e., magnitude
or parity judgements on numbers; Arrington, Reiman, & Weaver, 2014), some other research has
varied the difficulty between the two tasks (e.g., Stroop word reading (easy) and colour naming
(difficult) tasks), and showed that this variation greatly influences task selection with a tendency to
repeat the difficult task more than the easy task (e.g., Liefooghe et al., 2010; Millington, Poljac, &
Yeung, 2013; Yeung, 2010). This indicates that it is hard to switch from a difficult task to an easy
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task whereas it is fairly straightforward to switch from an easy task to a difficult task. According
to these authors, this effect is due to between task interference in which participants perform the
weaker task activated in working memory (i.e., the harder task) because it is difficult to switch
from this task to the task that is strongly activated (i.e., the easier task), leading them to surpris-
ingly perform the weaker and more difficult task. This idea is related to the common interpretation
of asymmetrical switch costs in which, when two tasks have unequal difficulty, the cost is greater
when switching to the easiest task than when switching to the hardest task (Ellefson, Shapiro, &
Chater, 2006).
Furthermore, a variant of VTS is the double registration procedure that temporally disentan-
gles task selection and task execution by using a task selection prompt (e.g., a question mark)
preceding the task execution target (Arrington & Logan, 2005). Therefore, individuals make two
responses on each trial, first they enter a response just to select the task and then they enter a sec-
ond response to execute it. The handful of adult studies using the double registration procedure
showed that task selection and task execution are distinct process differently affected by individ-
ual and contextual factors. For instance, different working memory capacities did not influence
p(switch) whereas higher working memory capacities led to smaller switch costs RTs (Butler et al.,
2011), reward receipt did not influence p(switch) but led to faster RTs and more accurate responses
(Fröber, Pfister, & Dreisbach, 2019) and larger task selection costs were observed when switching
to the more difficult task, whereas greater task execution costs were observed when switching to
the easier task (Millington et al., 2013). Some other research has highlighted a more complex re-
lationship between task selection and task execution with higher p(switch) associated with smaller
task execution switch costs (Mittelstädt, Dignath, Schmidt-Ott, & Kiesel, 2018) and lowerp(switch)
associated with greater task execution demands (Orr, Carp, & Weissman, 2012).
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Despite extensive research using VTS in adults, VTS has never been used with children whereas
it has the potential to shed light on how self-directed control develops across childhood.
4 Aim of the dissertation
The overarching aim of this dissertation will be to identify and understand the cognitive pro-
cesses that support the development of self-directed control in order to propose a tentative the-
oretical model of this form of control. Self-directed control is largely under-researched in the
developmental literature, with the exception of a handful of studies (Barker et al., 2014; Snyder &
Munakata, 2010, 2013), as opposed to externally-driven control (Best & Miller, 2010; Wiebe &
Karbach, 2017). A better understanding of self-directed control development and its age-related
cognitive processes has the potential to enhance our general comprehension of cognitive control
but also allow finer-grained training programme development, aiming to improve its engagement
beyond the scope of programmes developed so far as they have only targeted externally-driven
control (e.g., Kirk et al., 2015). This can have strong educational implications as similarly to
externally-driven control which has been identified to have a major impact on school performance
(e.g., Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Lawson & Farah, 2017; Samuels et al., 2016), self-directed con-
trol is also bound to substantially impact children’s lives and academic achievement, and perhaps
more than externally-driven control, as school activities become increasingly self-directed (i.e.,
relying on autonomous behaviours) as children move up school grades.
Task selection, which is a key sub-process of goal identification, and task execution are two
constructs of cognitive control engagement, which have been conceptually and empirically distin-
guished in adult studies (Fröber et al., 2019; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Millington et al., 2013; Mit-
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telstädt et al., 2018). More specifically, task selection has been identified to drive externally-driven
control development (Chevalier, 2015). However, the demands of this component are particularly
costly in situations where no external aids are provided, namely in self-directed situations, confer-
ring potentially a greater role of task selection, but not of task execution, in self-directed control.
As such, in Chapter 2, I will adapt the double registration procedure (Arrington & Logan, 2005)
with children to identify task selection, and not task execution, as the key component on which
the demands vary as regards self-directedness, with a higher demand for the former than the latter
form of control across childhood. More precisely, task selection should be mastered later in the
development under high self-directedness demands than under low self-directedness whereas task
execution should be proficient relatively early in development independently of self-directedness
demands.
In Chapter 3, I will focus more especially on task selection in self-directed development and
to examine how/if this component changes with age. To this aim, the first step will be to develop
a child-friendly paradigm that assesses directly task selection, namely VTS, which is the gold
standard paradigm targeting task selection in adults (Arrington & Logan, 2004; Arrington et al.,
2014). Task selection in VTS is particularly demanding as individuals have to self-directly (i.e.,
without the help of environmental cues or memorised sequences) select which task to perform
between two tasks with the instructions to perform them about equally often and in a random
fashion. I will then use VTS with children to investigate the age-related processes associated with
task selection in self-directed control development.
First of all, previous adult research has shown that p(switch), the main measure assessing task
selection in VTS, increases near to the optimal performance of .5 under longer preparation time
suggesting that time is needed for adults to perform well on VTS (Arrington & Logan, 2005; But-
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ler et al., 2011; Butler & Weywadt, 2013; Liefooghe et al., 2009; Yeung, 2010). More specifically,
longer preparation time may encourage the use of the representativeness heuristic whereas shorter
preparation time may drive the use of the availability heuristic, which map respectively onto the
distinction between reactive control and proactive control (Braver, 2012). Indeed, previous devel-
opmental research has shown that 5-years-old children essentially use a reactive form of control
when engaging cognitive control and progressively engage adaptively either a reactive or a proac-
tive form of control depending on the situation (e.g., Chevalier et al., 2015; Doebel et al., 2017;
Niebaum et al., 2019). As such, one might expect younger children to mostly rely on reactive con-
trol, and use the availability heuristic, independently of the time preparation duration. Conversely,
older children and adults would rely more on reactive control under short time preparation but more
on proactive control under long time preparation, and use the representativeness heuristic. As such,
p(switch) would be overall lower for younger children than other age groups, but this measure
would remain the same under short or long time preparations whereas for older children and adults,
p(switch) would be lower under short time preparation than under long time preparation. This
would highlight a critical role of proactive control in task selection in self-directed development.
However, my investigation will not be restricted to p(switch) as we suspect that this sole mea-
sure may fail to capture all processes of VTS performance, especially in younger children. Indeed,
VTS requires participants to perform each task equally often and in a random manner. Strikingly,
they can show a p(switch) lower than .5, which is meant to indicate that they perform the two task
unequally often while in practice they performed them similarly often (e.g., Task A – Task B – Task
B – Task B – Task B – Task A – Task A –Task A). Moreover, a p(switch) can be equal to .5 which
indicates optimal performance while they actually used a non-random strategy (e.g., Task A – Task
A – Task B – Task B – Task A – Task A). As a consequence, to account for all processes involved
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in VTS, how well the participants perform the two tasks equally often and how well they did so
randomly will be also examined alongside with p(switch).
In Chapter 4, resulting from this first adaption of VTS in children, I will argue that successful
self-directed performance requires two key sub-processes in goal identification which are keeping
track of the context and the use of this information to select the appropriate behaviour, respectively
context-tracking and task selection. Two studies will be carried out to explore the respective contri-
butions of these two components in self-directed control development. To this aim, in a first study, I
will manipulate the contextual information provided in VTS to specifically target context-tracking
by manipulating the amount of environmental support and explore to what extent it influences
VTS performance. In a second study, I will mostly target task selection by manipulating task
(a)symmetry in which participants will perform either two tasks with the same difficulty or two
tasks that differ in terms of difficulty as previous research has shown that different task difficulty
strongly influences p(switch) (e.g., Poljac et al., 2018). Overall, the results of these two studies will
allow for a better understanding of the underlying cognitive components involved in goal identifi-
cation in VTS performance, and also identify whether these two sub-processes contribute equally
or not to developmental progress in self-directed control.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I will present the main methodological and conceptual achievements
from this dissertation, before discussing results coming from Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and explain how
they shed new light on our understanding of self-directed control development, and will propose
a tentative model of self-directed control development. I will then provide potential new avenues
for developmental research on self-directed control to test this model and explore questions that
go beyond the scope of this thesis, in order to better comprehend cognitive control in general and
develop potential training programmes to promote self-directed control.
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Chapter 2: Dissociating task selection and




In this first empirical chapter, I investigated the separability of task selection and task
execution in childhood. To do so, I adapted the double registration procedure for use with
children to investigate how task selection and task execution are similarly or differently
affected by self-directedness demands and whether these two processes follow similar or
different developmental trajectories in children aged 4-5 years-old, 7-8 years-old.
This chapter has been accepted for publication in the journal Child Development, July 2020.
Frick, A., Brandimonte, M. A., Chevalier, N. (in press). Disentangling task selection and
task execution in self-directed control development. Child Development.
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Disentangling the respective contribution of task selection and task execution in self-1 
directed cognitive control development 2 
Abstract 3 
Task selection and task execution are key constructs in cognitive control development. Yet, 4 
little is known about how separable they are and how each contributes to task switching 5 
performance. Here, 60 4-5, 61 7-8 and 60 10-11-years-olds completed the double registration 6 
procedure, which dissociates these two processes. Task selection yielded both mixing and 7 
switch costs, especially in younger children, and task execution mostly yielded switch costs 8 
at all age, suggesting that task selection is costlier than task execution. Moreover, both task 9 
selection and execution varied with task self-directedness (i.e., to what extent the task is 10 
driven by external aids) demands. Whereas task selection and task execution are dissociated 11 
regarding performance costs, they nevertheless both contribute to self-directed control.  12 
 13 
Key words: cognitive control development, double registration procedure, task selection, task 14 
execution, self-directed control, self-directedness, mixing costs, switch costs  15 
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At school, children need to engage cognitive control – the goal-directed regulation of 16 
thoughts and actions – to follow different teaching instructions, raise their hands before 17 
talking or take turns in shared activities. To do so efficiently, they must identify what the goal 18 
is and what actions should be taken in order to reach it. In other words, they first need to 19 
select the relevant task goal or the appropriate actions before executing them. Although both 20 
task selection and task execution are involved when cognitive control is engaged, their 21 
respective contributions to children’s performance, especially the costs associated with task 22 
mixing and switching, have ever been disentangled. The current study aimed to temporally 23 
separate task selection and task execution (also referred to as task performance), examined 24 
how these processes contribute to both task mixing and switching costs, and how they are 25 
differentially affected by task self-directedness demands from early to late childhood. 26 
 As one of the best predictors of later life success such as academic achievement, 27 
income, and health (e.g., Daly, Delaney, Egan, & Baumeister, 2015; Moffitt et al., 2011), 28 
childhood cognitive control has attracted growing scientific interest over the last two decades 29 
(Best & Miller, 2010; Moriguchi, Chevalier, & Zelazo, 2016). Importantly, the ability to 30 
select the relevant tasks or actions (also referred to as goal identification) has emerged as a 31 
key process for efficient cognitive control engagement in adults (Broeker et al., 2018). Task 32 
selection is also a major force driving the development of cognitive control across childhood 33 
(Chevalier, 2015). For instance, when children have to switch between multiple tasks as a 34 
function of task cues, they perform better when the demands on task selection are reduced 35 
through cues that are easier to process, after practicing cue detection, or by scaffolding task 36 
selection strategies (e.g., Chevalier & Blaye, 2009; Chevalier, Chatham, & Munakata, 2014; 37 
Kray, Gaspard, Karbach, & Blaye, 2013; Lucenet & Blaye, 2019). 38 
 Task selection is conceptually distinct from task execution. Tasks, which refer to the 39 
activity of matching stimuli with responses according to specific rules (i.e., color and shape 40 
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matching or parity and magnitude judgments), may be represented on two different 41 
representation levels, a task level in which instructions and rules guide a specific task (task 42 
selection) and a parameter level specifying the stimulus-response association leading to task 43 
completion (task execution; Logan & Gordon, 2001). This dissociation has been empirically 44 
supported in adult task switching studies reporting either weak or no correlation between task 45 
selection measures such as the probability of self-directly deciding (i.e., decide freely), to 46 
switch tasks (i.e., p(switch)) and task execution measures such as the cost associated with the 47 
performance drop when individuals need to switch from one task to another (i.e., switch 48 
costs; Arrington & Yates, 2009; Butler, Arrington, & Weywadt, 2011; Mayr & Bell, 2006), 49 
hence speaking to the separability of these two processes. However, a drawback of these 50 
studies is that they do not disentangle task selection from task execution as both processes are 51 
simultaneously captured in one response on each trial. As a consequence, it is unclear how 52 
these processes contribute (whether similarly or differently) to performance.  53 
In contrast, the double registration procedure disentangles task selection and task 54 
execution by using a task selection prompt (e.g., a question mark) preceding the task 55 
execution target (Arrington and Logan, 2005). Therefore, individuals make two responses on 56 
each trial, first they enter a response just to select the task and then they enter a second 57 
response to execute it. The handful of studies using the double registration procedure with 58 
adults, did so in the voluntary task switching paradigm, in which participants freely choose 59 
which tasks to perform between two, following the general instructions of performing them 60 
equally often and in a random manner. They found that task selection and task execution are 61 
distinct processes, differently affected by individual and contextual factors. For instance, 62 
working memory capacity and reward influence task execution switch costs but not 63 
p(switch)—an index of task selection in the voluntary task switching paradigm (Butler et al., 64 
2011; Fröber, Pfister, & Dreisbach, 2019). But other research has highlighted a more 65 
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complex relation between task selection and task execution. That is, higher p(switch) is 66 
associated with smaller task execution switch costs (Mittelstädt, Dignath, Schmidt-Ott, & 67 
Kiesel, 2018). Further, task difficulty differently affects task selection and task execution, 68 
with greater task selection switch costs observed when switching to the harder tasks whereas 69 
greater task execution switch costs are found when switching to the easier task (Millington, 70 
Poljac, & Yeung, 2013). Moreover, consistent with the conflict monitoring model predicting 71 
that a task is more highly activated in working memory following the experience of response 72 
conflict (e.g., Botvinick, Carter, Braver, Barch, & Cohen, 2001; Brown, Reynolds, & Braver, 73 
2007), previous congruency influences both task selection and task execution, with higher 74 
p(switch) associated with better task performance after incongruent trials than congruent 75 
trials, but contrary to the predictions of this model, previous accuracy affects p(switch) but no 76 
task performance, with higher p(switch) and less (not more) accurate responses after incorrect 77 
responses (Orr, Carp, & Weissman, 2012). However, although these studies indicate that task 78 
selection and task execution are dissociated, they are nevertheless both sensitive to between-79 
task inference and congruency effects (Millington et al., 2013; Orr et al., 2012), revealing a 80 
more complex picture about their relation and potential relatedness. 81 
Of particular interest, it is unknown whether task selection and/or task execution gives 82 
rise to greater mixing costs or switch costs. Specifically, mixing costs were not investigated 83 
in the studies using the double registration procedure with adults. Yet, mixing costs capture a 84 
critical performance drop associated with repeating a task in blocks where it is mixed with 85 
another task (i.e., high task uncertainty), relative to repeating a task in a block where the same 86 
task is always relevant (i.e., low task uncertainty). Switch costs, as stated previously, 87 
correspond to the additional performance drop on trials where participants actually need to 88 
switch tasks relative to task repeat trials within mixed-task blocks (Peng, Kirkham, & 89 
Mareschal, 2018; Rubin & Meiran, 2005). As task uncertainty, which affects task selection, is 90 
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high on both switch and repeat trials within mixed blocks, mixing costs may mostly reflect 91 
the difficulty of task selection (e.g., Kikumoto & Mayr, 2017). Further, as task uncertainty 92 
may be similar on both switch and repeat trials within mixed blocks (at least when both trial 93 
types are equally frequent), switch costs may mostly reflect the greater difficulty of task 94 
execution when one needs to reorient attention to information that has been previously 95 
ignored (e.g., Courtemanche et al., 2019).  96 
Previous developmental investigations of cognitive control have used different task-97 
switching paradigms in which performance indistinctly reflects both task selection and task 98 
execution (e.g., Doebel & Zelazo, 2015; Gonthier, Zira, Colé, & Blaye, 2019), but never with 99 
the double registration procedure. It is therefore unknown how these two processes develop 100 
across childhood and whether their separability holds during childhood as it does during 101 
adulthood (Demanet & Liefooghe, 2014; Dignath, Kiesel, & Eder, 2015; Fröber et al., 2019; 102 
Millington et al., 2013; Mittelstädt et al., 2018; Orr et al., 2012a; Poljac, Poljac, & Yeung, 103 
2012). Indeed, recent research has shown that task selection becomes easier with age (e.g., 104 
Frick, Brandimonte, & Chevalier, 2019), but it is still unclear whether this is also the case for 105 
task execution. For instance, different developmental trajectories between task selection and 106 
task execution (e.g., if task execution was mastered earlier in the development than task 107 
selection) would speak to the separability of the two processes. 108 
Further, the separability of task selection and execution can be complementarily 109 
probed by investigating to what extent these two processes are influenced by distinct factors 110 
(e.g., Fröber et al., 2019; Millington et al., 2013; Orr et al., 2012; Poljac et al., 2012). One 111 
such factor is the self-directedness demand of cognitive control engagement, which ranges 112 
from being externally driven (e.g., forced task choices driven by environmental cues on each 113 
trial such as in cued task switching paradigm) to being self-directed (e.g., free task choices on 114 
each trial with the global instructions to perform each task equally often and randomly such 115 
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as in the voluntary task switching paradigm). Self-directedness demand affects the difficulty 116 
of task selection, as selecting the most appropriate task is especially challenging for children 117 
in self-directed situations in which no external aids guide what tasks/actions to perform and 118 
when. Indeed, in such contexts, children perform better when strategies reducing task 119 
selection demands are prompted before the task (Barker et al., 2014; Snyder & Munakata, 120 
2010, 2013; but for a review, see Barker & Munakata, 2015). In contrast, there is no a priori 121 
reason to expect self-directedness demand to affect task execution, as the task should 122 
similarly difficult to execute once it has been selected (Butler et al., 2011; Fröber et al., 2019; 123 
Millington et al., 2013). Alternatively, one may argue that self-directedness demand may still 124 
have an indirect influence on task execution through task selection if the difficulty of task 125 
execution is dependent on the difficulty of task selection, which would speak for a less 126 
dissociable aspect regarding these two processes. 127 
 The current study aimed to disentangle the respective contribution of task selection 128 
and task execution to childhood cognitive control by investigating (1) how they give rise to 129 
mixing and switch costs and (2) whether or not the self-directedness demand affects these 130 
processes. To this end, 4-5, 7-8 and 10-11-years-old children completed alternating-runs task 131 
switching paradigm in which the double registration procedure was used. The alternating-132 
runs task switching paradigm requires participants to follow a predictable task-rule sequence 133 
such as switching on every other trial (e.g., task A, task A, task B, task B, etc.) without 134 
external (environmental) cues as the task has to be performed on n trial, which therefore taps 135 
more self-directed than on externally-driven engagement of control (Rogers & Monsell, 136 
1995). Self-directedness demand was manipulated by either explicitly teaching children the 137 
alternating rule (low self-directedness demand) or letting them infer it from feedback (i.e., 138 
high self-directedness demand). Indeed, while children can already follow an alternating task 139 
rule without external cues relatively efficiently at around 5 years-old (Dauvier, Chevalier, & 140 
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Blaye, 2012), inferring a task rule from feedback largely improves from 7 years-old only 141 
before reaching an adult-like performance around 10 years of age (e.g., Chelune & Baer, 142 
1986; Rosselli & Ardila, 1993; Shu, Tien, Lung, & Chang, 2000). Consequently, targeting 4-143 
5-, 7-8- and 10-11-year-olds ensured varying levels of rule-inference ability, hence 144 
potentially revealing age-related change in how self-directedness may affect task selection 145 
and task execution. 146 
 We predicted that mixing costs should arise mostly from task selection and switch 147 
costs from task execution, as such we should observe greater mixing costs than switch costs 148 
for task selection and greater switch costs than mixing costs for task execution. Moreover, if 149 
the difficulties of task selection and task execution are independent of each other as previous 150 
research has showed that they are separable processes, we predicted that self-directedness 151 
demand should affect task selection performance but not task execution performance. Yet, it 152 
remained possible that the higher difficulty of task selection due to greater self-directedness 153 
demand may indirectly influence task execution. Finally, as self-directedness demand should 154 
be especially costly for younger children, we expected its effect on task selection to decrease 155 
with age, and more rapidly under low self-directedness demand than high self-directedness 156 
demand. The first and third hypotheses were confirmatory whereas the second hypothesis 157 
was exploratory. 158 
Methods 159 
Participants 160 
Participants included 60 4- and 5-year-old children (Mage = 5.21 years, SDage = .45, 161 
range: 4.25 – 5.98, 27 females), 60 7- and 8-year-old children (Mage = 7.92 years, SDage = .30, 162 
range: 7.40 – 8.42, 26 females) and 60 10- and 11-year-old children (Mage = 10.77 years, 163 
SDage = .40, range: 10.00 – 11.73, 34 females). Thirteen additional children were excluded 164 
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from the analysis: eight children due to an experimental error in the program and four 165 
children because they fell outside the targeted age range.  166 
  All children were tested at school and prior to data collection, a power analysis was 167 
conducted with the program GPOWER (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) which indicated 168 
that 180 children was enough to achieve a statistical power of .85 (Cohen, 1988) with a 169 
medium effect size of .25 based on previous studies using a similar paradigm to the present 170 
study (e.g., Hung, Huang, Tsai, Chang, & Hung, 2016). Therefore, data collection stopped 171 
when the sample size for each age group reached at least 60 children, with 30 children in each 172 
instruction condition. Informed written consent was obtained from children’s parents and all 173 
children provided signed assent and received a small age-appropriate prize (e.g., stickers) at 174 
the end of the experiment. Children were mostly Caucasian, monolingual and attended the 175 
same school, although socio-demographic information was not systematically collected as we 176 
did not have specific hypotheses about SES. All children were drawn from the same school 177 
catchment area, suggesting similar socio-economic backgrounds. Age and sex did not differ 178 
between conditions in any of the age groups (Table 1). The research project and protocol 179 
were approved by an Ethics Committee as well as participating schools. Data collection took 180 
place between May 2018 and March 2019. 181 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 182 
Material and procedure 183 
All children were tested individually in a 20-minute session in a quiet room at school. 184 
They completed a child-friendly alternating-run task-switching paradigm presented with E-185 
Prime 2 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) in which a monkey needed help to 186 
clean up his room. Toys needed to be sorted by colour or shape in two corresponding toy 187 
chests, the Colour toy chest and the Shape toy chest.  188 
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Each trial started with a question mark alongside the two closed toy chests with two 189 
response pictures below each toy chest (i.e., a blue and red patch under the Colour toy chest, 190 
a car and teddy-bear patch under the Shape toy chest) (Figure 1). The toy chests were 191 
constantly visible on the right- and left-hand sides of the monitor but their locations and 192 
corresponding response pictures were counter-balanced across participants. After children 193 
selected one of the two closed toy chests by pressing one of two keys (‘w’ and ‘i’ on a 194 
QWERTY keyboard), the question mark was replaced by a happy monkey face if they 195 
selected the correct toy chest or a sad monkey face if they selected the incorrect toy chest. 196 
Additionally, the selected toy chest opened and the two response pictures under the other toy 197 
chest disappeared. After 500 ms, the monkey face was replaced by the target and children had 198 
to match this target with one of the response pictures below the selected toy chest (i.e., the 199 
‘car’ or ‘teddy bear’ buttons if the Shape toy chest was selected or the ‘red or ‘blue’ buttons if 200 
the Colour toy chest was selected) by pressing the corresponding key on the keyboard (‘a’, 201 
‘d’, ‘j’ or ‘l’). As such, when children selected a task, whatever this selection was correct or 202 
incorrect based on the alternating rule, they had a chance to nevertheless execute it as we 203 
wanted to see if the difficulties of task selection were related to task execution. After the 204 
response, the target was replaced by an entire yellow banana if both task selection and task 205 
execution was correct, half of a yellow banana if only task selection or task execution was 206 
correct, or an entire green banana if both task selection chest and task execution was 207 
incorrect. 208 
[Insert Figure 1 around here]  209 
 All children first completed two single-task blocks in which they consistently filled 210 
the Colour toy chest or the Shape toy chest (order counter-balanced). Each single-task block 211 
contained 4 practice trials (repeated if more than two errors were committed) followed by 16 212 
test trials. The experimenter helped children on practice trials if necessary but not on test 213 
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trials. Then, children were told they would fill the two toy chests at the same time and 214 
proceeded to the mixed-task blocks. Children were assigned to one of the two experimental 215 
conditions. In the rule instruction condition, they were instructed to start with one dimension 216 
(counter-balanced across children) and then change dimension on every second trial. This 217 
rule was explained as follows: ‘Kiki wants you to fill both the Color and Shape toy chests. He 218 
wants you to start with the Color toy chest. He also wants you to sort the toys in a specific 219 
order: two toys in the Color toy chest, two toys in the Shape toy chest, two toys in the Color 220 
toy chest again, two toys in the Shape toy chest again and so on’. In the no rule instruction 221 
condition, they were instructed to start with a specific dimension, but were not told about the 222 
alternation between the two dimensions on every second trial, as they had to guess this rule 223 
from the feedback. This was explained as follows: ‘Kiki wants you to fill both the Color and 224 
Shape toy chests. He wants you to start with the Color toy chest. He also wants you to sort 225 
the toys in a specific order and it is your job to guess in which toy chest he wants you to sort 226 
the toys. Be careful, it will not be always the same toy chest’. Importantly, in both conditions, 227 
children were also instructed that they would have to restart from the start of the sorting rule 228 
if they did not select the correct toy chest and/or match correctly the target with the response 229 
button. Children completed a familiarization block of six practice trials before performing 230 
two mixed blocks of 32 test trials each separated by a short break. During the break, children 231 
were reminded of the instructions according to the instruction conditions they were assigned 232 
to, and they were told to start the second block with the same dimension than in the first 233 
block. 234 
Data analyses 235 
 The double registration procedure (Arrington & Logan, 2005) allowed for the 236 
distinction between task selection and task execution processes. Accuracy and RTs were 237 
separately examined for each process to better isolate the effects of the fixed factors, but also 238 
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because RTs for task selection and task execution were not comparable because children 239 
could prepare in advance their response before prompt onset (for task selection) whereas they 240 
could not do so before stimulus onset (for task execution). Prior to analyses, RTs were log-241 
transformed (to correct for skewness and minimize baseline differences between ages; 242 
Meiran, 1996). Log RTs were examined after discarding the first trial of each block, which 243 
were neither a task repetition trial nor task switch trial, which resulted in the removal of 244 
4.17% of the total trials. Moreover, for task selection, only correct task selection trials and 245 
task selection trials preceded by correct task execution trials were kept, resulting in the 246 
removal of 17.91% of the total trials and RTs above 10,000 milliseconds (ms) or 3 standard 247 
deviations above the mean for each participant were also removed (1.59% of the total trials). 248 
For task execution, a similar trimming procedure was performed with the difference that this 249 
time, we kept RTs of correct task execution trials and task execution trials preceded by 250 
correct task selection trials, which corresponded to the removal of 17.92% of the total trials. 251 
Finally, RTs below 200 ms and above 10,000 ms or 3 standard deviations above the mean for 252 
each participant were also removed, which resulted in the removal of 1.72% trials. 253 
 Mixed analysis of variances (ANOVAs) were run on accuracy and log RTs to 254 
examine the effect of age group (4-5 year-olds, 7-8 year-olds and 10-11 year-olds) as a 255 
between-subjects variable, and instruction condition (rule instruction, no rule instruction), 256 
and trial type (single task, task repetition, task switch) as within subject variables. When 257 
appropriate and evidenced by Mauchly’s tests (Mauchly, 1940), the Greenhouse-Geisser 258 
(Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959) correction was applied for violation of the assumption of 259 
sphericity. Tukey’s post hoc tests were used for pairwise comparisons resulting from these 260 
anovas when there were multiplicities issues. These analyses were performed on R version 261 
3.6.3 (R Core Team, 2020) using afex and emmeans packages (Lenth, 2020; Singmann, 262 
Bolker, Westfall, Aust, & Ben-Shachar, 2020). Mixing costs were examined by contrasting 263 
30
trials in single-task blocks (simply referred to as single trials below) with task repetition trials 264 
in mixed-task blocks (referred to as task repetition trials), while switch costs were examined 265 
by contrasting task repetition trials and task switch trials within mixed-task blocks (Rubin & 266 
Meiran, 2005). Rank-based methods with the Holm adjustment (Holm, 1979) to control for 267 
type I error (i.e., known as a false positive finding or conclusion) were used for multiple 268 
comparisons of costs with the nparcomp package (Konietschke, Placzek, Schaarschmidt, & 269 
Hothorn, 2015) and more specifically with the gao_cs function (Gao, Alvo, Chen, & Li, 270 
2008). 271 
Results 272 
Task selection accuracy 273 
Task selection accuracy was significantly affected by age group, F(2, 174) = 14.98, p 274 
<  .001, η2p = .15, instruction condition, F(1, 174) = 63.30, p < .001, η
2
p = .27, and trial type, 275 
F(2, 348) = 244.97, p < .001, η2p = .58. As illustrated in Figure 2, overall, 4-5 and 7-8-year-276 
olds did not differ, p = .079, but these two age groups were significantly less accurate than 277 
10-11 year-old children (M4-5 year-olds = .86 vs. M7-8 year-olds = .89 vs. M10-11 year-olds = .93; ps < 278 
.004). Accuracy was significantly higher with than without rule instruction (Mrule instruction 279 
condition = .94 vs. Mno rule instruction condition = .85; p < .001) and decreased significantly across 280 
single, task repetition, and task switch trials (Msingle trials = 1 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .86 vs. Mtask 281 
switch trials = .82; ps < .001), hence revealing significant mixing and switch costs overall.       282 
Age group and instruction condition significantly interacted, F(2, 174) = 3.07, p = 283 
.049, η2p = .03, 4-5 year-olds were less accurate than 7-8 year-olds and 10-11 year-olds in the 284 
rule instruction condition (M4-5 year-olds = .89 vs. M7-8 year-olds = .95 vs. M10-11 year-olds = .96; ps < 285 
.007), with no difference between the latter age groups, p = .694. Conversely, in the no rule 286 
instruction condition, both 4-5 year-olds and 7-8 year-olds showed similar accuracy rates that 287 
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were significantly lower accurate than 10-11 year-olds (M4-5 year-olds = .83 vs. M7-8 year-olds = .83 288 
vs. M10-11 year-olds = .90; ps < .001).  289 
Age group also interacted with trial type, F(4, 348) = 15.97, p < .001, η2p = .15. There 290 
were significant mixing costs for all ages and significant switch costs for 7-8 year-olds and 291 
10-11 year-olds, but not for 4-5 year-olds for whom non-significant reversed switch costs 292 
were observed (4-5 year-olds: Msingle trials = 1 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .78 vs. Mtask switch trials = .81; 293 
7-8 year-olds: Msingle trials = 1 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .88 vs. Mtask switch trials = .79; 10-11 year-olds: 294 
Msingle trials = 1 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .92 vs. Mtask switch trials = .87; ps < .009 and p = .168). 295 
Specifically targeting performance costs, we observed that mixing costs were overall 296 
significantly higher than switch costs (Mmixing costs = .14 vs. Mswitch costs = .03; p < .001). 297 
However, this difference was significant for 4-5 year-olds only (Mmixing costs = .22 vs. Mswitch 298 
costs = -.03; p < .001), but not for older children, ps > .093. Moreover, 4-5 year-olds showed 299 
greater mixing costs than older children (M7-8 year-olds  = .12 and M10-11 year-olds = .08; p < .001), 300 
whereas the latter did not differ, p = .125. Conversely, higher switch costs were observed for 301 
7-8 year-olds and 10-11 year-olds (M7-8 year-olds = .08 and M10-11 year-olds = .04; ps < .032) than 302 
for 4-5 year-olds. 303 
Finally, instruction condition and trial type significantly interacted, F(2, 348) = 48.20, 304 
p < .001, η2p = .22, with significant mixing costs in both instruction conditions but significant 305 
switch costs only in the no rule instruction condition (rule instruction condition: Msingle trials = 306 
1 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .90 vs. Mtask switch trials = .91; no rule instruction condition: Msingle trials = 1 307 
vs. Mtask repetition trials = .82 vs. Mtask switch trials = .74; ps < 001 and p = .868). Mixing costs were 308 
higher than switch costs in both instruction conditions (rule instruction condition: Mmixing costs 309 
= .10 vs. Mswitch costs = -.01; no rule instruction condition: Mmixing costs = .18 vs. Mswitch costs = .07; 310 
ps < .001). Finally, mixing and switch costs were higher in the no rule instruction condition 311 
than in the rule instruction condition, ps < .001. 312 
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The three-way interaction between age group, instruction condition and trial type 313 
failed to reach significance, p = .061.  314 
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 315 
Task selection RTs 316 
On task selection RTs, there were main effects of age, F(2, 169) = 138.48, p < .001, 317 
η2p = .62, trial type, F(2, 338) = 30.14, p < .001, η
2
p = .26, but not of instruction condition, p 318 
= .252 (Figure 3). Overall, task selection RTs decreased across all three age groups (M4-5 year-319 
olds = 7.27 log-transformed ms (ln ms) vs. M7-8 year-olds = 6.67 ln ms vs. M10-11 year-olds = 6.13 ln 320 
ms; ps < .001), and from single task trials to task repetition trials, and from the latter trials to 321 
task switch trials (Msingle task trials = 6.57 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials = 6.65 ln ms vs. Mtask switch trials 322 
= 6.80 ln ms; ps < .019), revealing significant mixing and switch costs. But mixing and 323 
switch costs did not differ from each other, p = .283.   324 
A two-way interaction between age group and trial type, F(4, 338) = 10.65, p < .001, 325 
η2p = .11, further revealed that switch costs were significant for 4-5 year-olds only (Mtask 326 
repetition trials = 7.13 ln ms vs. Mtask switch trials = 7.56 ms; p < 001. Switch costs were significantly 327 
higher than mixing costs for 4-5 year-olds (Mmixing costs = .01 vs. Mswitch costs = .43; p < .001), 328 
whereas no differences between these costs were observed for older children, ps > .277. 4-5 329 
year-olds showed greater switch costs than older children (M7-8 year-olds = .02 and M10-11 year-olds 330 
= .00; ps < .001), whereas these costs between the two latter age groups did not differ, p = 1. 331 
Mixing costs did not vary across age groups, ps > .474. 332 
Instruction condition also interacted with trial type, F(2, 338) = 4.51, p = .014, η2p = 333 
.03. Significant mixing and switch costs were observed in the no rule instruction condition 334 
(Msingle task trials = 6.54 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials = 6.72 ln ms vs. Mtask switch trials = 6.85 ln ms; ps 335 
< .004), but only significant switch costs were observed in the rule instruction condition 336 
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(Msingle task trials = 6.59 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials = 6.59 ln ms vs. Mtask switch trials = 6.75 ln ms; p < 337 
.001). Mixing and switch costs did not differ between the instruction conditions, ps > .070. 338 
 [Insert Figure 3 around here] 339 
Task execution accuracy 340 
Age group and trial type significantly affected task execution accuracy, F(2, 174) = 341 
15.91, p < .001, η2p = .15 and F(2, 348) = 14.83, p < .001, η
2
p = .08,  but not instruction 342 
condition, p = .514, and none of these factors interacted with each other, ps > .171 (Figure 4). 343 
Overall, 4-5 year-olds were less accurate than 7-8 year-olds and 10-11 year-olds, but the 344 
latter two did not differ from each other (M4-5 year-olds = .89 vs. M7-8 year-olds = .93 vs. M10-11 year-345 
olds = .94; ps < .001 and p = .391). Accuracy was lower in both single trials and task repetition 346 
trials, which did not differ from each other, relative to switch trials (Msingle trials = .92 vs. Mtask 347 
repetition trials = .91 vs. Mtask switch trials = .94; p = .508 and p < .001), hence revealing no 348 
significant mixing costs and reverse switch costs. 349 
[Insert Figure 4 around here]  350 
Task execution RTs 351 
On task execution RTs, there were main effects of age group, F(2, 169) = 197.70, p < 352 
.001, η2p = .70, and trial type, F(2, 332) = 378.99, p < .001, η
2
p = .69, but not of instruction 353 
condition, p = .834. As illustrated in Figure 5, RTs significantly decreased with age (M4-5 year-354 
olds = 7.48 ln ms vs. M7-8 year-olds = 7.08 ln ms vs. M10-11 year-olds = 6.67 ln ms; ps < .001), and 355 
were faster on single trials than on task repetition trials, and on task repetition trials than on 356 
task switch trials (Msingle trials = .6.88 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials = 7.02 ln ms vs. Mtask switch trials = 357 
7.30 ln ms; ps < .001), hence revealing significant mixing and switch costs. Switch costs 358 
were significantly higher than mixing costs overall (Mmixing costs = .13 ln ms vs. Mswitch costs = 359 
.28 ln ms; p < .001).  360 
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Moreover, age group significantly interacted with trial type, F(4, 338) = 3.10, p = 361 
.020, η2p = .03. Mixing costs were significant for 4-5 year-olds and 7-8 year-olds (4-5 years-362 
old: Msingle task trials = 7.26 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials = 7.43 ln ms; 7-8 years-old: Msingle task trials = 363 
6.90 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials = 7.02 ln ms; ps < .024), but not for 10-11 year-olds, p = .059. 364 
Switch costs were significant for all age groups (4-5 years-old: Msingle task trials = 7.26 ln ms vs. 365 
Mtask repetition trials = 7.43 ln ms vs. Mtask switch trials = 7.75 ln ms; 7-8 years-old: Msingle task trials = 366 
6.90 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials = 7.02 ln ms vs. Mtask switch trials = 7.31 ln ms; 10-11 years-old: 367 
Msingle task trials = 6.52 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials = 6.62 ln ms vs. Mtask switch trials = 6.87 ln ms; ps 368 
< .001). Switch costs were significantly higher than mixing costs for all age group (4-5 year-369 
olds: Mmixing costs = .18 ln ms vs. Mswitch costs = .31 ln ms; 7-8 year-olds: Mmixing costs = .12 ln ms 370 
vs. Mswitch costs = .29 ln ms; 10-11 year-olds: Mmixing costs = .10 ln ms vs. Mswitch costs = .25 ln ms; 371 
ps < .013). Mixing and switch costs did not differ between age groups, ps > .280. 372 
Finally, instruction condition significantly interacted with trial type, F(2, 338) =  3.61, 373 
p = .030, η2p = .03. Mixing and switch costs were significant in both instruction conditions 374 
(rule instruction condition: Msingle task trials = 6.89 ln ms vs Mtask repetition trials = 6.99 ln ms vs. Mtask 375 
switch trials = 7.32 ln ms; no rule instruction condition: Msingle task trials = 6.87 ln ms vs Mtask repetition 376 
trials = 7.04 ln ms vs. Mtask switch trials = 7.29 ln ms; ps < .001). Switch costs were higher than 377 
mixing costs in both instruction conditions, although this difference was smaller in the no 378 
rule instruction condition (rule instruction condition: Mmixing costs = .09 ln ms vs. Mswitch costs = 379 
.32 ms ls; no rule instruction condition: Mmixing costs = .17 ln ms vs. Mswitch costs = .25 ln ms; 380 
respectively p = .007 and p = .017). Mixing costs were higher in the no rule instruction 381 
condition than in the rule instruction condition whereas switch costs were higher in the rule 382 
instruction condition than in the no rule instruction condition, ps < .016.  383 
[Insert Figure 5 around here] 384 
Discussion 385 
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The present study temporally separated task selection and task execution to 386 
investigate to what extent these processes lead to mixing and switch costs and are affected by 387 
the self-directedness demand during childhood. Although mixing costs and switch costs were 388 
observed for both processes, task selection gave rise to both mixing and switch costs whereas 389 
task execution mostly gave rise to switch costs. Further, the self-directedness demand 390 
affected both task selection and task execution. This suggests that although these two 391 
processes are relatively independent regarding performance costs with age, they neverthless 392 
both contribute to self-directed cognitive control development.  393 
One of the main finding is that task selection was associated with both mixing and 394 
switch costs whereas task execution was mostly associated with switch costs. This pattern is 395 
not consistent with the proposal that mixing costs mostly reflect task selection and switch 396 
costs task execution, but it nevertheless indicates that performance costs are differently 397 
associated with these processes, hence speaking for their relative dissociation. However, 398 
whereas greater switch costs than mixing costs were observed in task execution RTs for all 399 
age groups, these costs differently contributed to task selection with age. Indeed, task 400 
selection accuracy mixing costs were significantly greater than task selection switch costs for 401 
4-5 year-olds but were similar for 7-8 year-olds and 10-11 year-olds. This primilarly sugests 402 
that mixing costs are more associated with task selection at a young age whereas both mixing 403 
and switch costs contribute to this this process in older children. 404 
However, when it came to RTs, task selection switch costs were higher than task 405 
selection mixing costs for RTs in 4-5 years-old children, whereas once again no difference 406 
was observed between these costs for older children. Thus, identifying when to switch the 407 
task was costlier for 4-5 year-olds than for other age groups (see Chevalier, Huber, Wiebe, & 408 
Espy, 2013). Interestingly, younger children showed non-significant reversed switch costs for 409 
task selection accuracy. This pattern suggests a speed-accuracy trade-off: 4-5 year-olds may 410 
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have been especially cautious on switch trials, leading to longer but more accurate responses 411 
on these trials as compared to task repetition trials, hence the reversed or small switch costs at 412 
that age. One possible interpretation for this trade-off is that 4-5 year-olds were easily 413 
detected that they needed to switch tasks, but figuring out which task to switch to and/or 414 
activating this task in working memory, was especially time consuming for them as compared 415 
to older children, potentially because of lower working memory capacities (Camos & 416 
Barrouillet, 2018). Similarly, we found similar reversed switch costs for task execution 417 
accuracy associated with longer switch costs for task execution RTs for all age groups. This 418 
pattern is consistent with potential speed-accuracy trade-offs: taking longer to executive a 419 
task seems to ensure greater likelihood of success.  420 
Taken together, these findings on task selection suggest that although both mixing and  421 
switch contribute to this process; these costs were higher in 4-5 year-olds than older children, 422 
indicating that this process was particularly costly for young children. This potentially shed 423 
new light on why children under 7-8 years-old struggle with task selection (Frick et al., 2019; 424 
Munakata, Snyder, & Chatham, 2012; Snyder & Munakata, 2010, 2013). Conversely, on task 425 
execution, switch costs were greater than mixing costs at all ages and these costs did not 426 
differ between age groups, indicating that this pattern is steady across childhood. Besides 427 
speaking for the separability of these two processes, the fact that task selection was 428 
associated with both performance costs whereas task execution was mostly associated with 429 
switch costs seem to indicate that task execution is less costly and master earlier in the 430 
development. 431 
 Furthemore, there were no significant costs for task execution accuracy, suggesting 432 
that task execution was less difficult to achieve than task selection in our paradigm. However, 433 
a limitation of this finding is that mixing costs may not have been observed for task execution 434 
accuracy because of the specificity of the paradigm used in the current study. Indeed, once 435 
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the task was selected, only that task remained available for task execution. This procedure is 436 
different from what has been done in some adult studies in which response options related to 437 
both tasks remained available during task execution (e.g., Demanet & Liefooghe, 2014). 438 
Children may have made less errors because they could only perform the task they previously 439 
selected, hence reducing accuracy mixing costs. Note however that significant mixing and 440 
switch costs were observed for task execution RTs, suggesting that executing the selected 441 
task remained demanding even though our setup likely resulted in highly successful 442 
outcomes, hence revealing that the difficulties of task selection did influence the difficulties 443 
of task execution. 444 
This transfer of difficulty from task selection to task execution was more salient when 445 
the self-directedness demand varied as both processes were affected. More specifically, both 446 
mixing costs for task selection accuracy and task execution RTs were significantly higher in 447 
the no rule instruction condition than in the rule instruction condition. Therefore, the costs 448 
associated to the selection of the relevant task when the two tasks are mixed, and more 449 
precisely when the relevant task has to be self-inferred, requiring increasingly working 450 
memory capacities and efficient abstract representations (Camos & Barrouillet, 2018; 451 
Munakata et al., 2012), transferred to when this task has to be executed. As such, although 452 
task selection and task execution processes progressively dissociate from each other with age, 453 
they are both sensitive to high self-directedness demand (i.e., when control engagement is 454 
especially self-directed). This has important implications for our understanding of the 455 
supposedly separability of these two processes as shown in the adult literature (e.g., Butler et 456 
al., 2011; Fröber et al., 2019; Millington et al., 2013; Mittelstädt et al., 2018; Orr et al., 2012). 457 
Indeed, while these studies have shown that factors such as between-task interference or 458 
previous congruency both affect task selection and task execution, but in a different ways 459 
(see Millington et al., 2013; Orr, Carp, & Weissman, 2012), our study reports that these 460 
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processes are similarly influenced by self-directedness demand, suggesting their dissociable 461 
but relatedness on this aspect and that they both contribute to self-directed control 462 
development as this effect hold for all age groups. 463 
Note that consistent with our initial hypothesis, task selection accuracy significantly 464 
increased from 4-5 years-old to 7-8 years-old, while no difference was observed between 7-8 465 
and 10-11 years-old under low self-directedness demand. Conversely, both 4-5 and 7-8 years-466 
old were significantly less accurate than 10-11 years-old under high self-directedness 467 
demand. These findings are in line with Dauvier et al. (2012) who showed that children from 468 
5-6 years-olds can be successful when the task provides alternating rule instructions even 469 
without external cues. In contrast, inferring the rule from feedback was challenging for 470 
children below 7-8 years-olds (e.g., Chelune & Baer, 1986; Rosselli & Ardila, 1993; Shu et 471 
al., 2000). However, this finding does not necessarily mean that children below 7-8 years of 472 
age cannot use feedback to infer a rule to guide behaviours. For instance, 4- to 6-years-olds 473 
children can successfully infer the relevant tasks based on feedback and switch between task 474 
sets, although not as efficiently as older children and adults (e.g., Chevalier, Dauvier, & 475 
Blaye, 2009; Cianchetti, Corona, Foscoliano, Contu, & Sannio-Fancello, 2007; Jacques & 476 
Zelazo, 2001). But, here, children assigned to the no rule instruction condition did not only 477 
need to infer the relevant task, they had to infer a relevant sequence of tasks. This required 478 
them to maintain the information conveyed by the feedback but also the information about 479 
the tasks they performed over multiple trials before they could actually infer the alternating 480 
rule. As such, it was more demanding in terms of working memory and abstract reasoning 481 
that what children are asked to do in tasks where after one or two trials children can know 482 
which task is now relevant for several further trials once they have inferred the newly 483 
relevant task (e.g., Chevalier et al., 2009; Cianchetti et al., 2007; Jacques & Zelazo, 2001). 484 
Therefore, improvement in task selection in our paradigm may be linked to increasingly 485 
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working memory capacities and efficient abstract representations with age (Camos & 486 
Barrouillet, 2018; Munakata et al., 2012). 487 
 Our study is limited by a potential confound between the self-directedness demand 488 
and reinforcement induced in our paradigm. As the task was easier to select with rule 489 
instructions, children in this condition received more positive feedback than children in the 490 
no rule instruction condition. Importantly, more frequently getting positive feedback may 491 
increase positive affect in the rule instruction condition. Research has shown that positive 492 
phasic (i.e., inducing an emotion before each trial) and tonic (i.e., inducing a general mood in 493 
the long run) affect reducing switch costs (e.g., Liu & Wang, 2014; Müller et al., 2007; 494 
Wang, Chen, & Yue, 2017; but for a review, see Goschke & Bolte, 2014). To further 495 
investigate this potential confound related to affect and motivation, we conducted further 496 
analyses on RTs for task execution to control for the phasic and tonic affect (see 497 
Supplemental Material). In short, we found the exact same pattern of findings as in the main 498 
analyses, suggesting that switch costs were more related to task execution than mixing costs. 499 
Moreover, if phasic and tonic affect had an effect on our initial results, we should have 500 
observed greater switch costs in the no rule instruction condition than in the rule instruction 501 
condition. However, in our initial analyses and supplemental analyses, we observed that 502 
switch costs were greater in the rule instruction condition than in the no rule instruction 503 
condition for task execution RTs. This indicates that children who received more negative 504 
feedback (in the no rule instruction condition) did not show a more pronounced switch costs 505 
that children who received more positive feedback (in the rule instruction condition), but the 506 
reverse, and that phasic and tonic affect did not influence this result. 507 
 Finally, another limitation relates to the fact that although no precise socioeconomic 508 
status (SES) information regarding the children tested in this study was collected, they all 509 
came from private schools and therefore our sample was largely homogenous. As such, our 510 
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results require cautious as they might not be generalizable to the larger population. Indeed, 511 
lower SES has been found to be associated with poorer cognitive control in situations where 512 
cognitive control is externally driven (Halse, Steinsbekk, Hammar, Belsky, & Wichstrøm, 513 
2019; Lawson, Hook, & Farah, 2018). In contrast, little is known about the influence of SES 514 
on self-directed engagement of cognitive control during childhood. Consequently, future 515 
research on self-directed control should examine how it may be influenced by SES, especially 516 
given that self-directed control likely plays a critical role in children’s lives and academic 517 
achievement. 518 
To conclude, our findings speak to the separability of task selection and task 519 
execution regarding performance costs. Indeed, both mixing and switch costs contributed to 520 
task selection, but to a greater extent in younger children than in older children, whereas task 521 
execution is mostly associated with switch costs at all age. This suggests that task execution 522 
and its underlying mechanism is mastered earlier in the development than task selection. One 523 
venue for future research is to explore how different modes of control engagement can 524 
account for this difference. For instance, younger children may show both greater 525 
performance costs for task selection because they rely more on a reactive form of control 526 
whereas older children engage more flexibly a proactive form of control, which potentially 527 
reduces these costs more than mixing costs, in task selection. However, so far this assumption 528 
remains speculative. Moreover, self-directedness demand variations have a greater effect on 529 
mixing costs than on switch costs, especially when this demand is high. But this effect can be 530 
seen in both task selection and task execution, suggesting that the difficulties in task selection 531 
transfers to some extent to task execution, and therefore that these two processes are related 532 
on this aspect. Consequently, although these two processes appear to be dissociated with age 533 
regarding performance costs, they are related when it comes to self-directedness, suggesting 534 
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that these two processes should be targeted if one wants to promote self-directed control 535 
development, which is key fostering autonomy in children.  536 
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741 
Figure 1: Double registration procedure in the child-friendly alternating-run task-switching 742 
paradigm. Children had to first select one of the two toy chests between the Color and Shape 743 
toy chests and then matched the toys with the appropriate response picture below the toy 744 
chest.  745 
  746 
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 747 
Figure 2: Accuracy for trial type (single task trials, task repetition trials, task switch trials; top 748 
left figure) as a function of age group (4-5 year-olds, 7-8 year-olds, 10-11 year-olds) and 749 
instruction condition (rule instruction, no rule instruction), as a function of age group and 750 
instruction condition all trials confounded (top right figure), as a function of costs (mixing 751 
costs, switch costs) and age group (bottom left figure) and as a function of costs and 752 
instruction condition (bottom right figure). Error bars represent standard errors.  753 
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 755 
Figure 3: Log RTs for trial type (single task trials, task repetition trials, task switch trials) as a 756 
function of age group (4-5 year-olds, 7-8 year-olds, 10-11 year-olds) and instruction 757 
condition (rule instruction, no rule instruction; top left figure), as a function of costs (mixing 758 
costs, switch costs) and age group (top right figure) and as a function of costs and instruction 759 
condition (bottom figure). Error bars represent standard errors.  760 
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 762 
Figure 4: Accuracy for trial type (single task trials, task repetition trials, task switch trials) as 763 
a function of age group (4-5 year-olds, 7-8 year-olds, 10-11 year-olds and instruction 764 
condition (rule instruction, no rule instruction). Error bars represent standard errors. 4-5 year-765 




Figure 5: Log RTs for trial type (single task trials, task repetition trials, task switch trials) as a 769 
function of age group (4-5 year-olds, 7-8 year-olds, 10-11 year-olds) and instruction 770 
condition (rule instruction, no rule instruction; top left figure) and as a function of costs 771 
(mixing costs, switch costs) and age group (top right figure) and as a function of costs and 772 
instruction condition. Error bars represent standard errors.  773 
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Table 1: Sample size, age mean, age deviation, age range and sex ratio as a function of age 775 
group and condition. 776 









Rule 30 5.13, .48 
.164 
4.25 – 5.98 19M, 11F 
.194 
No rule 30 5.29, .40 4.37 – 5.94 14M, 16F 
7-8 year-olds 
Rule 30 7.85, .29 
.067 
7.40 – 8.42 17M, 13F 
1 
No rule 30 7.99, .31 7.45 – 8.40 17M, 13F 
10-11 year-olds 
Rule 30 10.70, .37 
.194 
10.00 – 11.29 14M, 16F 
.602 
No rule 30 10.84, .42 10.10 – 11.73 12M, 18F 
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Supplemental Material 778 
Analyses controlling for feedback contingency differences between conditions on task 779 
execution RTs 780 
Data Analyses 781 
Prior to analyses, RTs were log-transformed (to correct for skewness and minimize 782 
baseline differences between ages; Meiran, 1996). RTs were examined after discarding the 783 
first trial of each block, which were neither a task repetition trial nor task switch trial, which 784 
resulted in the removal of 4.17% of the total trials. Then, to eliminate the potential confound 785 
between the instruction condition (rule instruction vs. no-instruction) and feedback received 786 
(positive vs. negative), and more specifically, confound of phasic affect, we kept trials when 787 
children started to correctly implement the rule in the mixed-blocks. That is, only trials that 788 
followed four correct trials for task selection and three correct trials for task execution in a 789 
row (e.g., colour-colour-shape-shape) were examined as they indicated that children learned 790 
the alternating rule. This was the case as children in the no-rule condition instruction received 791 
about the same number of positive feedback on task selection than children in the rule 792 
instruction condition (Mrule instruction condition = 85.53% vs. Mno-rule instruction condition = 90.63%, W = 793 
2709, p = .151), and this similarity hold for all age groups, ps > .239.  This trimming 794 
procedure removed 18.11% of the total trials. For task execution, we kept RTs of correct task 795 
execution trials and task execution trials preceded by correct task selection trials, which 796 
corresponded to the removal of 10.87% of the total trials. Finally, RTs below 200 ms and 797 
above 10,000 ms or 3 standard deviations above the mean for each participant were also 798 
removed, which resulted in the removal of 1.32% trials.  799 
Mixed analysis of variances (ANOVAs) were run on log-transformed RTs to examine 800 
the effect of age group (4-5 year-olds, 7-8 year-olds and 10-11 year-olds) as a between 801 
subjects variable, and instruction condition (rule instruction, no rule instruction), and trial 802 
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type (single, task repetition, task switch) as within subject variables. We used the total 803 
number of feedback received in single-task blocks and trials from the mixed-blocks in total as 804 
a covariate to control for the potential confound of tonic affect (i.e. reward history). We also 805 
add the number of trials after the rule has been implemented as this number was higher in the 806 
rule instruction condition than in the no-rule instruction condition. When appropriate and 807 
evidenced by Mauchly’s tests (Mauchly, 1940), the Greenhouse-Geisser (Greenhouse & 808 
Geisser, 1959) correction was applied for violation of the assumption of sphericity. Tukey’s 809 
post hoc tests were used for pairwise comparisons resulting from these anovas. These 810 
analyses were performed on R version 3.6.3 (R Core Team, 2020) using afex and emmeans 811 
packages for computing anovas and running pairwise comparisons with Tukey adjustments 812 
when there were multiplicity issues (Lenth, 2020; Singmann, Bolker, Westfall, Aust, & Ben-813 
Shachar, 2020). Mixing costs were examined by contrasting trials in single-task blocks 814 
(simply referred to as single trials below) with task repetition trials in mixed-task blocks 815 
(referred to as task repetition trials), while switch costs were examined by contrasting task 816 
repetition trials and task switch trials within mixed-task blocks (Rubin & Meiran, 2005). 817 
Rank-based non-parametric methods with the Holm-Bonferroni adjustment to control for 818 
error type I (Holm, 1979) were used for multiple comparisons of costs with the nparcomp 819 
package (Konietschke, Placzek, Schaarschmidt, & Hothorn, 2015) and the function ‘gao_cs’ 820 
(Gao, Alvo, Chen, & Li, 2008). 821 
Results 822 
Task execution RTs 823 
On task execution RTs, there were main effects of age group, F(2, 151) = 137.90, p < 824 
.001, η2p = .65, and trial type, F(2, 302) = 3.46, p = .036, η
2
p = .02, but not of instruction 825 
condition and number of feedback and number of trials, p > .835 (Figure 2). Overall, task 826 
execution RTs significantly decreased across age groups (M4-5 year-olds = 7.49 ln ms vs. M7-8 827 
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year-olds = 7.06 ln ms vs. M10-11 year-olds = 6.67 ln ms; ps < .001), and were faster on single trials 828 
than on task repetition trials and on task repetition trials than on task switch trials (Msingle trials 829 
= .6.87 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials = 6.99 ln ms vs. Mtask switch trials = 7.28 ln ms; ps < .001), 830 
hence revealing significant mixing and switch costs. Switch costs were significantly higher 831 
than mixing costs (Mmixing costs = .12 vs. Mswitch costs = .29; p < .001), and this held for all age 832 
groups (4-5 year-olds: Mmixing costs = .15 vs. Mswitch costs = .36; 7-8 year-olds: Mmixing costs = .10 833 
vs. Mswitch costs = .28; 10-11 year-olds: Mmixing costs = .11 vs. Mswitch costs = .24; ps < .002).  834 
Trial type significantly interacted with instruction condition, F(2, 302) = 3.17, p = 835 
.047, η2p = .02. Mixing and switch costs were significant in both instruction conditions (rule 836 
instruction condition: Msingle trials = 6.90 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials = 6.99 ln ms vs. Mtask switch 837 
trials = 7.32 ln ms; no rule instruction condition: Msingle trials = 6.83 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials ln 838 
ms vs. Mtask switch = 7.23 ln ms; ps < .001). Although mixing costs were greater in the no-rule 839 
instruction condition than in the rule instruction condition, this was not significant, p = .052, 840 
whereas switch costs were significantly higher in the rule instruction condition than in the no-841 
rule instruction condition (Mrule instruction condition = .33 vs. Mno rule instruction condition = .24; p = .004). 842 
Finally, switch costs were larger than mixing costs in the instruction condition (Mmixing costs = 843 
.09 vs. Mswitch costs = .33; p < .001), but it failed to reach significance in the no instruction 844 
condition, p = .052. 845 
846 
Figure 2. Log RTs for trial type (single task trials, task repetition trials, task switch trials) as a 847 
function of age group (4-5 year-olds, 7-8 year-olds, 10-11 year-olds) and instruction 848 
59
condition (rule instruction, no rule instruction; left figure) and costs (mixing costs, switch 849 
costs) as a function of instruction condition (right figure). Error bars represent standard 850 
errors.  851 
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Chapter 3: Investigating task selection in self-
directed cognitive control development using
the voluntary task-switching paradigm
62
Background
In this second empirical chapter, I investigated goal identification, with a particular focus on
task selection, in childhood. To do so, I adapted the voluntary task-switching paradigm for
use with children as young as 5 years-old, and looked at two other indices than p(switch),
which were task balance and task randomness. I also investigated the role of reactive and
proactive control by manipulating the preparation time before stimulus onset.
This chapter has been published in the journal Developmental Psychology, May 2019.
Frick, A., Brandimonte, M.A., Chevalier, N. (2019). Voluntary task switching in children:
Switching more reduces the cost of task selection. Developmental Psychology,
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Emerging cognitive control supports increasingly efficient goal-directed behaviors. With age, children
are increasingly expected to decide autonomously and with little external aid which goals to attain.
However, little is known about how children engage cognitive control in such a self-directed fashion. The
present study examined self-directed control development by adapting the voluntary task switching
paradigm—the gold standard measure of this control form in adults—for use with 5–6-year-old and
9–10-year-old children. Overall, p(switch) suggested that even younger children can engage self-directed
control successfully. However, other measures showed they struggled with task selection. Specifically,
compared with older children and adults, they relied more on systematic strategies which reduced the cost
of task selection, even when the strategy involved switching more often. Like externally driven control,
self-directed control relies critically on task selection processes. These two forms of control likely form
a continuum rather than two discrete categories.
Keywords: self-directed control, cognitive control, voluntary task switching, endogenous control, cog-
nitive development
Gaining autonomy is a key aspect of growing up. As children
grow older, they are increasingly expected to behave autono-
mously with little or no aids regarding what to do, how to do it,
and when to do it. For instance, most of the personal work
required to prepare for a school test is less explicitly guided by
teachers or parents as children move up across school grades,
hence leading to greater demands on what particular course
materials to study and when and how to study them. To com-
plete such tasks, children engage cognitive control to regulate
their thoughts and actions in a self-directed manner. Although
self-directed control engagement is bound to substantially im-
pact on children’s lives, including academic achievement, little
is known about its development. So far, cognitive control
development has been studied almost exclusively in situations
where its engagement is externally driven by cues, reminders,
or clear instructions about the goal to attain. In contrast, the
current study examined how children self-directedly engage
control when no external support is provided.
Even in situations in which cognitive control is externally
driven, the ability to select the relevant tasks or actions to perform
(or identify goals to pursue) is key to efficient cognitive control
(Broeker et al., 2018) and its development across childhood (Che-
valier, 2015). In particular, task selection (goal identification) is
often inferred through cues that guide relevant behavior selection
and engagement (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Indeed, frontoparietal
activation while engaging cognitive control is largely related to
cue processing in adolescents and adults (Chatham et al., 2012;
Church, Bunge, Petersen, & Schlaggar, 2017). Yet, children strug-
gle to process cues and use this info to select the most relevant task
in situations where they have to switch between multiple tasks
(Chevalier & Blaye, 2009; Chevalier, Huber, Wiebe, & Espy,
2013). They are better at switching tasks after practicing cue
detection (Chevalier, Chatham, & Munakata, 2014; Kray, Gaspard,
Karbach, & Blaye, 2013) or when cues are easier to process
(Chevalier & Blaye, 2009). Cue processing progressively im-
proves with age, resulting in increasingly successful task selection
and, more broadly, cognitive control (Chevalier, 2015). As task
selection is central, even in situations in which cognitive control is
externally driven, children may particularly struggle when cogni-
tive control is self-directed, as there is no external support to drive
what to do and when.
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To date, however, very little is known about how children
engage cognitive control in self-directed situations, as only a
handful of developmental studies have explored this question,
probably because of the difficulty of running less controlled tasks
in which control must be engaged in a self-directed manner (Barker &
Munakata, 2015). These studies have essentially used the semantic
verbal fluency task (Troyer, Moscovitch, & Winocur, 1997), in
which children must name as many items from a specific category
(e.g., animals) as they can (Barker et al., 2014; Snyder & Mu-
nakata, 2010, 2013). Although younger children spontaneously
generate only a couple of items from one subcategory (e.g., cat,
dog, rabbit, bird), they generate more items and switch more often
between subcategories when given pretask reminders (e.g., “a cat
is a pet” or “a lion is a zoo animal”) that reduce high task selection
demands (i.e., choices between multiple competing subcategories;
Snyder & Munakata, 2010, 2013). Therefore, reducing task selec-
tion demands seems critical for successful task performance in
young children, perhaps even more so than switching per se.
However, it remains unknown how children engage self-directed
control in nonlinguistic situations, what task selection strategies
they use to achieve a goal and how this use of strategies changes
with age, and to what extent becoming increasingly self-directed
may relate to adaptive use of different control modes. These
questions may not be easily answered using the verbal fluency task
as this task leaves little room for experimental manipulations
(Isacoff & Stromswold, 2014).
A promising paradigm to chart out the development of self-
directed control is the voluntary task switching (VTS; Arrington &
Logan, 2004) procedure, which is considered as the gold standard
assessment of self-directed control in adults (for a review, see
Arrington, Reiman, & Weaver, 2014). Unlike other externally
driven task switching paradigms, VTS requires individuals to
freely choose which task to perform between two simple tasks on
each trial, with the constraints to select the tasks equally often and
in a random fashion. But, similar to other task switching paradigms
(e.g., Meiran, 1996), task performance is worse in task switch trials
than in task repetition trials, and therefore a switch cost is ob-
served, especially in terms of reaction times (RTs, for review, see
Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen,
2010). In addition, adults are asked to choose both tasks equally
often in a random order, which should result in an equal number of
task repetitions and task switches. They nevertheless show a robust
repetition bias (i.e., repeating the task they have just done more
often than switching to the other task), quantified by a probability
of switching [noted p(switch) and ranging from 0 to 1] lower than
the optimal score of .5 (around .44), indicating that task selection
is particularly effortful (e.g., Arrington & Logan, 2005; Mittel-
städt, Dignath, Schmidt-Ott, & Kiesel, 2018). Interestingly, the
repetition bias seems to follow a U-shaped pattern with age, as
adolescents and elderly people show a stronger repetition bias than
adults (Butler & Weywadt, 2013; Poljac, Haartsen, van der Crui-
jsen, Kiesel, & Poljac, 2018; Terry & Sliwinski, 2012). In line with
these findings, VTS performance is associated with greater frontal
and prefrontal activation than cued task switching (in which the
relevant task on each trial is externally signaled by a task cue).
Specifically, enhanced activation in the rostral and dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex may reflect voluntary control of action and free
choice between competitive alternatives (Demanet, De Baene,
Arrington, & Brass, 2013; Marsh, Blair, Vythilingam, Busis, &
Blair, 2007), while activation in the posterior cingulate may sup-
port self-chosen intentions (Soon, He, Bode, & Haynes, 2013).
Thus, due to higher task selection demands, VTS is more demand-
ing than other task switching paradigms.
Having enough time to prepare for the next trial is crucial to
engage the cognitive control processes needed to select and exe-
cute a task, as evidenced by a smaller repetition bias and higher
p(switch) when participants are given a longer preparation time
(i.e., response to stimulus interval) before stimulus onset (Ar-
rington & Logan, 2005; Butler, Arrington, & Weywadt, 2011;
Butler & Weywadt, 2013; Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandieren-
donck, 2009; Yeung, 2010). Adults may benefit from longer prep-
aration time because they need time to adaptively select the task
they want to perform next through the representativeness heuristic,
that is, selecting a task after maintaining a sequence of recently
performed tasks in working memory and comparing it with an
internal sequence of randomness before stimulus onset. Alterna-
tively, the task to be performed next can be selected via the
availability heuristic, which consists in selecting after stimulus
onset the task that has just been done, which has had less time to
decay in working memory and is thus easier to reactivate than the
other task. Unlike the representativeness heuristic, the availability
heuristic requires no preparation time to operate but it leads to
more task repetitions (Arrington & Logan, 2005). Long prepara-
tion times may allow adults to anticipate and prepare in advance
for the upcoming task, hence encouraging the representativeness
heuristic over the availability heuristic. Interestingly, these two
heuristics map onto the distinction between proactive control (i.e.,
engagement of control in anticipation of upcoming demands) and
reactive control (i.e., engagement of control in the moment it is
needed; Braver, 2012), respectively. Concurrent working memory
load leads to more task repetitions in VTS (Liefooghe, Demanet, &
Vandierendonck, 2010; Weaver & Arrington, 2010), perhaps be-
cause it prevents proactive control, which heavily relies on work-
ing memory for the sustained maintenance of goal-relevant infor-
mation (Marklund & Persson, 2012). Unlike adults and older
children, younger children tend to be biased toward reactive con-
trol, rarely engaging proactive control (Chevalier, Martis, Curran,
& Munakata, 2015; Doebel et al., 2017; Munakata, Snyder, &
Chatham, 2012). They may therefore rely more on the availability
than the representativeness heuristic in VTS, and thus show a
greater repetition bias than adults, even with long preparation
times.
However, the repetition bias or p(switch), which is the unique
measure of task selection processes in most prior studies in adults,
may fail to capture important aspects of VTS performance, such as
the need to perform both tasks equally often and in random
fashion. Specifically, a participant could show a p(switch) equal to
.5, which is considered as a perfect score of randomness, but
nevertheless use a nonrandom strategy such as systematically
switching every two trials (e.g., Task A, Task A, Task B, Task B,
Task A, Task A, etc.). Indeed, there are individual differences in
self-organized strategies in VTS, with a majority of adults adap-
tively engaging in both task repetitions and task switches (i.e.,
alternators), but also a minority using more basic nonrandom
strategies such as constantly switching between the tasks (i.e.,
switchers) or constantly repeating the task they have just done on
a previous trial (i.e., blockers; Reissland & Manzey, 2016). This
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research showing great heterogeneity regarding the use of strate-
gies in externally driven task switching situations in children (e.g.,
Blakey, Visser, & Carroll, 2016; Dauvier, Chevalier, & Blaye,
2012). Consequently, a full account of task selection processes
involved in VTS should at least report measures of (a) task
transition, assessing how often participants repeat or switch tasks;
(b) task selection equality, indexing how well they perform the two
(or more) tasks equally often; and (c) task randomness, indicating
how often participants use nonrandom strategies.
VTS has never been used with children, despite its prominent
role in the adult literature and potential to shed light on self-
directed control development. The present study adapted this par-
adigm for children to investigate age-related changes in task
selection processes when no external aid is provided. We targeted
5- to 6- and 9- to 10-year-olds (in addition to adults), given the
now well-established transition from reactive to proactive control
during that age range (Chevalier et al., 2015; Munakata et al.,
2012). We used three different measures to comprehensively cap-
ture three main aspects of task selection processes: (a) task tran-
sition through p(switch), (b) task selection equality through the
relative difference between the proportion of trials in which each
of the two tasks was selected, and (c) task randomness through
occurrences of nonrandom strategies. In addition, we examined the
role of reactive and proactive control in VTS by varying prepara-
tion time duration using short (600 ms) and long (2,000 ms)
preparation times. Given that younger children engage proactive
control less than adults, we expected them to show a lower
p(switch) and to be worse at performing the two tasks equally
often and be less sensitive to preparation time variations than other
age groups, who should show a higher p(switch) and perform the
two tasks more equally often especially with the longer preparation
time. Importantly, we expected younger children to struggle par-
ticularly with task selection and therefore rely more on nonrandom
strategies than older children and adults.
Method
Participants
Participants included twenty-nine 5- and 6-year-old children
(Mage  6.11 years, SDage  .45, range: 5.33–6.71, 14 females),
31 9- and 10-year-old children (Mage  10.05 years, SDage  .52,
range: 9.13–10.95, 13 females), and 31 adults (Mage  21.80 years,
SDage  3.36, range: 18.77–30.77, 15 females). Two additional
5–6-year-olds were excluded, because one failed the practice (see
the Method section) the other fell outside the targeted age range.
Data collection stopped when the sample size of each age group
reached 31 participants, which is comparable to prior developmen-
tal studies comparing 5- and 6-year-old children and 9- and 10-
year-old children (e.g., Chevalier, Jackson, Revueltas Roux, Mori-
guchi, & Auyeung, 2019) or to adult studies using VTS (e.g.,
Fröber, Pfister, & Dreisbach, 2019). Children were recruited from
one private preschool and one private primary school and adults
were all students enrolling at the University of Edinburgh. In-
formed written consent was obtained from children’s parents and
from adult participants and all children provided signed assent.
Children received a small age-appropriate prize (e.g., stickers) and
adults received either course credits or £5 for their participation.
The research project and protocols were approved by the Ethics
Committee from the University of Edinburgh (Study title: “Role of
preparation time in voluntary task switching in children and
adults”: Ref. no. 23–1718/2,) as well as all participating schools.
Material and Procedure
All participants were tested individually in a 30-min session
either in a quiet room at school (children) or in the laboratory
(adults). They completed a child-friendly, VTS paradigm adapted
from a similar paradigm in adults (Arrington & Logan, 2004) and
presented with E-Prime 2 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh,
PA). It was introduced to participants as “Santa Claus and Mitch
the Bad Elf Game.” Participants were instructed to help Santa
sorting toys into two bags for Christmas, while watching out for
Mitch, an elf toy thief. Participants were instructed to switch
voluntarily between sorting bidimensional targets (e.g., a blue
teddy) by color and shape. If they played the color game, they had
to place the target in the color bag by pressing the response box
button matching the target’s color, whereas they had to place the
target in the shape bag if they played the shape game, by pressing
the button matching the matching the target’s shape. Participants
were given two additional instructions (modeled after Arrington &
Logan, 2004), corresponding to two main features of the adult
version of VTS. First, participants had to put roughly as many toys
in each of the two bags. Second, they had to play the two tasks
randomly, which was conveyed by asking participants to make
sure Mitch could not predict how they would sort the toys. Oth-
erwise, Mitch would show up and steal the toy inside the present
box (the now empty present box would still be moved into the
selected bag).
Each trial started with a central fixation cross alongside the two
bags with two responses pictures below each bag (i.e., a blue and
red patch under the color bag, a car and teddy bear under the shape
bag; Figure 1). The bags were constantly visible on the right- and
left-hand sides of the monitor but the locations of the bags and
responses pictures were counterbalanced across participants. After
1,500 ms (in the long preparation time condition) or 100 ms (in the
short preparation time condition), the fixation cross disappeared
and was replaced with the target that remained on the screen until
a response was entered by pressing one of the four buttons on a
response box. After the response, the target was replaced by a
closed present box that remained at the center of the screen for 250
ms before being moved to the selected bag for 250 ms. If a
predictable strategy was used and detected by the program (for
details on the different strategies implemented in the program and
how many trials in a row of a particular strategy would trigger
Mitch the thief elf, see the Data Processing and Analysis subsec-
tion), the target was replaced by an opened present box with a
small version of the toy alongside Mitch the thief elf for 250 ms
and the sound effect “ah-ah.” Then the same present box was
closed and moved into the bag chosen by the participants while the
small version of the toy and Mitch remained on the screen for 250
ms. Whether or not the elf showed up, the present box inside the
bag was no longer visible during the following trial.
All participants completed the task in two conditions (order
counterbalanced across participants). In the short preparation time
condition, the fixation cross was visible only for 100 ms, leaving
a total of 600 ms (cross fixation duration  100 ms  present
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to prepare for the upcoming trial. In contrast, in the long prepara-
tion time condition, the fixation cross was visible for 1,500 ms,
providing a total of 2,000 ms (cross fixation duration  1,500
ms  present moving or Mitch appearing duration  500 ms) for
the participant to prepare for the upcoming trial. Different combi-
nations of colors and shapes were used in each condition (either
car-teddy-blue-red or doll-plane-green-pink).
In both conditions, participants first completed two single
blocks in which they were instructed to always sort toys by either
color or shape, in order to get familiar with each task. Each single
block comprised four warm-up trials (repeated up to 2 times if
participants made more than 2 errors) followed by 16 test trials.
The order of the color and shape-matching tasks was counterbal-
anced across participants. Participants then completed two mixed
blocks in which they were instructed to switch voluntarily between
the two tasks with the two constraints of filling the two bags
equally often and tricking Mitch as much as they could. To make
sure all participants understood the instructions, the experimenter
performed two demonstration trials. In the first demonstration,
participants observed the experimenter alternate systematically
between the two bags (i.e., two tasks) on seven trials (“color-shape-
color-shape-color-shape-color” or “shape-color-shape-color-shape-
color-shape” with order counterbalanced across participants and
conditions), which resulted in the last target being stolen by Mitch.
In the second demonstration, participants were shown one of two
potential ways of successfully sorting the toys (“color-color-shape-
color-shape-shape-shape-color-color-shape-color-color” or
“shape-shape-color-shape-color-color-color-shape-shape-color-
shape-shape” with order counterbalanced across participants and
conditions), putting the same number of toys into each bag and
avoiding the theft of toys by Mitch. Participants then completed 16
practice trials. Practice trials were repeated (maximum 3 times) if
one bag contained more than 10 toys (62.5%), Mitch stole a toy
(i.e., detection of a predictable strategy), or more than eight errors
(50%) were made. Critically, participants first performed the prac-
tice trials on their own but if these trials needed to be repeated,
they received help from the experimenter. Participants who failed
to pass the practice trials after three repetitions were excluded (n 
1). Participants then completed two mixed-task blocks of 40 test
trials separated by a short break. At the end of each mixed block
(practice trials and test trials), feedback was provided to encourage
participants to respond accurately and follow the instructions of
preforming the two tasks equally often and in a random fashion.
Feedback conveyed the number of errors, whether one bag con-
tained more toys than the other (more than 62.5% of the toys), and
the number of toys stolen by Mitch. Although no feedback regard-
ing response times was given, participants were instructed to
respond as quickly as possible before each block.
Data Processing and Analysis
Trial type was determined as follows: if the task (color or shape)
performed on trial n repeated from the trial n-1, this trial was coded
as a “task repetition” trial, if, conversely, the task on trial n was
different from trial n-1, this trial was coded as a “task switch” trial.
Task performance, task choice and task transition measures, and
the use of strategies were analyzed. Task performance was indexed
by mean accuracy and RTs for each trial type (single, task repe-
tition, and task switch), which allowed estimating mixing costs
(contrasting between single trials and task repetition trials) and
switch costs (contrasting between task repetition trials and task
switch trials. Mixing costs index the difficulty of selecting the
relevant task when tasks are mixed and switch costs index the
difficulty of switching from one task to another per se. These
Figure 1. Child-friendly voluntary task switching paradigm. Participants had to decide whether to sort the toys
in the color or shape bags according to the general instructions of filling the two bags with about the same
number of toys in a no-predictable fashion to avoid the theft of the toys. See the online article for the color
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analyses were performed after discarding the first trial of each
block. Moreover, RTs were log-transformed (to correct for skew-
ness and minimize baseline differences between age groups al-
though only raw values are reported for the sake of clarity) and
only RTs for correct responses immediately preceded by another
correct response were kept in the analyses, resulting in the removal
of 13.46% of the trials in total (a rate in line with previous studies
using VTS in adults, e.g., Arrington & Weaver, 2015). RTs on
trials following the appearance of the bad elf were also removed as
their latencies were longer than on normal trials, which represented
1.07% of the remaining trials. Finally, RTs were trimmed out if
they were under 200 ms, to account for accidental button presses,
or greater than 3 standard deviations above the mean of each
participant (computed separately for trials from single blocks, and
repeat and switch trials from mixed blocks) or 10,000 ms, resulting
in the removal of 1.69% of the remaining trials.
Task selection was measured via three indices. (a) Task transi-
tion was calculated based on whether the task was repeated or
switched on a given trial n. This measure, often considered as the
main outcome variable in VTS studies, corresponding to p(switch),
and was calculated by dividing the number of task switch trials by
the total number of task switch and task repetition trials (i.e., 78).
This score ranged between 0 and 1 with 5 corresponding to a
perfectly equal number of task repetitions and task switches. (b)
Task selection equality corresponded to a task selection measure of
the ability to perform each task equally often in the mixed blocks.
This index consisted in the relative difference between the pro-
portion of trials in which the shape bag was selected and the
proportion of trials in which the color bag was selected. As such,
the closer this index was to 0, the more equally frequently the two
tasks were performed. (c) Task randomness was via occurrences of
10 different systematic strategies. These strategies ranged from
five basic to complex patterns as follows:
Repetition only (detected over 7 trials):
• Task A, Task A, Task A, Task A, Task A, Task A,
Task A.
• Task B, Task B, Task B, Task B, Task B, Task B,
Task B.
Switch only (detected over 7 trials):
• Task A, Task B, Task A, Task B, Task A, Task B,
Task A.
• Task B, Task A, Task B, Task A, Task B, Task A,
Task B.
One repetition and switch (detected over 9 trials):
• Task A, Task A, Task B, Task B, Task A, Task A,
Task B, Task B, Task A.
• Task B, Task B, Task A, Task A, Task B, Task B,
Task A, Task A, Task B.
Two repetitions and switch (detected over 11 trials):
• Task A, Task A, Task A, Task B, Task B, Task B,
Task A, Task A, Task A, Task B, Task B.
• Task B, Task B, Task B, Task A, Task A, Task A,
Task B, Task B, Task B, Task A, Task A.
Three repetitions and switch (detected over 13 trials):
• Task A, Task A, Task A, Task A, Task B, Task B,
Task B, Task B, Task A, Task A, Task A, Task A,
Task B.
• Task B, Task B, Task B, Task B, Task A, Task A,
Task A, Task A, Task B, Task B, Task B, Task B,
Task A.
If participants used one of these patterns, the corresponding
strategy was automatically detected by the program and triggered
Mitch the thief elf. The number of time these strategies was used
during the game (i.e., when Mitch showed up) provided an indi-
cation of randomness. Moreover, our analyses also focused on the
qualitative type of strategies (e.g., simple repetition of one task for
seven trials or more complex alternation with a switch every third
repetition for 13 trials).
Task performance and task selection measures were analyzed
with mixed analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with age as a between-
subjects variable, and preparation time and/or trial type as within-
subject variables, Bonferroni-corrected post hoc tests, and t tests.
When appropriate, the Greenhouse-Geisser (Greenhouse & Geis-
ser, 1959) correction was applied for violation of the assumption of
sphericity. Finally, the type of strategies used across age groups
and/or without preparation time durations was analyzed with mul-
tivariate analyses of covariance (MANOVAs).
Results
Task Performance
Accuracy rates. A 3 (age group: 5–6 years, 9–10 years,
adults)  2 (preparation time: short, long)  3 (trial type: single,
task repetition, task switch) mixed ANOVA was performed on
accuracy rates. The analysis showed main effects of age, F(2,
88)  10.56, p  .001, p2  .19, trial type, F(2, 176)  3.80, p 
.038, p2  .04, and preparation time, F(1, 88)  8.68, p  .004,
p2  .09, and these effects were qualified by a significant two-way
interaction between age and preparation time, F(2, 88)  4.30, p 
.017, p2  .09, and a significant three-way interaction, F(4,
176)  3.57, p  .014, p2  .07. Preparation time differentially
affected trial type across age groups (Figure 2). More specifically,
while 5–6-year-olds were significantly less accurate with the short
Figure 2. Accuracy rates by trial type (single, task repetition, task switch)
for 5–6- year-olds, 9–10-year-olds, and adults as a function of preparation
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than the long preparation time (Mshort  88.86% vs. Mlong 
93.04%), p  .008, no such difference was observed in 9–10-year-
olds and adults (9–10-year-olds: Mshort  94.32% vs. Mlong 
94.87%; adults: Mshort  97.15% vs. Mlong  97.59%), respec-
tively, p  .574 and p  .209. Moreover, for the 5–6-year-olds,
only the difference between single trials and task repetition
trials in the long preparation time condition (Msingle  96.09%,
vs. Mtask repetition  91.25%) was significant, p  .012, revealing
significant mixing costs. Conversely, 9–10-year-olds showed sig-
nificant mixing costs in the short preparation time condition
(Msingle  96.67% vs. Mtask repetition  92.82%), p  .014. For
adults, accuracy rates across trial types and preparation time re-
vealed no significant mixing or switch costs, all ps .079.
RTs. On RTs, a 3 (age group: 5–6 years, 9–10 years,
adults)  3 (trial type: single, task repetition, task switch)  2
(preparation time: short, long) mixed ANOVA was performed.
There were main effects of age, F(2, 88)  158.10, p  .001, p2 
.78, trial type, F(2, 176)  372.44, p  .001, p2  .81, but not of
preparation time, p  .290, and these effects were qualified by
two-way interactions between age and trial type, F(4, 176)  8.65,
p  .001, p2  .16, and trial type and preparation time, F(2,
176)  22.38, p  .001, p2  .20, and a significant three-way
interaction between these factors, F(4, 176)  3.00, p  .031,
p2  .06. Although each age group showed significant mixing and
switch costs, all ps .001, these costs were overall higher for
5– 6-year-olds (Msingle  1,241.47 ms, Mtask repetition 
1,869.75 ms and Mtask switch  2,613.95 ms) than for 9 –10-
year-olds (Msingle  710.00 ms, Mtask repetition  1,018.60 ms
and Mtask switch  1,219.11 ms) and adults (Msingle  485.20
ms, Mtask repetition  662.61 ms and Mtask switch  761.59 ms).
Moreover, preparation time did not affect mixing costs in children
(5–6-year-olds: Mshort  590.24 ms vs. Mlong  666.32 ms;
9–10-year-olds: Mshort  303.99 ms vs. Mlong  313.21 ms), all
ps .580, but it did in adults (Mshort  195.15 ms vs. Mlong 
159.67 ms), p  .041. Conversely, switch costs were higher with
short than long preparation times in each age group, and this
difference was largest for 5–6-year-olds (5–6-year-olds: Mshort 
1,034.47 ms vs. Mlong  453.93 ms; 9–10 year-olds: Mshort 
281.91 ms vs. Mlong  119.10 ms; adults: Mshort  128.03 ms vs.
Mlong  69.92 ms), all ps .005 (Figure 3).
Task Selection
Task transition—P (switch). Task transition was examined
with a 3 (age group: 5–6 years, 9–10 years, adults)  2 (prepa-
ration time: short, long) mixed ANOVA performed on p(switch).
The analysis revealed a main effect of preparation time, F(1, 88) 
7.90, p  .006, p2  .08, but no effect of age, p  .353, and no
significant interaction between preparation time and age, p  .275.
Overall, pairwise comparisons indicated that participants switched
tasks less often when preparation time was short than long, re-
spectively, Mp(switch)  44.78% and Mp(switch)  48.62%, p  .005
(Figure 4). However, when comparing p(switch) between both
conditions for each group, we found that there were significant
differences between the short and long preparation time conditions
in older children (Mp(switch)  46.24% and Mp(switch)  51.53%)
and adults (Mp(switch)  43.63% and Mp(switch)  48.97%), respec-
tively, p  .015 and p  .004, but no difference in younger
children (Mp(switch)  44.47% and Mp(switch)  45.14%), p  .831.
Task selection equality—Relative difference between the
frequency of each task. Task selection equality was analyzed
with a 3 (age group: 5–6 years, 9–10 years, adults)  2 (prepa-
ration time: short, long) mixed ANOVA performed on the relative
difference between the two tasks. The ANOVA showed a main
effect of age, F(2, 88)  8.19, p  .001, p2  .16 but no effect of
preparation time, p  .720, and no interaction, p  .871. Pairwise
comparisons indicated that 5–6-year-olds did not perform the two
tasks as equally often (Mdifference  10.30%) as 9–10-year-olds
(Mdifference  5.00%) and adults (Mdifference  5.28%), regardless
of the preparation time duration (Figure 5), all ps .003.
Task randomness—Strategy detection and type of strategy
used. We examined task randomness with a 3 (age group: 5–6
years, 9–10 years, adults)  2 (preparation time: short, long)
mixed ANOVA to test to what extent participants used predictable
strategies, and whether or not it varied according to age and/or
preparation time. There were main effects of age, F(2, 88) 
38.82, p  .001 p2  .47, and preparation time, F(1, 88)  6.15,
p  .015, p2  .06, while the interaction did not reach signifi-
cance, p  .113. Overall, pairwise comparisons indicated that
5–6-year-olds used significantly more nonrandom patterns or
strategies (M  2.59) than 9–10-year-olds (M  0.73) and adults
(M  0.55), all ps .001, and in all age groups, the use of
strategies was overall slightly higher in the short preparation time
condition than in the long preparation time condition (respectively,
M  1.46 and M  1.05), p  .019 (Figure 6), although further
analyses revealed that the difference between the two preparation
time conditions was not significant for all age groups, all ps .054.
Then, the type of strategies the participants used across age
groups and preparation time durations was investigated with a
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). It revealed a sig-
nificant difference in strategy type used based on age, F(10,
344)  9.45, p  .001, Wilk’s   .62, p2  .21, but not based
on preparation time, F(5, 172)  1.29, p  .269, Wilk’s   .97,
p2  .04, with no interaction between these two factors, p  .340.
As there was no effect of preparation time, we ran another
MANOVA without this factor and as illustrated in Figure 7; age
had a main effect on the strategy repetition only, F(1, 88)  17.46,
p  .001, p2  .28, switch only, F(1, 88)  11.89, p  .001, p2 
.21, and one repetition and switch, F(2, 88)  3.88, p  .024, p2 
.08, but not on the two other strategies, all ps .433. Pairwise
Figure 3. Reaction times (in milliseconds) for 5–6-year-olds, 9–10-year-
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comparisons indicated that 5–6-year-olds used repetition only and
switch only strategies more often than 9–10-year-olds and adults
(repetition only: M  2.31, M  .06, and M  .29, respectively,
all ps .001; switch only: M  1.52, M  .35, and M  .13,
respectively, ps .001). 5–6-year-olds also significantly used the
one repetition and switch strategy more than adults (M  .90 and
M  .26, respectively), p  .023, but not than 9–10-year-olds,
(M  .45), p  .182. All other comparisons were not significant,
all ps  .608. In 5–6-year-olds, the repetition only strategy was
not significantly used more frequently than the switch only strat-
egy, p  .232, but more frequently than one repetition and switch,
p  .039. No difference was observed between switch only and
one repetition and switch, p  .164.
Discussion
The current study addressed the development of self-directed
control by examining how 5- to 6-year-olds, 9- to 10-year-olds,
and adults voluntarily switched between tasks. In particular, we
explored the role of proactive and reactive control by using a short
and a long preparation time. Contrary to our expectations, younger
children showed a similar repetition bias to older children and
adults, with a p(switch) value inferior to .5. However, following
our predictions, their p(switch) was less sensitive to preparation
time variations than for older children and adults, suggesting they
engaged control more reactively than older groups. Moreover,
younger children were significantly worse at performing the two
tasks equally often, and used significantly more basic nonrandom
strategies such as repeating systematically the task that had just
been done, switching systematically between the two tasks or
always switching after one repetition, reducing the cognitive de-
mands of task selection.
Mixing and switch costs found in our experiment replicated the
trend found in externally driven task switching paradigms in
children (e.g., Chevalier & Blaye, 2009; Chevalier, Dauvier, &
Blaye, 2018; Dauvier et al., 2012), suggesting that our child-
friendly version of VTS appropriately tapped task switching. Fur-
thermore, using this child-friendly VTS paradigm for the first time,
we replicated previous findings from VTS studies in adults show-
ing that participants had overall a p(switch) lower than .5 which
even decreased with shorter preparation time for older children and
adults (e.g., Arrington & Logan, 2005; Butler et al., 2011; Butler
& Weywadt, 2013; Liefooghe et al., 2009; Yeung, 2010). This
further suggests that our VTS paradigm captured self-directed
control processes similar to those measured by classic VTS para-
digms in adults, hence speaking to the success of our VTS adap-
tation.
Surprisingly, children showed a similar p(switch) to adults,
against the expectation that the repetition bias would follow a
U-shaped pattern with age, as hinted by prior studies showing a
lower p(switch) during adolescence and aging than adulthood
(Butler & Weywadt, 2013; Poljac et al., 2018; Terry & Sliwinski,
2012). In our study, the similar p(switch) across all age groups
seemingly suggests no major differences between children and
adults in the task selection processes involved in VTS. However,
although the interaction between age and preparation time was not
significant, younger children showed the same p(switch) with both
preparation times, whereas p(switch) significantly increased with
preparation time in older children and adults. Younger children
may have used reactive control (i.e., availability heuristic) in VTS
regardless of the amount of preparation time available, while older
participants may have engaged proactive control (i.e., representa-
tiveness heuristic) when enough time was available. This would
corroborate similar trends observed in task switching paradigms,
but also in other paradigms both tapping externally driven cogni-
tive control (e.g., Blackwell & Munakata, 2014; Chevalier, James,
Wiebe, Nelson, & Espy, 2014; Chevalier et al., 2015; Lucenet &
Blaye, 2014). Nevertheless, further research is needed to clarify
Figure 4. P(switch) for 5–6-year-olds, 9–10-year-olds, and adults as a
function of preparation time. Error bars represent standard errors.
Figure 5. Difference between the two bags for 5–6-year-olds, 9–10-year-
olds, and adults as a function of preparation time. Error bars represent
standard errors.
Figure 6. Strategy detection (mean) for 5–6-year-olds, 9–10-year-olds,
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the role of reactive and proactive control in children’s VTS per-
formance. One promising option would be to couple our child-
friendly VTS with physiological measurements such as event-
related potentials, functional MRI, and pupil dilation, as these
measures have shown sensitivity to reactive and proactive control
engagement on other tasks (e.g., Chatham et al., 2012; Chevalier et
al., 2015; Church et al., 2017).
As mentioned earlier, a drawback of using p(switch) as a unique
measure of task selection (Arrington et al., 2014) is that it does not
capture all aspects of VTS performance. In our study, the similar
p(switch) found across age groups would suggest that children, and
younger children in particular, have little difficulty with self-
directed control, which would seem at odds with previous research
on self-directed control development using different tasks (Barker
et al., 2014; Snyder & Munakata, 2010, 2013; White, Burgess, &
Hill, 2009). However, when considering measures other than
p(switch), a different picture emerged, showing that task selection was
particularly costly for younger children. In particular, younger chil-
dren performed the two tasks less equally often than older children
and adults.
Besides task selection difficulty, developmental limitations in
numerical understanding may contribute to age-related differences
in VTS performance. Indeed, learning number magnitudes devel-
ops slowly across childhood and although children as young as 5
years old can compare and add numerical quantities, they do not
have adultlike exact number magnitude representations and they
do not have much experience with numbers exceeding the 0–10
range (Barth, La Mont, Lipton, & Spelke, 2005, but see Siegler,
2016). Therefore, younger children may therefore have failed to
add on from the last number and maintained this representation in
working memory, leading them to struggle with performing the
two tasks equally often. That said, counting strategies may not
necessarily consist in counting how many times each task was
played throughout the game, but instead counting trials within a
run of trials before switching to the other task and starting from 1
again, which would require simpler numerical processing. Helping
children more easily keep track of how many toys have been put
into each bag by letting children see how many toys have been
sorted within each bag should reduce age-related differences in
future research, if these differences arise from limited numerical
processing in younger children.
Another important finding was that, systematic, nonrandom
strategies were more frequent in younger children than older
children and adults. To account for this difference, one may argue
that younger children simply did not understand the instruction of
filling the two bags in a random fashion, even though this instruc-
tion was conveyed in a child-friendly manner through a bad elf that
could otherwise guess how the target would be sorted and steal it.
However, during practice, the use of systematic strategies was
actively monitored and participants would progress onto the test
trials of the mixed blocks only if they successfully played ran-
domly, hence ensuring their understanding of this instruction. Indeed, as
younger children required more practice than older children and adults
(respectively, Mnumber of practice  1.43, Mnumber of practice  1.21 and
Mnumber of practice  1.11, all ps .019) to master the instructions, one
may argue that they may still have struggled to understand this
instruction. However, when comparing younger children who needed
only one practice round without the help of the experimenter—and
therefore showed perfect understanding of the “randomness” instruc-
tion—to younger children who needed more than one practice round
with the help of the experimenter, we observed no significant differ-
ences regarding how often they resorted to strategies (respectively,
Mnumber of strategy  2.50 and Mnumber of strategy  2.64, p  .804).
These findings further suggest that younger children understood the
need to sort targets randomly but nevertheless relied on nonrandom
strategies.
Young children may have been especially prone to resorting to
strategies because of a lack of working memory abilities coupled
with a difficulty to keep in mind the instructions of performing the
two tasks equally often and in a random manner. Indeed, pre-
schoolers, who have low working memory abilities, are more
prone to goal neglect (i.e., failure to maintain a goal although how
to achieve it is fully understood; see Marcovitch, Boseovski, &
Knapp, 2007). Moreover, decrements in task performance when
keeping prospective rule instructions in mind have been observed
with both adults (e.g., Smith, 2003) and children (e.g., Leigh &
Marcovitch, 2014; Nigro, Brandimonte, Cicogna, & Cosenza,
2014; Smith, Bayen, & Martin, 2010). In our study, younger
children may have needed the appearance of the thief elf as a
prospective cue to follow the instruction of being nonpredictable.
It is therefore possible that processes underlying prospective mem-
ory abilities also affect task selection processes along with task
Figure 7. Use rate (mean) of each strategy from the more basic to the more complicated (left to right) as a
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performance processes. Consistently, commonality in processes
between cognitive control and prospective memory has been em-
phasized in childhood (Brandimonte, Filippello, Coluccia, Altgas-
sen, & Kliegel, 2011; Mahy, Moses, & Kliegel, 2014; Mahy &
Munakata, 2015; Spiess, Meier, & Roebers, 2016).
Whether intentional or not, use of nonrandom strategies reduced
the high cost of task selection demands specific to VTS for
younger children. Having to hold complex rule instructions while
performing VTS is particularly costly for younger children, and
one way to reduce this cost is to favor the easiest rule instruction
(i.e., putting about the same number of toys into each bag) over the
most difficult rule instruction (i.e., performing the two tasks ran-
domly). In prior research, removing the instruction of performing
the two tasks in a random manner resulted in larger individual
differences regarding task selection in adults, as indicated by large
standard deviations in p(switch), suggesting that some participants
were more likely to repeat tasks, whereas others were more likely
to switch tasks (Arrington et al., 2014). Of particular interest, one
of the two most frequent strategies among the younger children
consisted in repeating the same task for long runs of trials, which
led to a small p(switch) and would fit with the U-shaped changes
in VTS performance with age, with adolescents and elderly people
showing a greater repetition bias than adults (Butler & Weywadt,
2013; Poljac et al., 2018; Terry & Sliwinski, 2012). However,
younger children also often used another strategy that consisted in
switching systematically on every trial, which led to a very large
p(switch) and could explain why the overall p(switch) at the group
level was unexpectedly similar to that of older children and adults.
Favoring the rule instruction of performing the two tasks equally
often over the rule instruction of performing the two tasks ran-
domly effectively reduces the cost of task selection. The selection
of the repeat only and switch only as nonrandom strategies by
younger children echoes the study of Arrington et al. (2014), as
well as a recent study showing individual preferences in the use of
strategies in a modified version of VTS in adults (Reissland &
Manzey, 2016), and confirms that in task switching situations,
children show higher variability in individual profiles when it
comes to strategy selection (Dauvier et al., 2012; Moriguchi &
Hiraki, 2011).
It is surprising that children systematically switched between
tasks on every trial, given that this strategy must have resulted in
heavier task switching demands. This finding further suggests that
switching per se is not children’s main difficulty when it comes to
engaging efficient cognitive control. Switch costs were indeed not
significant in terms of accuracy, even in younger children, al-
though switching tasks is still more time consuming than repeti-
tions, as attested by significant switch costs in terms of RTs.
Unlike switching per se, selecting the appropriate task appeared
particularly demanding as attested by (a) significant mixing costs
for both accuracy and RTs, and (b) the use of nonrandom strategies
by young children to reduce its costs. This corroborated studies
using externally driven situations showing that task selection
might be young children’s main difficulty when engaging cogni-
tive control (Chevalier, 2015; Chevalier et al., 2018; Deák, Ray, &
Pick, 2004; Holt & Deák, 2015).
In our experiment, participants showed similar mixing and
switch costs on RTs to those observed in externally driven situa-
tions. Similar processes may indeed be involved in both externally
driven and self-directed control, which may mostly differ in task
selection difficulty. Indeed, in VTS, while older children and
adults adaptively selected tasks, younger children struggled in their
task selection as attested by the fact that they performed the two
tasks less equally often and used more nonrandom strategies. This
confirms the recent idea that task selection is key in cognitive
control (Broeker et al., 2018) and a major force driving cognitive
development (Chevalier, 2015). Further, it also suggests that task
selection is crucial when drawing the contrast between externally
driven and self-directed control. For instance, consider the Wis-
consin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948) compared
with VTS. Both tap self-directed control as in VTS, participants
have to decide on their own when to switch and what task to switch
to, while in WCST, participants have to infer that the rule has
changed and figure out on their own which rule is now relevant.
However, WCST also taps externally driven control because the
need to switch is externally supported by a short feedback from the
experimenter after each choice. This feedback indicates when to
switch but not toward what to switch to. These differences shed
light on a continuum between externally driven and self-directed
control based on the amount of task selection demands rather than
a difference in nature, such as between reactive and proactive
control.
To conclude, when voluntarily switching between tasks in VTS,
5- to 6-year-old children especially struggled to select between the
two tasks, in comparison with 9- to 10-year-old children and
adults, and used strategies which reduced task selection demands,
even if these strategies involved frequent switching. These find-
ings are strikingly similar to what has been previously found in
tasks tapping externally driven control in children, speaking to the
idea that these two forms of control form a continuum in which
task selection demands vary rather than two discrete categories. As
a consequence, better understanding task selection processes and
their development open up new directions to design efficient
interventions for assessing and supporting cognitive control in
childhood.
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Chapter 4: Investigating the cognitive pro-




In this last empirical chapter, I used the child-friendly version of the voluntary
task-switching paradigm presented in Chapter 3 to disentangle the two sub-processes of goal
identification in self-directed control, namely context-tracking and task selection in children
aged 5-6 years-old, 9-10 years-old and adults. To do so, in a first experiment, I manipulated
the amount of environmental support provided which targeted context-tracking. In a second
experiment, I manipulated the difficulties of the two tasks (symmetrical or asymmetrical) to
specifically target task selection. I investigated how these manipulations influenced the three
indices of VTS: p(switch), task balance and task randomness.
This chapter is currently under review in the journal Cognition, June 2020.
Frick, A., Brandimonte, M.A., Chevalier, N. (2019). Understanding autonomous behaviour




Understanding autonomous behaviour development: Testing the respective 1 
contributions of context-tracking and task selection 2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
Gaining autonomy is a key aspect of growing up and support cognitive control development. 5 
However, little is known about how children engage cognitive control in an autonomous (or 6 
self-directed) fashion. Here, we propose that in order to successfully engage self-directed 7 
control, children identify and achieve goals by tracking contextual information and using this 8 
information to select relevant tasks. To disentangle the respective contributions of these 9 
processes, we manipulated the difficulty of context-tracking by providing or not 10 
environmental support (Study 1) and of task selection by varying task difficulty (a)symmetry 11 
(Study 2) in 5-6 and 9-10-year-olds, and adults. Results showed that, although both processes 12 
contribute to successful self-directed engagement of cognitive control, age-related progress 13 
mostly relates to context-tracking. 14 
 15 
Key words: cognitive control development, self-directed control, context-tracking, task 16 
selection, voluntary task-switching  17 
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1. Introduction 18 
Cognitive control, the goal-directed self-regulation of thoughts, actions and emotions, plays a 19 
critical role in children’ daily lives. For instance, to answer a question asked by the teacher 20 
(i.e., the goal) at school, children have to adaptively engage cognitive control to inhibit their 21 
desires to directly give the answer but instead raise their hand first, to update information if 22 
another child has just given the same answer, and to switch to another answer if the one just 23 
given was wrong. Critically, with age, they are increasingly expected to do so without being 24 
explicitly prompted by the teacher. In other words, they need to become increasingly self-25 
directed (as opposed to externally-driven) when engaging cognitive control. However, little is 26 
known about the cognitive processes underlying self-directed engagement of cognitive 27 
control. The current paper explores the role of two fundamental aspects of self-directed 28 
control which are context-tracking and task selection. 29 
 Self-directed control engagement is more challenging than externally-driven control 30 
engagement to children (Munakata, Snyder, & Chatham, 2012), probably because of the 31 
greater difficulty related to goal identification. Goals guide information processing and 32 
actions and are thus critical for cognitive control engagement (Miller & Cohen, 2001). 33 
Children struggle to identify goals from contextual cues, even when such cues are externally 34 
provided in the environment (e.g., a grey background to indicate sorting toys according to 35 
their colour), and largely contributing to immature cognitive control engagement in early 36 
childhood (Chevalier, 2015; Chevalier, Dauvier, & Blaye, 2018; Kray, Gaspard, Karbach, & 37 
Blaye, 2013). Indeed, when cue processing is facilitated or practiced, children show improved 38 
cognitive control performance (e.g., Chevalier & Blaye, 2009; Chevalier, Chatham, & 39 
Munakata, 2014). However, goals are particularly difficult to identify when no or few 40 
environmental cues are provided such as in situations involving self-directed control. 41 
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Successful goal identification involves two key cognitive processes that are likely to 42 
be especially challenging when cognitive control is engaged self-directedly. The first 43 
cognitive process is to keep track of the context (context-tracking). Contexts may involve 44 
changes in task demands or goals and may be influenced by past actions. In particular, 45 
attainment of a specific goal (e.g., prepare breakfast) may require a series of sub-goals (e.g., 46 
make coffee, cut bread, etc.). Therefore, one needs to keep track of contextual information 47 
including where one stands in a hierarchy of sub-goals and goals, or cues suggesting that a 48 
new goal should be pursued. The second cognitive process consists in using this contextual 49 
information to determine when and what behaviour should be engaged (task selection) in 50 
order to achieve sub-goals and goals. However, the relation between context-tracking and 51 
task selection may be bidirectional. Indeed, although context-tracking may guide task 52 
selection by providing information about sub-goals and goals, task selection may also 53 
influence the content of this information, requiring context-tracking to update it, based on 54 
task selection (i.e., once a task has been selected, this selection should be considered when 55 
one keeps track of the context). Working memory, which refers to the maintenance and 56 
manipulation of information in the cognitive system, is known to support both 57 
updating/maintenance of contextual information and manipulation of this information to 58 
select the relevant task. As such, working memory development (e.g., Camos & Barrouillet, 59 
2018) is likely to drive progress in self-directed control engagement in childhood.  60 
The respective contribution of context-tracking and task selection to self-directed 61 
control development may be examined with the voluntary task-switching paradigm (VTS; 62 
Arrington & Logan, 2004), in which individuals self-directedly select which task to perform 63 
following the instructions to perform each task equally often and in a random manner. 64 
Indeed, despite these instructions, adults often tend to repeat the same task more often than 65 
they switch between tasks, hence showing a lower probability of switching, noted p(switch) 66 
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than what would be expected if they repeated and switched tasks equally often (i.e., p(switch) 67 
= .5; e.g., Arrington, Reiman, & Weaver, 2014; Mittelstädt, Dignath, Schmidt-Ott, & Kiesel, 68 
2018). This p(switch) follows an inverted U-shaped pattern with adolescents and elderly 69 
people showing a lower p(switch) than adults (Poljac, Haartsen, van der Cruijsen, Kiesel, & 70 
Poljac, 2018; Terry & Sliwinski, 2012).  71 
However, in the only study examining VTS performance in children, 5-years-olds 72 
showed a similar p(switch) to 9-year-olds and young adults (Frick, Brandimonte, & 73 
Chevalier, 2019), perhaps suggesting that children show no specific difficulty in switching 74 
between tasks in the VTS. Yet, 5-year-old children selected one task more often than the 75 
other and relied on predictable strategies more than older children and adults did, hence 76 
failing to comply with instructions to select both tasks equally often and randomly. These 77 
results show that p(switch) does not capture all aspects of self-directed control in VTS, and 78 
are consistent with evidence of age-related progress during childhood in other tasks tapping 79 
self-directed control (Barker et al., 2014; Snyder & Munakata, 2010, 2013; White, Burgess, 80 
& Hill, 2009; for a review see Barker & Munakata, 2015). Interestingly, young children often 81 
switched between tasks on every trial (thus failing to select tasks randomly), suggesting that 82 
implementing a task switch per se is not the main difficulty for younger children. 83 
Implementing a predictable pattern may be a way for these children to reduce the high costs 84 
of context-tracking and task selection, hence pointing to these two processes as the main 85 
source of children’s difficulty. 86 
It is unclear whether children’s difficulty with goal identification relates to keeping 87 
track of contextual information, selecting the task based on this information, or both. The 88 
present studies examined their respective contributions to self-directed control engagement 89 
and their relation. Specifically, Study 1 addressed whether decreasing the working memory 90 
demands on context-tracking by providing environmental support enhances VTS 91 
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performance, while Study 2 varied the difficulty of task selection through task difficulty 92 
(a)symmetry. Finally, given the limitations of p(switch), we considered other indices that 93 
may more directly capture context-tracking and task selection, namely task balance and task 94 
randomness. 95 
2. Study 1 96 
Study 1 examined to what extent context-tracking contributes to age-related 97 
differences in self-directed control performance by providing environmental information 98 
about what has been done previously, therefore reducing the working memory demands 99 
related to this process. Specifically, in the environmental-support condition, they were shown 100 
how many times each task was played to help them keep track of which task they performed, 101 
whereas in the no-environmental-support condition, no such environmental information was 102 
provided, forcing participants to keep track of their performance on their own. Note that the 103 
environmental support did not directly signal which task to select, unlike task cues or 104 
alternating-runs rules as done in externally-driven or less externally-driven task-switching 105 
paradigms (e.g., Chevalier et al., 2018; Dauvier, Chevalier, & Blaye, 2012). To this end, 5-6 106 
years-olds, 9-10 years-olds, and adults completed a child-friendly version of VTS (adapted 107 
from Frick et al., 2019). If 5-6-year-old children’s difficulty is related to context-tracking, 108 
providing environmental support about previously performed tasks should improve their 109 
performance and reduce differences across age groups. Conversely, if the difficulty is rather 110 
related to the use of the information provided by context-tracking, therefore to task selection, 111 
the presence of environmental support should not affect performance. Specifically, we 112 
expected environmental support to affect task balance and randomness, because both indexes 113 
critically rely on contextual information. In contrast, it is less clear how providing 114 
environmental information would influence p(switch) as children can have a good p(switch) 115 
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despite difficulties in tracking and using contextual information through the use of 116 
(maladaptive) systematic alternating strategies. 117 
2.1.Methods 118 
2.1.1. Participants 119 
Participants included 30 five- to six-year-old children (M = 5.93 years, SD = .89, 120 
range: 5.00 – 6.85, 12 females), 30 nine- to ten-year-old children (M = 9.64 years, SD = .95, 121 
range: 9.03 – 10.99, 13 females), and 29 adults (M = 22.55 years, SD = 4.56, range: 18.21 – 122 
33.02, 15 females). Ten additional participants were excluded: two failed the practice blocks, 123 
four wished to withdraw or performed only with the help of the experimenter, two fell outside 124 
of the age range and two due to an experimental error. All children were recruited from the 125 
local community and adults were undergraduate students enrolled in the local university. 126 
Parent consent was obtained for all children. Parents received £10 compensation, and 127 
children received an age-appropriate prize. Adults received course credits. This study 128 
received approval from the Ethics Committee of the University of Edinburgh. 129 
Parent filled out a demographic questionnaire to asses socio-economic status (SES) in 130 
which they informed their postcode to determine their Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 131 
(SIMD) quintile index (Scottish Governement, 2020) ranging from 1 = lowest income to 5 = 132 
highest income. This information was missing for five children. Half of the children came 133 
from the area with the highest income (54.54%) while the other half came from areas with 134 
lower income, revealing that children SES varied between middle to high SES background 135 
(see Table 1). Participants were mostly Caucasian although this information was not collected 136 
due to the ethical reasons. 137 
 138 
Table 1. Quintile Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SIMD) for 5-6 year-olds and 9-10 139 
year-olds as a function of their residence areas. 140 
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 Quintile SIMD Scores 
 1 2 3 4 5 
5-6 year-olds 3.57% 17.86% 21.43% 3.57% 53.57% 
9-10 year-olds 7.41% 7.41% 14.81% 14.81% 55.56% 
 141 
2.1.2. Material and procedure 142 
All participants were tested individually in the laboratory. They completed a child-143 
friendly VTS similar to Frick et al. (2019) presented with E-Prime 2 (Psychology Software 144 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Participants had to voluntarily switch between matching 145 
bidimensional targets (e.g., a blue teddy) according to their colour (i.e., sending it to the 146 
colour bag) or shape (i.e., sending it to the shape bag; Figure 1). Each trial started with a 147 
fixation cross. After 1,500 ms, the fixation cross was replaced with the onset of the target that 148 
remained on screen until participants’ response on the response box. After the response, the 149 
target was replaced by a present that remained for 500 ms and then appeared into the chosen 150 
bag chosen for 500 ms. In the environmental support condition, the present remained visible 151 
into the bag during the task, whereas it disappeared from the bag at the onset of the next trial 152 
in the no environmental support condition. All participants were tested in the two conditions 153 




Figure 1. Child-friendly voluntary task switching paradigm. Children had to voluntarily 156 
match bidimensional stimuli according to their colour or shape with the general instructions 157 
to perform the colour and shapes games equally often (i.e., place about the same number of 158 
targets in the Colour or Shape bags) and in random manner (i.e., not using a predictable 159 
strategy to avoid the theft of the target by an elf). In Study 1 (top figure), the presents 160 
remained into the bag in the next trial (environmental support condition) or disappeared from 161 
the bag in the next trial (no environmental support condition). In Study 2 (bottom figure), 162 
children had to match targets with the same dimensions in both tasks (task difficulty 163 
symmetry condition) to match targets with the same dimensions in one task whereas they had 164 





 Participants first completed two single-blocks (one colour, one shape; order counter-168 
balanced across participants) in which they were instructed to sort the targets either only by 169 
colour or only by shape on all trials. Each block comprised four practice trials (repeated if 170 
more than two errors with a maximum of two times) followed by 16 test trials. Then, 171 
participants completed two mixed-blocks where they had to voluntarily switch between the 172 
two tasks, that is, fill the two bags with about the same number of toys. Importantly, they 173 
were instructed to make sure a thief elf could not predict how they would sort the toys. The 174 
following two demonstrations were provided. First, the experimenter demonstrated a strict 175 
alternation between the two bags on seven trials (e.g., colour-shape-colour-shape-colour-176 
shape-colour), which resulted in the elf stealing the toy. Second, the experimenter 177 
demonstrated how to successfully put about the same number of toys into each bag while not 178 
following a predictable order to prevent the elf from stealing toys (e.g., colour-colour-shape-179 
colour-shape-shape-shape-colour-colour-shape-colour-colour). Participants then completed 180 
16 practice trials which were repeated (maximum three times) if (a) one bag contained more 181 
than 10 toys (62.5%), (b) the elf detected one of the ten predictable patterns (see Data 182 
Processing and Analyses section) and/or (c) more than eight errors (50%) were made. No 183 
guidance was provided for the first warm-up block performed but if repetition was then 184 
needed, guidance by the experimenter was provided. Only those participants who 185 
successfully passed the practice block were included in the sample. Participants then 186 
completed two series of 40 test trials each (80 test trials per condition, 160 in total). 187 
2.1.3. Data processing 188 
 P(switch) was calculated by dividing the number of task switch trials (i.e., different 189 
task on trials n and n-1) by the total number of task switch and task repetition trials (i.e., same 190 
task on trials n and n-1).  191 
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Task balance consisted in the difference between the proportion of Colour and Shape 192 
trials. A score was computed depending on how far the difference from 0 was. For instance, a 193 
difference of 0.125 was scored 1, 0.5 was scored 4 and so forth.  194 
Task randomness was measured via occurrences of ten different strategies ranging 195 
from five basic to complex sequences: ‘Repetition Only’ or ‘Switch Only’ detected over 196 
seven trials (e.g., colour-colour-colour-colour-colour-colour-colour or colour-shape-colour-197 
shape-colour-shape-colour, respectively), ‘One Repetition and Switch’ detected over nine 198 
trials (e.g., colour-colour-shape-shape-colour-colour-shape-shape-colour), ‘Two Repetition 199 
and Switch’ detected over eleven trials (e.g., colour-colour-colour-shape-shape-shape-colour-200 
colour-colour-shape-shape) and ‘Three Repetition and Switch’ detected over thirteen trials 201 
(e.g., colour-colour-colour-colour-shape-shape-shape-shape-colour-colour-colour-colour-202 
shape). The frequency of these strategies was used during the game (i.e., when the elf showed 203 
up) to index task randomness. Moreover, our analyses also focused on the qualitative type of 204 
strategies.  205 
2.1.4. Data analyses 206 
 P(switch), task balance and task randomness were analysed using a Linear Mixed 207 
Model (LMM 1), and two Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM 1 and GLMM 2) with 208 
a Poisson distribution for count data, respectively. These models were fit in R version 4.0.2 209 
(R Core Team, 2020) using the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, & Bolker, 2015). LMM 1 and 210 
GLMM 1 contained with age group (5-6 years-old, 9-10 years-old and adults) and 211 
environmental support condition (no environmental support, environmental support) as fixed 212 
effects and Participant as a random effect with all possible interactions. GLMM 2 included 213 
age group, environmental support condition and strategy type (Repetition Only, Switch Only, 214 
One Repetition and Switch, Two Repetitions and Switch, Three Repetition and Switch) as 215 
fixed effects and Participant as a random effect with all interactions possible using the 216 
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BOBYQA optimization (Powell, 2009). On lmer/glmer output we performed mixed model 217 
ANOVA tables via Likelihood Ratio Test using the mixed function from the afex package 218 
(Singmann, Bolker, Westfall, Aust, & Ben-Shachar, 2020). This function fits the full model 219 
and then versions thereof in which a single effect is removed comparing the reduced model to 220 
the full model. Pairwise comparisons were used with Tukey’s adjustments when there were 221 
multiplicity issues using the emmeans package (Lenth, 2020) and estimated marginal means 222 
(EMMs) are reported. Plots of the results were obtained using the ggeffects and ggplot2 223 
packages (Hadley, 2016; Lüdecke, 2018) and error bars represent confidence intervals. 224 
2.2.Results 225 
 Results regarding task performance indexed by accuracy and reaction times (RTs) are 226 
available in Supplemental Material (I). 227 
2.2.1. P(switch) 228 
There were no effects of age group and environmental support condition and no 229 
interaction, ps > .142, indicating similar p(switch) rates across age groups and environmental 230 
support conditions (Figure 2).  231 
 232 
Figure 2. P(switch) as a function of age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds, adults) and 233 
environmental support condition (environmental support, no environmental support). All age 234 
87
 
groups showed similar p(switch) which did not differ across environmental support 235 
conditions. 236 
 237 
2.2.2. Task balance 238 
There were main effects of age group, χ2 = 9.44, df = 2, p = .009, and environmental 239 
support condition, χ2 = 58.71, df = 1, p < .001, on whether participants performed the two task 240 
equally often. 5-6 year-olds and 9-10 year-olds performed the two task less equally often than 241 
adults (M5-6 year-olds = 1.56 vs. M9-10 year-olds = 1.52 vs. Madults = .83; ps < .021), but they did not 242 
differ from each other, p = .988. Participants performed the two tasks more equally often with 243 
(M = .77) than without (M = 2.06) environmental support. Importantly, age group and 244 
environmental support condition interacted, χ2 = 7.30, df = 2, p = .026 (Figure 3), which 245 
revealed that the no environmental support condition, adults were better than younger and 246 
older children at performing the two tasks equally often (M5-6 year-olds = 3.26 vs. M9-10 year-olds = 247 
2.42 vs. Madults = 1.10; ps < .005) with no difference between children, p = .310, whereas no 248 
differences across age groups were observed with environmental support, ps > .382. 249 
 250 
Figure 3. Score of difference as a function of age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds, adults) 251 
and environmental support condition (environmental support, no environmental support). 252 
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Error bars represent standard errors. Children showed greater asymmetry between the two 253 
tasks in the no environmental condition than in the environmental condition than adults. No 254 
differences were observed between age groups in the environmental support condition. 255 
 256 
2.2.3. Task randomness 257 
The full model comprising main effects and all possible interactions did not converge 258 
with the BOBYQA optimization, we therefore reduced this model removing the highest order 259 
three-way AgeGroup X EnvironmentalSupportCondition X StrategyType interaction, and this 260 
reduced model converged, producing stable results. 261 
On strategy occurrences, there were effects of age group, χ2 = 21.19, df = 2, p < .001, 262 
and strategy type, χ2 = 75.20, df = 4, p < .001, but not of environmental support condition, p = 263 
.436 (Figure 4). Overall, 5-6 year-olds used more predictable strategies than 9-10 year-olds 264 
who used more strategies than adults (M5-6 year-olds = .32 vs. M9-10 year-olds = .19 vs. Madults = .10; 265 
ps < .048). Participants used significantly more the ‘One Repetition and Switch’ strategy 266 
more than other strategies (MRepetition Only = .20 vs. MSwitch Only = .36 vs. MOne Repetition and Switch = 267 
.42 vs. MTwo Repetitions and Switch = .17 vs. MThree Repetitions and Switch = 04, ps < .015), but this strategy 268 
did not differ from the use of the ‘Switch Only’ strategy, p = .930. Age group interacted with 269 
strategy type, χ2 = 40.73, df = 8, p < .001. 5-6 year-olds used more the ‘Switch Only’ strategy 270 
than other strategies (MRepetition Only = .59 vs. MSwitch Only = 1.22 vs. MOne Repetition and Switch = .62 271 
vs. MTwo Repetitions and Switch = .11 vs. MThree Repetitions and Switch = .06; ps < .001). 9-10 year-olds used 272 
more the ‘Switch Only’ and ‘One Repetition and Switch’ strategies than the ‘Three 273 
Repetitions and Switch’ strategy (MSwitch Only = .33 vs. MOne Repetition and Switch = .35 vs. MThree 274 
Repetitions and Switch = .05; ps < .018). No other differences were observed, ps > .079. Adults used 275 
more the ‘One Repetition and Switch’ strategy than the ‘Repetition Only’ and ‘Three 276 
Repetitions and Switch’ strategies (MRepetition Only = .07 vs. MOne Repetition and Switch = .34 vs. MThree 277 
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Repetitions and Switch = .02; ps < .029). Finally, 5-6 year-olds used more the ‘Repetition Only’ and 278 
‘Switch Only’ strategies than 9-10 year-olds and adults (9-10 year-olds: MRepetition Only = .20; 279 
adults: MSwitch Only = .12; ps < .004) with no differences between these two latter age groups, 280 
ps > .055. Other comparisons were not significant, ps > .075. 281 
 282 
 283 
Figure 4. Number of strategy used as a function of the type of strategies (Repeat Only, Switch 284 
Only, One Repetition and Switch, Two Repetitions and Switch, Three Repetitions and 285 
Switch) and age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds, adults). 5-6 year-olds used significantly 286 
more strategies (‘Repetition Only’, ‘Switch Only’) than other age groups and used 287 
preferentially the ‘Switch Only’ strategy. 288 
 289 
2.3.Discussion 290 
In line with our prediction, providing environmental support about previously 291 
performed tasks enhanced task balance in children, but not in adults. This suggests that part 292 
of children’s difficulty in engaging cognitive control self-directedly stems from sub-optimal 293 
context-tracking. Note that both younger and older children showed poorer task balance 294 
performance than adults, revealing that difficulties in self-directed situations remain until at 295 
least late childhood. However, contrary to our expectation, task randomness was not affected 296 
by environmental support. With or without environmental support, younger children relied 297 
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more on the ‘Switch Only’ strategy than older children and adults. As such, task randomness 298 
seems less sensitive to context-tracking than task balance, and may instead mostly reflect task 299 
selection.  300 
3. Study 2 301 
Study 2 addressed the role of task selection in children’s VTS performance by 302 
manipulating task difficulty (a)symmetry. Indeed, task asymmetry has been shown to 303 
significantly bias participants to repeat the harder task more than the easier task, as the former 304 
task is the most implemented in working memory (Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 305 
2010; Millington, Poljac, & Yeung, 2013; Poljac et al., 2018; Weaver & Arrington, 2010; 306 
Yeung, 2010). In particular, the difficult task engages working memory to a larger extent than 307 
the easy task, making it more difficult to move away from this task, as there are less 308 
resources left for switching. If so, one would expect lower p(switch) as well as lower task 309 
balance and task randomness with asymmetrical than symmetrical task difficulty. 310 
Importantly, based on Study 1 findings, if task randomness reflects task selection to a greater 311 
extent than task balance, then task randomness should be the index most affected by task 312 
difficulty asymmetry. To this end, 5-6 years-old and 9-10 years-old children as well as adults 313 
completed a child-adapted version of VTS similar to Study 1. In the task difficulty symmetry 314 
condition, participants performed the same two tasks (‘regular’ colour and shape matching) 315 
as in Study 1. In the task difficulty asymmetry condition, participants performed the regular 316 
shape matching task (easy) and a ‘reversed’ colour-matching task in which they had to match 317 
the target to the response option of the other colour (difficult). We expected lower accuracy 318 
and longer RTs with asymmetric than symmetric task difficulty. More critically, we expected 319 
that if task selection is an important source of difficulty, then task difficulty asymmetry 320 
should affect p(switch), task balance, and—perhaps to an even greater extent—task 321 
randomness. Further, these effects should be more pronounced in younger than older 322 
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participants. In contrast, if task selection is relatively trivial in VTS, then task difficulty 323 
asymmetry should affect response times and accuracy, but not the other indices.  324 
3.1.Methods 325 
3.1.1. Participants 326 
 Participants were 30 5-6 year-old children (Mage = 5.95 years, SDage = 0.55 years, 327 
range = 5.00-6.90 years, 17 females), 30 9-10 year-old children (Mage = 9.98, SDage = 0.53, 328 
range = 6.08-10.84, 15 females) and 30 adults (Mage = 20.68, SDage = 1.81, range = 18.07-329 
26.15, 15 females). All children were recruited at the same private school and adults were 330 
students enrolled at the university of the same city. A parental consent was obtained for each 331 
child who also gives a verbal and written assent to participate. Children received age-332 
appropriate prices and adults received 2€ for their participation. This study received approval 333 
from the Ethics Committee of the University of Edinburgh as well as from the participating 334 
school. Participants were mostly Caucasian and children, as they came from the same private 335 
school, had the same SES background although this information was not collected. 336 
3.1.2. Material and procedure 337 
Children were tested in a quiet room within the school and adults were tested in a 338 
quiet room at the university. They completed a child-friendly voluntary task-switching 339 
paradigm similar to Study 1 presented with E-Prime 2 (Psychology Software Tools, 340 
Pittsburgh, PA). The procedure and number of trials were the same than in Study 1. The 341 
exception was that this time, participants entered their responses by pressing one of the four 342 
buttons (i.e., ‘q’, ‘w’, ‘o’, ‘p’) on a QWERTY keyboard. All participants completed two 343 
conditions (Figure 1). In the task symmetry condition, which was similar to the no 344 
environmental support condition in Study 1, participants were told to match the targets either 345 
with the button of the same Colour or with the button of the same Shape, the task symmetry 346 
condition. Conversely, in the task asymmetry condition, they had to match the target with the 347 
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button of the same dimension for one game (e.g., match the targets with the button of the 348 
same shape when playing the Shape game) and to match the target with the button of the 349 
different dimension for the other game (e.g., match the targets with the button of the different 350 
colour when playing the Colour game). The order of the two working memory demands 351 
conditions was counter-balanced across participants. 352 
3.1.3. Data processing 353 
Task performance on the easy and hard tasks on single-task blocks within the higher 354 
working memory demands was examined through accuracy and response time (RTs) to 355 
ensure that these two tasks had different difficulty. These analyses were performed after 356 
discarding the first trial of each block. Prior to analyses, RTs were log-transformed (to correct 357 
for skewness and minimize baseline differences between ages; Meiran, 1996). Only RTs for 358 
correct trials preceded by correct trials were kept. Finally, RTs were trimmed out if they were 359 
under 200 ms, to account for accidental button presses, or greater than 3 standard deviations 360 
above the mean of each participant (computed separately for trials from single blocks, and 361 
task repetition and task switch trials from mixed blocks) or 10,000 ms. 362 
P(switch), task balance and task randomness were computed using the same 363 
procedure than in Study 1. 364 
3.1.4. Data analyses 365 
Our analyses first focused on whether the supposedly easy task was less costly than 366 
the difficult task in terms of accuracy and averaged RTs within the task difficulty asymmetry 367 
condition. As such, a GLMM and LMM were performed with age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 368 
year-olds and adults) and task difficulty (easy, difficult) as fixed effects and Participant as a 369 
random effect. Then, p(switch), task balance and task randomness were analysed in the 370 
similar manner than Study 1 with the difference that the task difficulty condition (symmetry, 371 
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asymmetry) replaced the environmental support condition. Estimated marginal means and 372 
plots with confidence intervals as error bars are reported and presented. 373 
3.2.Results 374 
Results regarding task performance indexed by accuracy and reaction times (RTs) are 375 
available in Supplemental Material (II). 376 
3.2.1. Easy task vs. hard task – Accuracy rates and RTs 377 
The analysis performed on the accuracy measure showed a main effect of task 378 
difficulty, χ2 = 34.72, df = 1, p < .001, but not of age group, p = .498. Accuracy was lower in 379 
the harder task than in the easier task (Mhard = .94 vs. Measy = .98; p < .001). Age group 380 
significantly interacted with task difficulty, χ2 = 21.91, df = 2, p < .001. 5-6-year-olds and 381 
adults were significantly less accurate when the task was difficult than when the task was 382 
easy (5-6 years-old: Measy = .99 vs. Mdifficult = .91; adults: Measy = .98 vs. Mhard = .95; ps 383 
<.002), whereas no difference in terms of accuracy between the easy and the hard task was 384 
observed for 9-10-year-olds, p = .906. On RTs, there were main effects of age group, χ2 = 385 
97.48, df = 2, p < .001, and task difficulty, χ2 = 63.53, df = 1, p < .001, but no interaction 386 
between these factors, p = .219. Overall, 5-6 year-olds were significantly slower than 9-10 387 
year-olds, and 9-10 year-olds were significantly slower than adults (M5-6 year-olds = 7.28 log-388 
transformed ms (ln ms) vs. M9-10 year-olds = 6.74 ln ms vs. Madults = 6.40 ln ms; ps < .001). 389 
Moreover, participants were significantly slower on the difficult task than on the easy task 390 





Figure 5. Accuracy and log RTs as a function of age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds and 394 
adults) and task difficulty (easy task, hard task). Accuracy was lower and log RTs were 395 
higher in the hard task than in the easy task. 396 
 397 
3.2.2. P(switch) 398 
On p(switch), there were a significant main effect of age group, χ2 = 9.77, df = 2, p = 399 
.008, but no effect of task difficulty (a)symmetry condition and no interaction, ps > .155. 9-400 
10 year-olds switched significantly more than adults, but not than 5-6 year-olds (M5-6 year-olds = 401 
.49 vs. M9-10 year-olds = .55 vs. Madults = .47; p = .008 and p = .071) and the two latter age groups 402 





Figure 6. P(switch) as a function of age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds, adults) and task 406 
difficulty (a)symmetry condition (task difficulty symmetry, task difficulty asymmetry). 5-6 407 
year-olds and adults showed similar p(switch) whereas 9-10 year-olds showed higher 408 
p(switch) than adults. P(switch) did not vary as a function of task difficulty (a)symmetry 409 
conditions. 410 
 411 
3.2.3. Task balance 412 
On task balance, one subject was removed because he/she has a score of 49 whereas 413 
the maximum score for other subjects was 23. 414 
There was a significant main effect of age group, χ2 = 7.29, df = 2, p = .026, and task 415 
difficulty a(symmetry) condition, χ2 = 7.48, df = 1, p = .006, but no interaction between these 416 
factors, p = .123, on how participants performed the two tasks equally often. 5-6-year-olds 417 
showed a significantly greater asymmetry in performing the two tasks in comparison to 418 
adults, but did not differ from 9-10 year-olds (M5-6 year-olds = 3.39 vs. M9-10 year-olds = 2.31 vs. 419 
Madults = 2.19; p = .031 and p = .067). 9-10 year-olds and adults did not differ from each 420 
other, p = .950. who did not differ from one another, p = .954. Surprisingly, participants 421 
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performed significantly less equally often the two tasks in the task difficulty symmetry 422 
condition than in the task difficulty asymmetry condition (Mtask difficulty symmetry condition = 2.91 vs. 423 




Figure 7. Score of difference as a function of age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds, adults) 428 
and task difficulty (a)symmetry condition (task difficulty symmetry, task difficulty 429 
asymmetry). 5-6 year-olds showed greater asymmetry between the two tasks selection than 9-430 
10 year-olds and adults. The two latter did not differ. Participants showed greater asymmetry 431 
regarding task balance in the task difficulty symmetry condition than in the task difficulty 432 
asymmetry condition. 433 
 434 
3.2.4. Task randomness 435 
The full model comprising the main effects and all possible interactions did not 436 
converge with the BOBYQA optimization. As in Study 1, we first removed the higher three-437 
way interaction and ran the model again, which again did not converge. Using plots, we 438 
identified that some values of combinations of factor levels had zero variance, we therefore 439 
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subset the data by removing those with zero variance. This reduced model finally converged 440 
but produced warning which disappeared when removing the 441 
TaskDifficulty(A)symmetryCondition X StrategyType interaction. However, when keeping 442 
the AgeGroup X StrategyType interaction led to inestimable estimates. We therefore 443 
removed this interaction and report the reduced converging model containing the main effects 444 
and the AgeGroup X TaskDifficulty(A)symmetryCondition interaction. 445 
This model revealed main effects of age group, χ2 = 6.83, df = 2, p = .009, task 446 
difficulty (a)symmetry condition, χ2 = 4.48, df = 1, p = .034, and strategy type, χ2 = 68.35, df 447 
= 4, p < .001, on strategy occurrences. 5-6 year-olds used significantly more strategies than 9-448 
10 year-olds, who used significantly more strategies than adults (M5-6 year-olds = .41 vs. M9-10 449 
year-olds = .27 vs. Madults = .14; ps < .031). Participants used significantly more strategy in the 450 
task difficulty asymmetry condition than in the task symmetry condition (Mtask difficulty symmetry 451 
condition = .23 vs. Mtask difficulty asymmetry condition = .30), and used more the ‘Switch Only’ and ‘One 452 
Repetition and Switch’ strategies than other strategies (MRepetition Only = .31 vs. MSwitch Only = 453 
.69 vs. MOne Repetition and Switch = .56 vs. MTwo Repetitions and Switch = .17 vs. MThree Repetitions and Switch = 454 
.06; ps < .001), with no difference between these two strategies, p = .438.  455 






Figure 7. Number of strategy used as a function of age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds, 460 
adults; top left figure), task difficulty (a)symmetry condition (task difficulty symmetry, task 461 
difficulty asymmetry; top right figure) and strategy type (Repeat Only, Switch Only, One 462 
Repetition and Switch, Two Repetitions and Switch, Three Repetitions and Switch; bottom 463 
figure). 5-6 year-olds used more strategies than 9-10 year-olds who used more strategies than 464 
adults. Participants used more strategies in the task difficulty asymmetry condition than in the 465 
task difficulty symmetry condition. Participants used more the ‘Switch Only’ and ‘One 466 
Repetition and Switch’ strategies than other strategies. 467 
 468 
3.3.Discussion  469 
As expected, lower accuracy and higher RTs were observed in the task difficulty 470 
asymmetry condition than in the task difficulty symmetry condition (see Supplemental 471 
Material, Study 2), which speaks to the success of our manipulation. 472 
Task balance and task randomness were differently affected by the task difficulty 473 
(a)symmetry, whereas p(switch) was not. Specifically, when task difficulty was 474 
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asymmetrical, participants used significantly more predictable strategies. Given that the 475 
model on task randomness did not allow to test for the interaction between age group and 476 
strategy type, and task difficulty (a)symmetry condition and strategy type, we conducted a 477 
mixed ANOVA to explore these possible interactions (see Supplemental Material, III). This 478 
analysis produced similar main effects than our GLMM but more specifically revealed that 479 
participants used more the ‘Switch Only’ strategy in the task difficulty asymmetry condition 480 
than in the task difficulty symmetry condition. This finding suggests that task selection does 481 
indeed contribute to participants’ difficulty in VTS, and given the lack of interaction between 482 
age group and task difficulty (a)symmetry, this contribution may be similar for children and 483 
adults. Indeed, as the ‘Switch Only’ strategy is generally more frequently used by younger 484 
children than the other age groups, increasing the difficulty of task selection may make older 485 
age groups revert to less mature engagement of cognitive control, more akin to younger 486 
children. An important question is why increasing this difficulty results in more frequent use 487 
of ‘Switch Only’ but not the other strategies. One plausible answer is that the use of the 488 
‘Switch Only’ strategy reduces demands on task selection and context-tracking (i.e., one only 489 
needs to know what task has just been performed in order to select the new task, alleviating 490 
the working memory demands on context-tracking and task selection), whereas other 491 
strategies minimise task selection but at the cost of relatively high context-tracking demands 492 
(i.e., need to maintain information about previously performed tasks over several trials). 493 
Although one may go as far as to argue that task difficulty asymmetry may have mostly 494 
affected context-tracking, this seems implausible as we reported that participants performed 495 
worse on task balance in the task difficulty symmetry condition than in the task difficulty 496 
asymmetry condition. As such, increasing the difficulty of task selection surprisingly results 497 
in improving context-tracking, hence speaking for the separability of these two processes.  498 
100
 
Note that participants did not perform the harder task more often than the easier task 499 
when the two tasks differed in difficulty, which is contrary to previous studies (Liefooghe et 500 
al., 2010; Millington et al., 2013; Weaver & Arrington, 2010; Yeung, 2010). One potential 501 
reason for this result is that the difference in difficulty between the two tasks in the task 502 
difficulty asymmetry condition may have not been strong enough for participants, as they 503 
were both perceptual tasks and were not strongly different in terms of working memory 504 
demands as in previous adult studies. But, more broadly, the effect of task difficulty 505 
(a)symmetry conditions on accuracy and RTs, as well as the lack of effect of these conditions 506 
on goal identification indices further suggest that task performance and goal identification tap 507 
different processes. 508 
Another result was that p(switch) unexpectedly varied across age groups, with older 509 
children showing a higher p(switch). This pattern may be due to the fact that older children 510 
used more the ‘Switch Only’ strategy than other strategies and showed less variation in 511 
strategy use than younger children (see Supplemental Material, III). This suggests that 512 
p(switch) may be more informative about VTS performance in older children and adults than 513 
in younger children, the two former age groups showed less variability in the strategies used. 514 
4. General discussion 515 
 We hypothesised that context-tracking and task selection are two inter-related key 516 
processes ensuring goal identification in situations necessitating self-directed control 517 
engagement: the information provided by context-tracking must be used to implement task 518 
selection, and conversely context-tracking requires updating contextual information once task 519 
selection has been implemented. So far, research on self-directed control has focused on task 520 
selection (e.g., Mittelstädt et al., 2018) whereas  research on externally-driven tasks has 521 
examined context monitoring of cues (e.g., Hadley, Acluche, & Chevalier, 2020; Schuch, 522 
Dignath, Steinhauser, & Janczyk, 2019) but never addressed how context-tracking is 523 
101
 
achieved in the absence of cues and to what extent these processes may be related to each 524 
other. Results from Studies 1 and 2 indicated a dissociation between the effects of 525 
environmental support, which affects context-tracking, and task difficulty asymmetry, which 526 
makes task selection more difficult. Specifically, provision of environmental support 527 
enhanced task balance, whereas task difficulty asymmetry impaired task randomness, through 528 
more frequent engagement in systematic task sequences, but also improved context-tracking. 529 
These results suggest that task balance and task randomness respectively capture context-530 
tracking and task selection. As varying the difficulty of one process does not necessarily 531 
negatively affect the other, our study brings the first evidence for some degree of 532 
independence between context-tracking and task selection (despite their conceptual inter-533 
relatedness).  534 
Following the dissociation between context-tracking and task selection, we observed 535 
that the effect of environmental support (Study 1) was most pronounced in younger 536 
participants, whereas the effect of task difficulty (a)symmetry (Study 2) did not interact with 537 
age. Therefore, although both context-tracking and task selection may contribute to self-538 
directed control, context-tracking seems to drive developmental progress during childhood to 539 
a much greater extent than task selection. In other words, relative to adults, children 540 
disproportionately struggle to extract contextual information, however once this information 541 
has been extracted, they do not struggle more than adults to use it to identify the relevant 542 
task. Thus, our findings point out to distinct developmental trajectories, potentially reflecting 543 
more substantial age-related change in context-tracking than task selection, although further 544 
research is needed to examine the developmental course of these two processes in more 545 
detail.  546 
An important question that follows from these findings is what drives better context-547 
tracking with age. Working memory capacity increase during childhood (e.g., Camos & 548 
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Barrouillet, 2018) may play a prominent role. Working memory, which is a key component 549 
of cognitive control (Friedman & Miyake, 2017), is likely to support efficient context-550 
tracking because this process requires maintaining contextual information without external 551 
aids and updating this information as a function of changes in the environment and/or past 552 
actions (i.e., previous task selections). Indeed, the slow development of working memory 553 
capacity during childhood and adolescence may explain why context-tracking remains 554 
challenging until late childhood. Specifically the cingulate cortex supports successful 555 
working memory engagement (Lenartowicz & McIntosh, 2005; Rushworth, Hadland, Gaffan, 556 
& Passingham, 2003), suggesting that context-tracking and working memory may be 557 
supported by common brain regions. Moreover, previous behavioural research has reported 558 
that children with atypical development causing working memory impairments show poorer 559 
performance on self-directed tasks than typically developing children, whereas this difference 560 
is attenuated in externally-driven tasks (Craig et al., 2016; White et al., 2009).  561 
Interestingly, in Studies 1 and 2, children used systematic strategies consisting of 562 
repeating the same task or in switching tasks on every trial, which is in line with a previous 563 
study (Frick et al., 2019). These strategies may be a way for them to ease context-tracking 564 
demands, as they only require keeping track of the task performed on the immediately 565 
preceding trial. These strategies also facilitate task selection, but at the cost of reduced 566 
randomness. Further, younger children showed substantial variability in the types of strategy 567 
they used, more so than older children and adults. Although we did not measure working 568 
memory capacity, the types of strategy that children used may relate to individual differences 569 
in working memory capacity, as has been previously shown in a different task-switching 570 
paradigm at age 5 (Dauvier et al., 2012). For instance, children with the poorest working 571 
memory capacities may have used the strategy of repeating always the same task, as this 572 
pattern does not require strong maintenance of previous tasks and contextual information 573 
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updating while also dropping switching demands. Conversely, children with higher working 574 
memory capacities may have used more demanding strategies such as switching on every two 575 
trials or may have used less strategies overall. Indeed, their working memory capacities might 576 
have been strong enough to manage the higher costs of context-tracking without external 577 
aids. Nevertheless, this claim remains a speculation at this stage, as we did not test working 578 
memory capacity, however, it offers an interesting venue for future research to explore the 579 
link between working memory capacities and context-tracking. 580 
In addition to working memory, age-related gains in context-tracking may relate to 581 
increasing abstract representation capacity, which has been argued to support successful self-582 
directed control development (Snyder & Munakata, 2010, 2013). This capacity allows the 583 
formation and maintenance of task representations, which may be critical to context-tracking. 584 
More specifically, previous studies on self-directed control development have typically used 585 
fluency tasks, in which children were asked to name as many items from a particular category 586 
(e.g., animals) as possible in a short amount of time. Younger children were found to struggle 587 
to form short clusters of items from the same sub-category (e.g., lion, tiger, zebra etc.) but 588 
also to repeat the same items throughout the task (Snyder & Munakata, 2010, 2013). While 589 
this behaviour may be explained by failure to form abstract representations of different 590 
categories and sub-categories, this might be also due to difficulties with context-tracking, 591 
namely with manipulating these abstract representations to keep track of which items have 592 
already been chosen and from which specific sub-category. However, at this point, it remains 593 
an open question whether gains in context-tracking relate to increasingly abstract 594 
representations and/or greater working memory capacity with age. This question should be 595 
directly addressed in future research. 596 
Finally, Studies 1 and 2 consistently showed that even younger children had very little 597 
difficulty in switching between tasks, as evidenced by their frequent use of the ‘Switch Only’ 598 
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strategy, as previously reported in the VTS paradigm (Frick et al., 2019). Of particular 599 
interest, recent research using externally-driven tasks has shown that that switch costs (i.e., 600 
the costs associated with task switching) do not vary with age whereas mixing costs (i.e., the 601 
costs associated with goal identification) decrease with age (Chevalier et al., 2018; Peng, 602 
Kirkham, & Mareschal, 2018). Taken together, our study adds to the growing body of 603 
evidence that goal identification may be a greater source of difficulty than switching per se in 604 
cognitive control development (Broeker et al., 2018; Chevalier, 2015).  605 
To conclude, both context-tracking and task selection contribute to self-directed 606 
control performance, but age-related gains during children are mostly driven by progress in 607 
context-tracking. Future research will need to clarify what drives increasingly efficient 608 
context-tracking with age, paying special attention to increasing working memory capacities 609 
and/or abstract representations. Answering these questions may also help develop efficient 610 
interventions aimed at promoting autonomous behaviours in children. Moreover, the 611 
dissociation between context tracking and task selection opens up the possibility that these 612 
two processes may be supported by distinct brain substrates. Past research has largely 613 
highlighted that different areas of the cingulate cortex (e.g., anterior, rostral, dorsal), 614 
alongside with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), are involved in goal identification 615 
processes in self-directed control (Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & von Cramon, 2006; Holroyd & 616 
McClure, 2015; Umemoto & Holroyd, 2016; Wisniewski, Reverberi, Tusche, & Haynes, 617 
2015), but these studies did not disentangle context-tracking from task selection. As such, 618 
considering the distinction between context tracking and task selection may help disentangle 619 
the contribution of these brain regions to self-directed control and its development across 620 
childhood.  621 
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Supplemental Material: Analyses of accuracy and log RTs for Study 1 and Study 2 752 
I. Study 1 – Accuracy and RTs 753 
Data processing and analyses 754 
Task performance was indexed by accuracy and response times (RTs) for each trial 755 
type, which allowed estimating mixing costs (contrasting between single task trials and task 756 
repetition trials) and switch costs (contrasting between task repetition trials and task switch 757 
trials). Task mixing costs index the difficulty of selecting the relevant task when tasks are 758 
mixed and task switching costs index the difficulty of switching from one task to another 759 
(Rubin & Meiran, 2005). Analyses were performed after discarding the first trial of each 760 
block. RTs were log-transformed (to correct for skewness; Meiran, 1996) and for the course 761 
of their analyses, incorrect responses or correct responses following an incorrect response 762 
were trimmed, trials following the elf appearance and trials under 200 ms or greater than 3 763 
standard deviations above the mean of each participant (computed separately for each trial 764 
type) or 10,000 ms were trimmed. 765 
Accuracy was analysed with a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) and 766 
averaged RTs were analysed using a Linear Mixed Model. Models were fit in R version 4.0.2 767 
(R Core Team, 2020) using the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, & Bolker, 2015) with age 768 
group (5-6 years, 9-10 years, adults), environmental support condition (environmental 769 
support, no environmental support) and trial type (single task, task repetition, task switch) as 770 
fixed effects and the variable Participant as a random effect. On glmer/lmer outputs, we 771 
performed mixed model ANOVA tables via Likelihood Ratio Test using the afex package 772 
(Singmann, Bolker, Westfall, Aust, & Ben-Shachar, 2020). Tukey’s post-hoc tests were used 773 
for pairwise comparisons when there were multiplicity issues using the emmeans package 774 
(Lenth, 2020) and estimated marginal means (EMMs) are reported. Plots of the results were 775 
obtained using the ggeffects and ggplot2 packages (Hadley, 2016; Lüdecke, 2018).  776 
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Accuracy rates 777 
Effects of age group, χ2 = 65.90, df = 2, p < .001, environmental support condition, χ2 778 
= 14.25, df = 1, p < .001 and trial type, χ2 = 97.39, df = 2, p < .001, were observed (Figure 1). 779 
5-6 year-olds were less accurate than 9-10 year-olds and adults (M5-6 year-olds = 89 vs. M9-10 year-780 
olds = .96 vs. Madults = .97; ps < .001), whereas the two latter age groups did not differ, p = 781 
.175. Participants were less accurate in the environmental support condition than in the no 782 
environmental support condition (Mno environmental support condition = .94 vs. Menvironmental support condition 783 
= .95). Accuracy on single task trials were lower than on task repetition trials (Msingle task trials = 784 
.97 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .93; p < .001), and task repetition and task switch trials did not 785 
differ, p = 1, hence revealing significant mixing costs but non-significant switch costs 786 
overall.  787 
Age group and trial type interacted, χ2 = 24.56, df = 4, p < .001, revealing that 788 
although both age groups showed significant mixing costs (5-6 year-old: Msingle task trials = .95 789 
vs. Mtask repetition trials = .86; 9-10 years-old: Msingle task trials = .97 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .85; 790 
Adults: Msingle task trials = .98 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .96; ps < .001), switch costs were marginally 791 
significant for younger children (Mtask switch trials = .84; p = .092) but not for other age groups, 792 




Figure 1. Accuracy as a function of age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds, adults) 795 
environmental support condition (environmental support, no environmental support) and trial 796 
type (single task, task repetition, task switch). Mixing costs were significant and switch costs 797 
were not significant for all age groups, although the latter approached the significance level 798 
for 5-6 year-olds. 799 
 800 
Log RTs 801 
Effects of age group, χ2 = 100.88, df = 2, p < .001, trial type, χ2 = 237.79, df = 2, p < 802 
.001, but not of environmental support condition, p = .264, were observed. RTs significantly 803 
decreased across all age groups (M5-6 year-olds = 7.24 ln ms vs. M9-10 year-olds = 6.90 ln ms vs. 804 
Madults = 6.40 ln ms; ps < .001). RTs were lower on single task trials than on task repetition 805 
trials, and lower on task repetition trials than task switch trials (Msingle task trials = 6.62 ln ms vs. 806 
Mtask repetition trials = 6.89 ln ms vs Mtask switch trials = 7.04 ln ms; ps < .001), revealing significant 807 
mixing and switch costs. 808 
Age group and trial type significantly interacted, χ2 = 14.61, df = 4, p = .006, revealing 809 
that adults did not show significant switch costs, p = .246, but significant mixing costs (Msingle 810 
task trials = 6.22 ln ms vs. Mtask repetition trials = 6.46 ln ms; p < .001). Children showed both 811 
significant mixing and switch costs contrary to children (5-6 year-olds: Msingle task trials = 7.02 812 
vs. Mtask repetition trials = 7.27 ln ms vs. Mtask switch trials = 7.45 ln ms; 9-10 year-olds: Msingle task trials 813 





Log RTs as a function of age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds, adults) environmental 817 
support condition (environmental support, no environmental support) and trial type (single 818 
task, task repetition, task switch). Significant mixing costs were observed for all age groups 819 
but switch costs were observed for children only. 820 
 821 
II. Study 2 – Accuracy and RTs 822 
Data processing and analyses 823 
As Study 1, these analyses were performed after discarding the first trial of each 824 
block. Prior to analyses, RTs were log-transformed (to correct for skewness and minimize 825 
baseline differences between ages; Meiran, 1996). Only RTs for correct trials preceded by 826 
correct trials were kept. RTs on trials following the appearance of the elf were also removed 827 
as their latencies were longer than on normal trials. Finally, RTs were trimmed out if they 828 
were under 200 ms, to account for accidental button presses, or greater than 3 standard 829 
deviations above the mean of each participant (computed separately for trials from single 830 
blocks, and task repetition and task switch trials from mixed blocks) or 10,000 ms. 831 
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Analyses were similar to Study 1 expect that the experimental condition was task 832 
difficulty (a)symmetry (task difficulty symmetry, task difficulty asymmetry). 833 
Accuracy rates 834 
On accuracy, there were main effects of age group, χ2 = 19.56, df = 2, p < .001, task 835 
difficulty (a)symmetry condition, χ2 = 64.16, df = 1, p < .001, and trial type, χ2 = 42.29, df = 836 
2, p < .001 (Figure 3). 5-6 year-olds and 9-10 years-old were significantly less accurate than 837 
adults (M5-6 year-olds = .92 vs. M9-10 year-olds = .93 vs. Madults = .97; ps < .001), but they did not 838 
differ from each other, p = .872. Accuracy was lower in the task difficulty asymmetry 839 
condition than in the task difficulty symmetry condition (Mtask difficulty symmetry condition = .96 vs. 840 
Mtask difficulty asymmetry condition = .93) and lower on task repetition trials than on single task trials 841 
but no difference was observed between task repetition trials and task switch trials (Msingle task 842 
trials = .96 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .94 vs. Mtask switch trials = .93; ps < .001 and p = .640), hence 843 
revealing significant mixing costs but no significant switch costs overall.  844 
These effects were qualified by a three-way interaction between these factors, χ2 = 845 
9.52, df = 4, p = .049, revealing that 9-10 year-olds showed no significant switch costs in all 846 
condition, ps > .683, no significant mixing costs in the task difficulty symmetry condition, p 847 
= .174, but significant mixing costs in the task difficulty asymmetry condition (Msingle task trials 848 
= .95 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .89; p < .001). 5-6 year-olds showed significant mixing costs in all 849 
conditions (task difficulty symmetry: Msingle task trials = .96 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .90; task 850 
difficulty asymmetry: Msingle task trials = .95 vs. Mtask repetition trials = .92; ps < .014), but no 851 






Figure 3. Accuracy as a function of age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds, adults), task 856 
difficulty (a)symmetry condition (task difficulty symmetry, task difficulty asymmetry) and 857 
trial type (single task, task repetition, task switch). 5-6 year-olds showed significant mixing 858 
costs but no significant switch costs in all conditions. 9-10 year-olds showed significant 859 
mixing costs in the task difficulty asymmetry condition only. Adults showed no mixing and 860 
switch costs. 861 
 862 
Log RTs 863 
On log RTs, the analysis revealed main effects of age group, χ2 = 114.19, df = 2, p < 864 
.001, task difficulty (a)symmetry condition, χ2 = 147.71, df = 1, p < .001, and trial type, χ2 = 865 
310.68 df = 2, p < .001, but no significant interactions, ps > .260. 5-6 year-olds were 866 
significantly slower than 9-10 year-olds who were slower than adults (M5-6 year-olds = 7.37 ln 867 
ms vs. M9-10 year-olds = 6.87 ln ms vs. Madults = 6.49 ln ms; ps < .001). Moreover, participants 868 
were significantly slower in the task difficulty asymmetry condition than in task difficulty 869 
symmetry condition (Mtask difficulty symmetry condition = 6.81 ln ms vs. Mtask difficulty asymmetry condition = 870 
7.01 ln ms. Finally, participant showed significant mixing and switch costs (Msingle = 6.69 ln 871 






Figure 4. Log RTs as a function of age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds, adults), task 876 
difficulty (a)symmetry condition (task difficulty symmetry, task difficulty asymmetry) and 877 
trial type (single task, task repetition, task switch). Log RTs decreased with age, were greater 878 
in the task difficulty asymmetry condition than in the task symmetry condition and 879 
participants showed both significant mixing and switch costs.  880 
 881 
III. Study 2 – Complementary analyses with a mixed ANOVA on task 882 
randomness 883 
The analysis revealed main effects of age group, F(2, 87) = 13.45, p < .001, η2p = 884 
.236, task difficulty (a)symmetry condition, F(1, 87) = 5.60, p = .020, η2p = .060, and strategy 885 
type, F(4, 348) = 19.11, p < .001, η2p = .180, on strategy occurrences. 5-6 year-olds used 886 
significantly more strategies than 9-10 year-olds, who used significantly more strategies than 887 
adults (M5-6 year-olds = .58 vs. M9-10 year-olds = .40 vs. Madults = .24; ps < .044). Participants used 888 
significantly more strategy in the task difficulty asymmetry condition than in the task 889 
symmetry condition (Mtask difficulty symmetry condition = .45 vs. Mtask difficulty asymmetry condition = .36), and 890 
118
 
used more the ‘Switch Only’ and ‘One Repetition and Switch’ strategies than other strategies 891 
(MRepetition Only = .36 vs. MSwitch Only = .79 vs. MOne Repetition and Switch = .64 vs. MTwo Repetitions and 892 
Switch = .20 vs. MThree Repetitions and Switch = .03; ps < .049), with no difference between these two 893 
strategies, p = .571.  894 
Age group significantly interacted with strategy type, F(8, 348) = 3.08, p = .009, η2p = 895 
.066 (Figure 5). 5-6 year-olds used significantly more the ‘Repeat Only’ strategy than other 896 
age groups (M5-6 year-olds = .73 vs. M9-10 year-olds = .13 vs. Madults = .22; ps < .007), with no 897 
difference between 9-10 year-olds and adults, p = .875. 5-6 year-olds and 9-10 year-olds used 898 
more the ‘Switch Only’ strategy than adults (M5-6 year-olds = 1.08 vs. M9-10 year-olds = .97 vs. 899 
Madults = .32; ps < .001), with no difference between children, p = .770. 5-6 year-olds used 900 
more the ‘One Repetition and Switch’ strategy than adults but not than 9-10 year-olds (M5-6 901 
year-olds = .82 vs. M9-10 year-olds = .72 vs. Madults = .38; p = .029 and p = 825) with no difference 902 
between the two latter age groups, p = .121. No other differences between age groups and 903 
strategy types were observed, ps > .875. 5-6 year-olds used similarly the ‘Repetition Only’, 904 
‘Switch Only’ and ‘One Repetition and Switch’ strategy, ps > .265, but more than other 905 
strategies (MOne Repetition and Switch = .82 vs. MTwo Repetitions and Switch = .18 vs. MThree Repetitions and Switch 906 
= .07; ps < .016). 9-10 year-olds used more the ‘Switch Only’ strategy than the ‘Repetition 907 
Only’ strategy, p < .001, but similarly the ‘Switch Only’ strategy and the ‘One Repetition and 908 
Switch’ strategy, p = .607, and more the ‘One Repetition and Switch’ strategy than the 909 
‘Repeat Only’ strategy, p = .008. Adults used all strategies similarly, ps > .183.  910 
Task difficulty (a)symmetry condition significantly interacted with strategy type, F(4, 911 
348) = 3.02, p = .041, η2p = .033, revealing that the ‘Switch Only’ strategy was more used in 912 
the task asymmetry condition than in the task symmetry condition (Mtask symmetry condition = .57 913 
vs. Mtask asymmetry condition = .1.01; p < .001), whereas no differences between task difficulty 914 






Figure 5. Number of strategy used as a function of the type of strategies (Repeat Only, Switch 919 
Only, One Repetition and Switch, Two Repetitions and Switch, Three Repetitions and 920 
Switch) and age group (5-6 year-olds, 9-10 year-olds, adults; top figure), and as a function of 921 
the type of strategies and task difficulty (a)symmetry (task difficulty symmetry, task 922 
difficulty asymmetry; bottom figure). 5-6 year-olds and 9-10 year-olds used significantly 923 
more strategies than adults. The ‘Switch Only’ strategy was more used in the task difficulty 924 
asymmetry condition than in the task difficulty symmetry condition. 925 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and conclusion
Developing autonomous behaviours is critical in children’s lives, especially in school situations
where the instructions given by the teachers become less externally-driven and require children
to self-directly engage cognitive control to achieve goals. For instance, when moving up grades,
children are increasingly expected to decide by themselves which relevant part of the course should
be studied and how long in order to successfully prepare for an exam. Understanding how a self-
directed form of control develops and what are the underlying cognitive processes driving this
development is therefore crucial to develop efficient training programmes promoting this form of
control, and later academic achievement.
To this aim, in this dissertation, I presented three developmental studies with the objective to
disentangle the processes at play in self-directed control development (Chapter 2). I then focused
on the process of task selection to investigate how it develops across childhood using a paradigm
that specifically targets this process (Chapter 3). This investigation led me to better understand
the processes underlying goal identification in self-directed control, namely context-tracking and
task selection, and how they contribute to the development of this form of control during childhood
(Chapter 4). In the following, I first discuss the novel methodological and conceptual achieve-
ments of this dissertation to investigate self-directed control in childhood. I then move on the main
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findings coming from the studies carried out in these different chapters, and propose a tentative
theoretical model of self-directed control development. Following this, I address some limitations
which, hopefully, offer interesting venues for future research, before closing this dissertation by a
short summary.
1 Challenge of investigating self-directed control in childhood
Understanding self-directed control remains a challenge. In psychological research, and more
particularly when examining cognitive control, participants are almost always driven by clear in-
structions before starting the task, cues throughout the task, or reminders at some point during the
task (e.g., Stroop task or cued task-switching paradigm; Meiran, 1996; Stroop, 1935). In com-
parison, few studies have been carried out with tasks offering less guidance. Wilson, Alderman,
Burgess, Emslie, and Evans (1996) have developed the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecu-
tive Syndrome (BADS) in which two tasks (Key Search task, Six Elements task) tap self-directed
control, and this battery has been adapted for use with children (Emslie, Wilson, V, Nimmo-Smith,
& Wilson, 2004), but the minimum age required for this battery is 8 years-old. Similarly, the Verbal
Fluency assesses self-directed control (Troyer et al., 1997), but is not informative in children below
7 years-old due to their low linguistic abilities. Finally, another candidate is the alternating-runs
task-switching paradigm (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), which has been used with children aged 5-
years-old (e.g., Dauvier et al., 2012), but given that the instructions of the alternating rule is given
prior the start of the experiment, this paradigm nevertheless offers some guidance critically for task
performance, and therefore remains partially externally-driven. As such, there was a real need to
develop a task that exclusively relies on self-directed control and is appropriate for use with very
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young children.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I adapted the gold-standard paradigm of self-directed used with adults, VTS
(Arrington & Logan, 2004), which specifically targets goal identification with a particular focus on
task selection, measured by the amount of task switches made in comparison to task repetition,
namely p(switch). In my paradigm, the instructions of performing the two tasks equally often and
in a random manner was explained to the children as putting the same number of toys in two bags
and tricking a thief elf. As described in Chapter 3, even younger children performed well during
the practice revealing that these instructions were appropriate. Further, I extended the variable of
interest, initially only p(switch), to other variable of interests which were how well the two tasks
were performed equally (task balance) and whether task choice was really random as evidenced
by different patterns of possible strategies (task randomness) in order to get finer analyses of goal
identification processes at play in VTS.
Moreover, due to the fact that this child-friendly paradigm is a task-switching paradigm, it also
offers the possibility for experimental manipulations. In Chapters 3 and 4, I manipulated the time
between the response and stimulus onset, environmental support and task difficulty, the latter two
offering insight about the two sub-processes of goal identification, which have so far always been
confounded. Of particular importance, further modifications could be applied to our paradigm such
as modifying the general instructions (e.g., removing one and/or both instructions) to investigate
how children behave, removing the appearance of the thief elf which could be act as a reminder
throughout the task, using more than two tasks, and so forth. Consequently, in addition to offering
a better insight of goal identification processes in self-directed control, I offer here a novel tool that
can be used in future studies to replicate and/or refine our understanding of this form of control.
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2 A tentative theoretical model of self-directed control develop-
ment based on goal identification
2.1 Goal identification more than switching per se is the main difficulty in
self-directed control development
In this dissertation, I investigated cognitive control development using task-switching paradigms.
These paradigms are associated with mixing (or global) and switch (or local) costs as regards to
accuracy and RTs. Recall that mixing costs capture a critical performance drop associated with
repeating a task in blocks where it is mixed with another task (i.e., high task uncertainty; task rep-
etition trials in mixed blocks), relative to repeating a task in a block where the same task is always
relevant (i.e., low task uncertainty; trials from single-task blocks). Switch costs correspond to the
additional performance drop on trials where participants actually need to switch tasks relative to
task repeat trials within mixed-task blocks Peng et al. (2018); Rubin and Meiran (2005). As task
uncertainty is high on both switch and repeat trials within mixed blocks, mixing costs may mostly
reflect the difficulty of goal identification (e.g., Kikumoto & Mayr, 2017). Further, as task un-
certainty may be similar on both switch and repeat trials within mixed blocks (at least when both
trial types are equally frequent), switch costs may mostly reflect the greater difficulty of executing
a task when one needs to reorient attention to information that has been previously ignored (e.g.,
Courtemanche et al., 2019).
In externally-driven control, numerous studies have examined accuracy and RTs mixing and
switch costs across development. Studies from more than a decade ago have examined mixing
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costs in children and showed that these costs decrease from 7 years-old onwards (e.g., Cepeda,
Kramer, & Gonzalez de Sather, 2001; Kray, Eber, & Karbach, 2008; Reimers & Maylor, 2005),
suggesting age-related progress in goal identification throughout the lifespan. Conversely, find-
ings regarding switch costs have yielded mixed conclusions. Indeed, some research has reported a
significant decrease with age regarding these costs (e.g., Cepeda et al., 2001; Crone, Bunge, Van
Der Molen, & Ridderinkhof, 2006; Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006) whereas other
research has observed no changes with age (e.g., Dibbets & Jolles, 2006; Ellefson et al., 2006;
Reimers & Maylor, 2005). However, recent research investigating mixing and switch costs from
early childhood has shown that the magnitude of improvements with age is more pronounced for
mixing costs than for switch costs (Chevalier, Dauvier, & Blaye, 2018; Peng et al., 2018). This
suggests that difficulties for children when engaging externally-driven cognitive control, and more
particularly in task-switching situations, rely on goal identification to a greater extent than on diffi-
culties related to switching per se.
In line with this previous research on externally-driven control, I observed that in self-directed
situations, task selection, a key process of goal identification, is mastered later in development than
task execution, although these two processes are somehow related regarding performance costs
as a function of the self-directedness of the task (Chapter 2). But critically, I also reported that
children as young as 5 years-old have little difficulties engaging switching behaviours (Chapters 3
and 4). Indeed, in the voluntary task-switching paradigm, 5 year-olds often relied on a predictable
strategy that consisted of switching tasks on every trial, indicating that they can easily redirect their
attention to activate a new task different from the task just performed. However, these children,
as well as older children aged 9- to 10-years-old, struggled to select the appropriate task in order
to perform the two tasks equally often (task balance) and in a random order (task randomness),
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hence revealing that difficulties do not rely on activating a new task, but rather selecting which task
is relevant. Moreover, as regards accuracy, no switch costs were observed in children and adults
whereas mixing costs were observed only in children (Chapters 3 and 4). Taken together, this
indicates that goal identification, much more than switching per se, is the main source of difficulty
in the development of self-directed cognitive control engagement, but more broadly, this extends
this claim to all forms of cognitive control.
2.2 The sub-processes underlying self-directed control development: The
premises of a theoretical model
As stated in the previous paragraph, goal identification is key in self-directed control devel-
opment. In particular, based on these findings, I propose a tentative theoretical model of the
underlying processes of goal identification in self-directed control development. In this theoret-
ical model (Figure 1), goals are self-directedly identified through two sub-processes, which are
context-tracking and task selection (Chapter 4).
Figure 1: Theoretical model of the underlying processes of goal identification in self-directed and
its development with age.
More specifically, contextual information is treated directly by the context-tracking process for
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which the first role is to store and monitor this information. However, contextual information is
also influenced by changes in task demands or goals and is influenced by past actions. In particular,
attainment of a specific goal (e.g., prepare dinner) may require a series of sub-goals (e.g., cut ingre-
dients, boil water, etc.). Therefore, the second role of context-tracking is to keep track of contextual
information including where one stands in a hierarchy of sub-goals and goals, or cues suggesting
that a new goal should be pursued. The second cognitive process, task selection, consists in using
this contextual information to determine when and what behaviour should be engaged in order to
achieve sub-goals and goals. However, the relation between context-tracking and task selection is
bi-directional. Indeed, although context-tracking guides task selection by providing information
about sub-goals and goals, task selection may also influence the content of this information, as this
information must be updated after a task has been selected and executed (i.e., once a task has been
selected, this selection should be considered when one keeps track of the context).
Results from Chapter 4 indicated that despite their conceptual inter-relatedness, context-tracking
and task selection show some degree of independence. Indeed, varying the difficulty of one pro-
cess does not systematically affect the other process. Further, progress in goal identification in
self-directed control throughout development appears to be mostly due to improvements in context-
tracking rather than task selection, as providing environmental support improves the implementa-
tion of the first process in children, but not in adults. Context-tracking is likely to be supported
by increasing working memory and abstract representation capacities (e.g., Cowan, 2014; Sny-
der & Munakata, 2013), which allow for adaptive storage and manipulation of the information
needed for the task selection process. In particular, better working memory performance with age
is achieved by increasing capacities for abstractedly refreshing information held in memory (Camos
& Barrouillet, 2011; Camos, Mora, & Oberauer, 2011; Souza, Rerko, & Oberauer, 2015). Such a
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refreshing process may be key for context-tracking involving micro-switches of attention between
the tasks done and the new task that needs to be selected in order to achieve a goal. However, how
working memory and abstract representations precisely support efficient context-tracking remains
to be investigated and offer an interesting venue for future research.
Furthermore, such dissociation between context-tracking and task selection does not appear
as a surprise as previous studies have identified that several areas of the prefrontal cortex and
cingulate cortex are activated when identifying goals in self-directed control (Forstmann et al.,
2006; Holroyd & McClure, 2015; Umemoto & Holroyd, 2016; Wisniewski, Reverberi, Tusche, &
Haynes, 2015). But interestingly, this distinction may offer insights on how these brain regions
support self-directed control. For instance, if context-tracking taps on working memory and ab-
stract representations capacities, one may expect this process to involve more activation of the right
dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; e.g., Cabeza, Anderson, Locantore, & McIntosh, 2002;
Christophel, Klink, Spitzer, Roelfsema, & Haynes, 2017; Funahashi, 2017) and rely on increasing
fronto-parietal connectivity (Sauseng, Klimesch, Schabus, & Doppelmayr, 2005). Conversely, task
selection may involve more anterior regions such as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC;
e.g., Wisniewski et al., 2015). Of particular importance, involvement of brain areas in cognitive
control becomes specialised during childhood with a shift from diffuse to focal prefrontal activity
as well as a progressive segregation and integration of fronto-parietal networks (e.g., Durston et al.,
2006; Fair et al., 2009), which supports increasingly successful cognitive control engagement, and
therefore might also be key for self-directed control.
At this stage, this theoretical model is at its premises. Indeed, it is still unclear how context-
tracking organises the hierarchy of sub-goals and goals, similarly to the Supervisory Attentional
System which monitors the Contention Scheduling (i.e., context-tracking) in order to activate or
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suppress schematas when engaging control, according to the seminal model of Norman and Shallice
(1986), and how task selection uses this information to decide when and what behaviour should be
engaged. For instance, when children are provided with environmental support (Chapter 4, Study
1), although they more ably perform the two tasks equally often, they still struggle to select them
randomly. As such, it might also be that the difficulties for children are to use the information from
context-tracking before passing it on to task selection, but at this stage this remains speculative. One
way to address this question would be to use a version of the voluntary task-switching paradigm
similar to Chapter 4 (Study 1) contrasting between providing environmental support or not and in
which a cue would signal to the children that the thief elf is about to steal a toy. If younger children
struggle to use the information coming from context-tracking, then we should not observe any
differences between the two environmental support conditions, suggesting that even when context-
tracking is facilitated, using this information remains difficult in order to select the appropriate
task.
Moreover, while working memory and abstract representation capacities may be crucial for
context-tracking specifically, it is unknown to what extent and how inhibitory processes are in-
volved either in context-tracking or task selection, or both. For instance, it is plausible that sub-
goals or goals are no longer pursued based on the information provided by context-tracking, but
that the decision of abandoning these sub-goals and goals is taken when one has to select a task. As
such, inhibition processes may be a retroactive break only activated during task selection, which
forces context-tracking to update the sub-goals and goals. This question is an exciting venue for
future research attempting to identify which executive processes are at play during goal identifica-
tion.
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3 Limitations and directions for future studies
3.1 Use of physiological measures in self-directed control development
In Chapter 3, I showed that different preparation durations, one favouring the use of proactive
control (long preparation time, 1,500 ms) and another supposedly forcing the use of reactive control
(short preparation time, 100 ms), did not influence self-directed control. However, despite these
different preparation times, participants had a time interval of 500 ms between their responses and
the start of the preparation time before stimulus onset. This has potentially resulted in participants
having enough time to prepare for the next trial right after their responses. As such, my study did
not allow us to conclude firmly whether or not younger children were biased towards a reactive form
of control whereas conversely older participants used a proactive form of control. Further, results
from Chapter 4 indicated that even older children, who are likely to rely on proactive control,
had difficulties with goal identification, suggesting that proactive control is not synonymous of
successful self-directed control as argued in the adult literature. Recall that according to Arrington
et al. (2014), one needs to have enough time to prepare in advance for the upcoming trial in order
to select adaptively the appropriate task (i.e., representativeness heuristic). One way to directly
address this question is to combine physiological measures such event-related potentials (ERPs)
and/or pupillometric measures to behavioural investigations.
Examinations of ERPs have revealed that different neuro-cognitive markers are associated with
task preparedness in self-directed control. Specifically, before stimulus onset, a preparatory me-
dial frontal modulation has been found to be associated with voluntary task selection (Forstmann,
Ridderinkhof, Kaiser, & Bledowski, 2007). Studies using ERPs have shown that task preparation
131
is associated with a slowly developing negative wave across frontal sites (i.e., contingent negative
variation, CNV; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Hohnsbein, & Kleinsorge, 2003; Hoofs, Princen, Poljac,
Stolk, & Poljac, 2018; Poljac & Yeung, 2014). Interestingly, the CNV seems to reflect intentional
task preparation in self-directed control, being stronger in task switch trials (Kang, DiRaddo, Lo-
gan, & Woodman, 2014; Vandamme, Szmalec, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2010), and more
pronounced in fast responses (Lavric, Mizon, & Monsell, 2008; Poljac & Yeung, 2014). This sug-
gests that trial types are differently prepared. Of particular interest, a recent study has reported
that the CNV is attenuated in individuals with autistic traits but not control participants (Hoofs et
al., 2018), confirming difficulties of the former group in behavioural studies on self-directed con-
trol (e.g., Poljac, Hoofs, Princen, & Poljac, 2017; White et al., 2009), potentially due to a lack of
efficient task preparation before stimulus onset or an efficient use of proactive control.
This result offers an important venue for future ERPs research in self-directed control develop-
ment as examining the CNV in children can shed light on whether or not they efficiently prepare or
not their responses in advance. Indeed, as stated previously, in Chapter 3, participants had enough
time to prepare for the next trial as the stimulus to response interval was of 600 ms. Critically,
previous studies have shown that the CNV is present 600 ms before the appearance of the stimulus
(Hoofs et al., 2018; Poljac & Yeung, 2014), confirming that our study did not allow to conclude
firmly whether or not younger children relied more on a reactive form of control whereas con-
versely older participants used a proactive form of control. Future research should examine the
CNV in children and adults during self-directed control engagement with the expectation that the
CNV would be attenuated in younger children as they tend to not prepare their responses in advance
(Chevalier et al., 2015; Doebel et al., 2017) as compared to older participants.
Note that besides ERPs, further measures that could be of interest are pupillometry and blink
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rates acquired through eye-tracking. Pupil dilation can be used as an alternative or in addition to
ERPs to examine the temporal dynamics of cognitive control and changes in cognitive demand
and effort (Beatty, 1982; Chiew & Braver, 2013). Indeed, developmental research has shown that
when engaging proactive control, greater pupil dilation before the onset of a stimulus is observed,
whereas no such modulations are observed when reactive control is engaged (Chatham et al., 2009;
Chevalier et al., 2015). Blink rates can be also used as a peripheral measure of dopamine which
modulates fronto-striatal circuits supporting the maintenance of abstract goals and motivation to
hierarchically organise and update of sub-goals and goals in relation to working memory allocation
(Puig, Rose, Schmidt, & Freund, 2014; Westbrook & Braver, 2016).
As such, an interesting venue for future studies would be to combine ERPs and eye-tracking
measures in order to try clarifying (1) whether reactive and proactive control do matter in suc-
cessful goal identification in self-directed control and (2) whether when context-tracking and task
selection are experimentally disentangled, this dissociation can be evidenced by blink rates (e.g.,
more voluntary blink rates when keeping track of the context than selecting the relevant task).
3.2 P(switch) and cognitive fatigue
One of the main findings from Chapters 2 and 3 is that p(switch) did not strongly vary across age
groups and the different experimental conditions. Note that p(switch) was significantly lower for
younger children when little time preparation between the response and the stimulus was available
(Chapter 3) and that p(switch) was higher for older children in Study 2 (Chapter 4). But overall,
children and adults showed similar p(switch), challenging the supposedly reversed U-shape pattern
for this measure with age (e.g., Poljac et al., 2018; Terry & Sliwinski, 2012). Moreover, although
adults showed a small repetition bias in Chapters 3 and 4, this was above the expected value of .44
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and therefore not significantly different from a value of .5 (see Arrington et al., 2014).
Possibly, the number of trials proposed to the participants may have played a role in the higher
p(switch) observed. Indeed, due to the specificity of developmental research, a small amount of
trials were used in both studies with a total of 80 trials per condition, so 160 trials per participant
in Chapters 3 and 4. This strikingly contrasted with the number of trials used in adult research.
Indeed, for instance, in the seminal study by Arrington and Logan (2004), participants completed
480 trials in total. In a more recent study, Mittelstädt et al. (2018) used 1008 trials. In another
study exploring age-related effects on p(switch), Poljac et al. (2018) used 480 trials. Therefore,
the number of trials used in previous VTS studies is significantly higher than in Chapters 3 and
4. Importantly, cognitive fatigue – the decrease of cognitive performance following and during
the course of prolonged periods of demanding cognitive activity – has been evidenced to induce
a decrease in cognitive control performance in adults Lorist, Boksem, and Ridderinkhof (2005);
Lorist et al. (2000); Van der Linden, Frese, and Meijman (2003), and in children (Liu et al., 2012).
Specifically, the tendency to repeat the same task more than to switch between tasks may be, among
other possibilities, a way to minimize or avoid effort due to the implementation of a switching
behaviour Kool et al. (2010); Westbrook et al. (2013, 2019), and this tendency could be enhanced
when a large of number of trials are presented to participants. Although such a claim remains
speculative, an interesting venue for future VTS research would be to test whether cognitive fatigue
does impact the repetition bias in such tasks by presenting participants with a small number of trials
versus a large number of trials. Moreover, inducing cognitive fatigue may also favour age-related
differences in p(switch) between children and adults, contrary to what is observed in Chapters 3
and 4, where children show a p(switch) similar to adults. Indeed, it is plausible that children might
be less resistant to cognitive fatigue than adults. Little research has investigated this question, but
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one study found that inducing cognitive fatigue leads to more goal neglect in an inhibitory task
(Rauch & Schmitt, 2009). Younger children are particularly inclined to goal neglect (Marcovitch et
al., 2010), and although this concept is separable from goal identification (Chevalier, 2015), there
is reason to suspect that cognitive fatigue might affect the latter process, and perhaps even more so
in children. Finally, such research would shed new lights on how cognitive fatigue affects cognitive
control in children as, so far, no study has addressed this question.
3.3 Contrasting children with low and high socio-economic status and need
for cross-cultural investigations
A major limitation of this dissertation is to have only tested children coming from middle to
high socio-economic status (SES), which makes our samples not representative of all children. Of
particular importance, school activities become increasingly self-directed with age (e.g., selecting
the relevant courses to work on when preparing for an exam without clear instructions from the
teacher) and engaging adaptive behaviours during these activities, and therefore engaging success-
ful self-directed control, is likely to predict future academic achievement. Research has shown
that SES is positively associated with externally-driven cognitive control, with children having the
higher SES engaging more efficient cognitive control whereas children with lower SES have poorer
externally-control capacities (Blakey et al., n.d.; Hackman, Gallop, Evans, & Farah, 2015; Lawson,
Hook, & Farah, 2018), especially in task-switching situations from a very young age (Clearfield
& Niman, 2012). As such, studying self-directed control in children with low SES should be a
priority. Indeed, children with lower SES are likely to have less access to autonomous activities not
supervised by adults such as reading or drawing, critical for practice of self-directed control (Barker
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et al., 2014), and might be engaged in more supervised activities with their siblings, as the higher
SES, the fewer number of siblings (Öberg, 2017). Thus, it is possible that academic achievement
is impaired, partly because of poor externally-driven control, but more critically because of self-
directed control. Future studies should investigate whether and how self-directed control predicts
academic achievement, and whether it does so over and beyond externally-driven control.
Further, it is important to note that our research has been conducted on children from highly
educated and relatively high income and industrialised populations, also refered to as W(estern),
E(ducated), I(ndustrialised), R(ich), D(emocratic) or WEIRD societies (Henrich, Heine, & Noren-
zayan, 2010) and comparisons between WEIRD. Whereas cognitive control performance in non-
WEIRD children are absent in influential reviews (e.g., Barkley, 2012; Best & Miller, 2010; Dia-
mond, 2013), there is a growing evidence that cognitive control and its development vary between
WEIRD and non-WEIRD populations. For instance, East Asian children outperform Western chil-
dren on measures of inhibition and cognitive flexibility (i.e., rule-switching flexibility; e.g., Lan,
Legare, Ponitz, Li, & Morrison, 2011; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). Conversely,
it has been recently reported that Western children outperform African children in rule-switching
flexibility Legare, Dale, Kim, and Deák (2018); Pope, Fagot, Meguerditchian, Washburn, and Hop-
kins (2019). However, these studies have used externally-driven tasks and the children tested had
little experience with direct instructions in learning, suggesting that these effects might be essen-
tially due to a lack of formal schooling. Interestingly, in some populations, autonomous behaviours
are more prominent in childhood than in Western countries (e.g., Bushman children, see Nielsen,
Tomaselli, Mushin, & Whiten, 2014). As such, it is not impossible that these children may perform
better in tasks requiring children to decide on their own what to do, despite lower SES.
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4 Conclusion
To conclude, here, I have attempted to investigate the underlying cognitive processes of self-
directed control, a form of control which is largely under-researched in the developmental literature
despite its increasing critical role in children’s daily lives, and more particularly at school. One po-
tential reason for the lack of investigations of self-directed control in children relies on the difficulty
to design experimental tasks aiming to examine this form of control by providing little guidance.
To overcome this difficulty, I modified the alternating-runs task-switching paradigm (Rogers &
Monsell, 1995), and adapted the voluntary task-switching paradigm (Arrington & Logan, 2004) for
use with children as young as 5 years-old. Doing so, I showed that goal identification is not only
key in externally-driven control (e.g., Chevalier et al., 2018), but also in self-directed control and
confirmed that this ability is the main source of difficulties when engaging cognitive control, espe-
cially for children (Chevalier, 2015). Critically, I claimed that goal identification and achievement
is made through two key sub-processes which are context-tracking and task selection, and reported
that progress in goal identification is mostly due to improvements in context-tracking rather than
task selection, the latter remaining difficult in self-directed situations even during late childhood.
While this confirms that self-directed control development lags behind externally-driven control de-
velopment, these findings offer the first step towards a theoretical model of the underlying cognitive
processes of self-directed control and their development in which future research should examine
how working memory and abstract representations account for developmental progress. Finally,
I hope that our results also provide key elements to encourage the elaboration of future training
programmes aiming to promote autonomous behaviours during childhood.
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